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Abstract
Purpose: Researchers have recently demonstrated interest in interpretive bias, the
tendency to interpret ambiguous information more negatively and/or less positively. The
extent to which interpretive biases influence the occurrence of life stressors and
potentially compound the negative effects of life stress in the development of depression
is presently unknown. Hence, the purpose of this study was to investigate interpretive
bias for ambiguous social information within the context of stress and depression. This
study examined interpretive bias in the context of two theoretically and empirically
supported models of depression – stress generation and diathesis-stress – to determine the
mechanism through which interpretive bias influences depression. Method: Two hundred
and seven young adult women participated in a two-wave prospective study. At Time 1,
participants were asked to complete two measures of interpretive bias—the Scrambled
Sentences Test and the Ambiguous Stories Task— as well as self-report questionnaires of
their current depressive symptoms and depression symptom history. Five weeks later,
participants were asked to complete a measure of their current depressive symptoms and
a life events questionnaire. Results: Consistent with expectations, multiple indices of
interpretive bias were directly predictive of Time 2 depression symptoms, over and above
the effects of Time 1 symptoms. Some evidence was found for a role of interpretive bias
in stress generation. In contrast to hypotheses, none of the interpretive bias variables
interacted with life stress to predict depressive symptoms at follow-up (diathesis-stress
model). Conclusion: Taken together, the findings suggest that a theoretically significant
role exists for interpretive biases in depression vulnerability. Additionally, these findings
offer initial evidence that individuals with a pre-existing cognitive vulnerability may be at
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risk of contributing to the occurrence of stressful life events in their lives. Future research
should examine interpretive biases in the context of interpersonal behaviours to
determine the specific pathways from interpretation of an ambiguous situation to stress
generation and/or depression.

Keywords: Interpretive Bias, Information Processing, Dysphoria, Depression, Stress,
Life Events, Stress Generation, Diathesis-Stress
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Introduction
According to findings from the Global Burden of Disease study, Major
Depressive Disorder (MDD) is the fourth leading cause of disease burden (e.g., disability
and mortality) and the leading cause of non-fatal burden worldwide (Üstün, AyusoMateos, Chatterji, Mathers, & Murray, 2004). In Canada, MDD affects more than 1.35
million people and accounts for $51 billion per year in direct treatment costs and indirect
costs of disability claims and lost productivity (Lim, Jacobs, Ohinmaa, Schopflocher, &
Dewa, 2008; Stephens & Joubert, 2001). By the year 2020, MDD is predicted to be
second only to ischemic heart disease in terms of its overall cost to society (Keller &
Boland, 1998; Lecrubier, 2001).
Major depression affects 2 to 4% of adults at any given moment (World Health
Organization [WHO] International Consortium in Psychiatric Epidemiology, 2000) and
between 12 and 25% of adults at some point in their lifetime (Kessler et al., 2005;
Kessler, Zhao, Blazer, & Swartz, 1997; Lewinsohn, Rohde, Seeley, & Fischer, 1991;
Patten et al., 2006). In Ontario alone, MDD affects 4.8% of the population over the age of
15 years, which translates into half a million people per year (Patten et al., 2006).
Women are twice as likely as men to experience a major depressive episode
during their lifetime (Kessler et al., 2003; Patten, 2000). This gender difference in the
prevalence and incidence rates of MDD emerges in early adolescence and remains
significant until older adulthood (Akhtar-Danesh & Landeen, 2007; Kessler et al., 2003;
Wade, Cairney, & Pevalin, 2002). Research has shown that the increased prevalence of
MDD among women as compared to men is primarily the result of a greater number of
first onsets of depression, and not the result of gender differences in duration of episodes
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or recurrence of depression (Eaton et al., 1997; Hankin et al., 1998; Keller & Shapiro,
1981; Kessler, McGonagle, Swartz, Blazer, & Nelson, 1993; Kovacs, 2001). Hence, it is
critically important to understand the factors that may make women especially
susceptible to the development of MDD.
Introduction to the Current Study and Conceptual Framework
The present study investigated one potential information processing risk factor for
depression – interpretive bias – within the context of life stress in a sample of young
women. Interpretive bias refers to the tendency to impose more negative interpretations
on ambiguous information (e.g., Lawson, MacLeod, & Hammond, 2002). This cognitive
tendency may play a causal role in the onset and maintenance of depression (Gotlib &
Joormann, 2010; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). A basic conceptual model outlining the
primary variables of interest is depicted in Figure 1. In the proposed conceptual model,
interpretive biases are based upon an individual’s pre-existing vulnerabilities (e.g.,
genetic, neurobiological, temperamental, personality, cognitive, social) and previous life
experiences (e.g., victimization, trauma), and are influenced by other information
processing biases that the individual possesses (e.g., attention, memory, inhibition; A.
Byrne & Eysenck, 1993; Chan, Goodwin, & Harmer, 2007; M. W. Eysenck, MacLeod, &
Mathews, 1987; Gibb, Schofield, & Coles, 2009; Rijsdijk et al., 2009; Rusting, 1998).
For example, both attention biases towards threat-relevant stimuli and memory biases for
negative information would influence how someone interprets ambiguity (Ingram,
Steidtmann, & Bistricky, 2008; White, Suway, Pine, Bar-Haim, & Fox, 2011; Wisco &
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2011). To date, there has been limited research examining interpretive
bias relative to other forms of information processing (e.g., attention, memory) in the
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Pre-Existing
Vulnerabilities
and Previous
Experiences

Information
Processing Biases
(e.g., memory,
attention, inhibition)
Interpretive
Bias

Life Stress

Depression

Figure 1. Conceptual research model situating interpretive bias within the context of life
stress and depression. Note. Bolded items are the variables of interest in the current
investigation. Dashed lines indicate unique pathways investigated in the current study.
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context of depression, despite the fact that it may be an independent contributor to
depression (Rude, Durham-Fowler, Baum, Rooney, & Maestas, 2010). At the same time,
limited research has examined interpretive bias within the context of life stressors or life
events – a well-known precipitant to the onset of dysphoria and depression (Hammen,
2005; Mazure, 1998). Previous research suggests that cognitive factors influence the
occurrence of life stressors, indirectly contributing to depression, and also interact with
stressful life experiences, directly causing depression (for reviews, see Hammen, 2005,
2006; Liu & Alloy, 2010). However, interpretive bias has never been investigated in
relation to the occurrence of life stressors, and no one has examined how these variables
interact or influence each other in the development of depression (Ingram et al., 2008).
Negatively biased interpretations may contribute to the creation of stressful life
circumstances directly, and have an indirect influence on depression through the
generation of life stressors (stress generation/mediation model). Alternately, biased
interpretation of ambiguous stimuli may cause depression directly in the context of life
stressors (diathesis-stress/interactional/moderation model). Because of these unexplored
questions, the main objective of this dissertation research was to examine interpretive
bias, life stress, and depression, in a prospective design.
In the following sections, cognitive theories of depression are reviewed as an
overall framework for understanding the role of information processing biases in
depression. Subsequent to that, a brief summary of the existing research on information
processing biases in depression, and a comprehensive review of the interpretive bias
literature, are provided. After discussing the extant research on interpretive bias and
depression, the role of stress in depression is examined. Two models incorporating stress
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in depression—stress generation and diathesis-stress— are then discussed, and the
hypothetical role of interpretive bias is situated within each of those proposed models.
The final sections outline the rationale for the current study and provide a description of
the specific study objectives and hypotheses.
Cognitive Theories of Depression
A vast body of research has tested the central tenets of cognitive theories of
depression (e.g., Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989; Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale,
1978; Beck, 1967, 1976; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Teasdale, 1983, 1988). According to
these theories, various cognitive constructs, including perception, attention, recall,
recognition, conceptualization, interpretation, and judgement, have an impact on the
development, maintenance, and remission of depression (Ingram, Miranda, & Segal,
1998). Each model situates the role of cognition at a different point, but they all define
cognitive vulnerability to depression as an internal, stable characteristic of an individual
that places him or her at risk for developing depression following the occurrence of
stressful life events (Ingram et al., 1998). Hence, these models are diathesis-stress models
(i.e., interactional/moderation models), in that maladaptive cognition contributes to the
development of depression only in the context of stressful life circumstances. In other
words, the presence of both a cognitive vulnerability factor and life stressors is required
to lead to depression.
Information processing bias and depression. Depression is characterized by
cognition biases in information processing that are hypothesized to play a causal role in
the onset and maintenance of disorder (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Mathews & MacLeod,
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2005). Such biases1 in attention, memory, interpretation, intrusive ideation, and inhibitory
control for emotional information have been reported in both children and adults (for
reviews, see Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Leppänen, 2006; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005;
Peckham, McHugh, & Otto, 2010; Yiend, 2010). Specifically, process-based models of
depression have shown that there are significant attentional biases toward negative
information and away from positive stimuli. However, stimuli may need to be selfreferent or mood-congruent, and presentation durations may need to be longer ( ≥ 1,000
ms) to allow for elaborative stimulus processing (Leppänen, 2006; Mathews & MacLeod,
2005; Mogg & Bradley, 2005; Peckham et al., 2010; Yiend, 2010). Furthermore, there
are relatively consistent memory biases characteristic of depression. In particular,
individuals with dysphoria or depression show enhanced memory for negative
information compared to neutral and positive information, whereas non-dysphoric
participants or healthy controls show enhanced memory for positive information
compared to neutral and negative information (Bower, 1981; Bradley, Mogg, &
Williams, 1995; Denny & Hunt, 1992; Derry & Kuiper, 1981; Ellwart, Rinck, & Becker,
2003).
While the majority of research has focused on the memory and attentional biases
specific to depression, less empirical attention has been paid to interpretive biases (Gotlib
& Joormann, 2010; Ingram et al., 2008; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Mineka, Rafaeli, &
Yovel, 2009). However, many emotional and behavioural reactions are at least partially
1

The term “bias” is used throughout this document to denote a tendency to process information in a way
that favours a particular emotional valence or meaning. It does not refer to the accuracy or inaccuracy of
those information processing tendencies in reflecting objective reality, or suggest a dysfunctional
characteristic of the individual in possession of the particular bias. In fact, everyone has biases in some
form or another. For example, individuals who are emotionally stable have positively biased interpretations
in ambiguous social contexts (Hirsch & Mathews, 1997, 2000).

7
mediated by the perceptions, thoughts, and interpretations an individual generates
concerning a given event or situation (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1992). In many ways,
interpretation is one of several higher-level cognitive processes, along with judgement,
decision-making, and reasoning, that influence a person’s reactions to a given stimuli
(Blanchette & Richards, 2010). At the same time, numerous everyday situations are
ambiguous and can be interpreted in multiple ways. Ambiguity, for the purposes of this
research, was defined as a situation involving a certain degree of uncertainty or
vagueness that lends itself to multiple interpretations or meanings. Each possible
interpretation or meaning may have a different emotional valence or consequence on
affect, behaviour, or cognition. In the sensory domain, a slight touch on the skin could
signal a mosquito bite (negative interpretation) or a strand of hair falling on the skin
(benign interpretation; Blanchette & Richards, 2010). In the social realm, a friend who
walks past you without acknowledging you might be understood to be ignoring you
(negative interpretation) or preoccupied (benign interpretation; Holmes, Mathews,
Dalgleish, & Mackintosh, 2006). In communication, a written or spoken sentence could
be construed as sarcastically intended (negative interpretation) or taken at face value
(benign interpretation; Blanchette & Richards, 2010). Examining interpretive bias in the
context of depression may provide a way to understand how the integral cognitive
process of interpretation relates to and/or plays a causal role in the development of a
significant emotional disturbance. The existing literature on interpretive bias in
depression is reviewed in the following sections.
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Interpretive Bias and Depression
As stated earlier, interpretive bias generally refers to the tendency to impose more
negative and/or less positive/benign interpretations on ambiguous stimuli, situations, and
events (e.g., Lawson et al., 2002; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997).
Cognitive theories of depression would suggest that individuals vulnerable to depression
or experiencing a depressive mood state should show an increased tendency to impose
negative interpretations on ambiguous information due to underlying negative cognitive
structures that influence information processing (e.g., Beck, 1967, 1987). In fact,
previous research has suggested that depressed mood can influence how people interpret
events, resulting in selective attention to negative aspects of social situations (Dodge,
1993). Despite this theoretical claim, research on interpretive bias has been somewhat
mixed with respect to whether or not an interpretive bias exists in dysphoria and
depression. Researchers have used various methodologies and paradigms to determine if
and how interpretive biases relate to depression and dysphoric mood states.
Several studies have found evidence that depression is characterized by the
presence of an interpretive bias. In their seminal work, Butler and Mathews (1983)
presented participants with ambiguous written scenarios and asked them to rank order
three interpretations in the order that they would most likely come to mind in a similar
situation. Compared to non-depressed control participants, patients with clinical
depression demonstrated a tendency to rank negative response options as more likely to
come to mind. Other studies using questionnaire-based methods requiring participants to
choose between alternative interpretations of ambiguous scenarios have yielded similar
results in adults with clinical depression and elevated symptoms of depression (Nunn,
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Mathews, & Trower, 1997; Voncken, Bögels, & Peeters, 2007). In children, similar
methodologies have been used, including ambiguous story cards (Dineen & Hadwin,
2004) and ambiguous scenarios (Eley et al., 2008) with forced-choice interpretation
options. These studies have found further evidence for an association between negative
interpretations of scenarios and stories, and depressive symptoms, in children.
Other studies have applied homonym paradigms borrowed from the anxiety
disorders literature. For example, Mogg and colleagues (2006) used a homophone task
that required respondents to write down a list of orally presented words that included
homophones (each with a negative and a non-negative meaning; e.g., die/dye, weak/week)
and neutral filler words. Compared to control participants, outpatients with clinical
depression made more negative interpretations on the homophone task (Mogg et al.,
2006). In contrast, other studies have found no association between self-reported
depressive symptoms and negative interpretations using a similar homophone task (Pury,
2002). Using a similar methodology adapted for young children, Eley and colleagues
(2008) asked participants to listen to a homophone word (e.g., mug, leaves, patient) and
then provide a sentence that used that word which was recorded and coded. Increased
depressive symptoms were significantly related to greater numbers of negative
interpretations of ambiguous homophones in 8-year-olds, even after controlling for
anxiety symptoms (Eley et al., 2008). Another study used a homograph task in which
participants were asked to generate an interpretation of an ambiguous single word, such
as “break” (broken/rest) or “sentence” (prison/phrase). In this case, no differences were
found in the frequency of positive or negative interpretations generated by high dysphoric
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and low dysphoric students (Holmes, Lang, Moulds, & Steele, 2008). Hence, homonym
paradigms are supported by evidence in clinical and youth, but not analogue, samples.
One disadvantage of these formats of interpretive bias assessments is that they
rely on participants’ self-report, which raises concerns about possible response biases and
demand characteristics (Lawson & MacLeod, 1999; MacLeod, 1993; MacLeod &
Mathews, 1991; Mathews & MacLeod, 1994). For instance, individuals with dysphoria or
depression may process both neutral/benign and negative interpretations of ambiguous
material, but endorse or select the latter more often than control participants due to a
reporting bias rather than an interpretive bias (Mogg et al., 2006; Wisco, 2009). This
possibility was supported in a study that examined depressed participants’ sucrose taste
sensitivity threshold using signal detection methods (Potts, Bennett, Kennedy, &
Vaccarino, 1997). Potts and colleagues (1997) found that response bias rather than true
differences in taste sensitivity were the cause of higher thresholds in individuals with
depression. Additionally, dysphoric participants generate significantly more negative
interpretations than do non-dysphoric participants, and are more likely to select a
negative interpretation from their generated list, even though both groups are able to
generate an equal number of possible interpretations for a given ambiguous situation
(Wisco & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010, 2011). Self-report measures are also influenced by
participants’ previous experiences and may be skewed because of anchoring and
overestimation biases (Rude, Wenzlaff, Gibbs, Vane, & Whitney, 2002).
To overcome limitations with these early methods of assessment, researchers have
developed alternate techniques and methodologies to assess interpretation that do not
require participants to endorse alternative response options. One information processing
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measure that has been frequently used to assess interpretive bias is the Scrambled
Sentences Task (SST; Wenzlaff, 1988, 1993). In this task, participants are asked to
construct a grammatically correct sentence using five out of the six words presented to
them in a nonsensical manner (e.g., good feel very bad I usually). Each sentence can be
unscrambled to form a negative sentence (e.g., I usually feel very bad) or positive/benign
sentence (e.g., I usually feel very good). Negative interpretive bias is inferred based on
the number of sentences a participant unscrambles using the negative solution, as a
proportion of the total number of sentence unscrambled. As would be expected,
currently-depressed individuals constructed a greater proportion of negative sentences
than do never-depressed or previously-depressed individuals (Hedlund & Rude, 1995).
Wenzlaff and colleagues (Hedlund & Rude, 1995; Rude, Covich, Jarrold, Hedlund, &
Zentner, 2001; Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998) hypothesized that biased information processing
patterns remain active in previously-depressed and currently dysphoric individuals, but
cannot be easily accessed using self-report measures because these individuals suppress
negative thoughts using mental control. Increasing the cognitive load (e.g., rehearsing a
series of numbers, counting aloud during the task) is believed to make volitional negative
thought suppression more difficult, rendering vulnerable participants more likely to
unscramble sentences using the negative solution. Indeed, dysphoric individuals were
more likely than non-dysphoric individuals to unscramble sentences in a negative way,
but only under cognitive load (Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998). Interestingly, individuals with a
history of major depression also tended to construct more negative sentences than did
never-depressed persons, providing further evidence that interpretive bias may linger
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even once depressive symptoms abate (Hedlund & Rude, 1995; Rude et al., 2001; Van
der Does, 2005; Watkins & Moulds, 2007).
Interpretation biases in depression have also been investigated using priming
paradigms. In a priming task, participants view an ambiguous prime stimulus and then an
unambiguous semantically related stimulus. This experimental technique assumes that a
particular meaning is activated in the participant’s mind when the ambiguous prime
stimuli are presented. Interpretive bias is inferred by the degree to which the prime
facilitates the processing of subsequent target words related to either possible prime
meaning. By measuring the response latency to read a negative or neutral associated
unambiguous stimulus, interpretive bias is calculated. In one of the first studies to use this
approach, Lawson and MacLeod (1999) compared participants who were high versus low
in depressive symptoms and who had been primed using a negative or positive Velten
mood induction procedure. These researchers presented individuals with ambiguous
sentences (e.g., The doctor examined little Emily’s growth), followed by either a negative
target word (e.g., tumour) or a neutral target word (e.g., height). Participants were asked
to read aloud the sentence and the word that followed as quickly and as accurately as
possible. In the case of a negative interpretation, response latencies for the negative target
word were expected to be faster than response latencies for the benign/neutral target
words, suggesting that the negative words were primed by the sentence. Unfortunately,
support was not found for this hypothesis. No evidence of naming facilitation for
negative target words was shown in the group of participants with elevated depressive
symptoms, whereas the group with fewer symptoms of depression demonstrated faster
reaction times (facilitation) in naming negative target words. Hence, contrary to
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expectations, participants with higher depressive symptomatology actually showed a
decreased tendency to attach a negative interpretation to ambiguous written stimuli when
compared to participants with lower depressive symptoms, and this effect held
irrespective of the mood manipulation condition (Lawson & MacLeod, 1999).
A second study replicated and extended Lawson and MacLeod’s (1999) semantic
priming task, but used a video and musical negative mood induction procedure (Bisson &
Sears, 2007). Instead of requiring participants to read the target words aloud, respondents
were asked to listen to the prime sentences presented auditorily, and then were asked to
make a lexical decision about whether the target was a word or non-word (yes/no
response) by pressing one of two buttons. Response latencies were measured from the
initial visual presentation of the target word until the participant’s button response.
Bisson and Sears (2007) found no response latency evidence for an interpretive bias, and
no differences in semantic priming effects between dysphoric and non-dysphoric
participants. In other words, dysphoric individuals were no more likely than nondysphoric individuals to impose a negative interpretation, and were no more and no less
likely to consider a positive interpretation, of the ambiguous prime sentences (Studies 1A
and 1B) even following a negative mood induction procedure (Study 2).
In a further modification of the priming paradigm, Mogg and colleagues (2006)
used a sample of clinically depressed adult outpatients and compared them to matched
non-depressed control participants. In their priming task, participants were initially
presented with a negative (e.g., death) or benign/positive (e.g., marriage) word before the
ambiguous sentence (e.g., Carol felt emotionally throughout the service). The response
duration for participants to read aloud a continuation sentence was recorded. The final
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sentence was a logical continuation of the ambiguous sentence, and was either negative
(e.g., Funerals always made her cry) or benign/positive (e.g., Weddings always made her
cry). The study authors hypothesized that faster reading latency for the negative
continuation sentences would indicate a negative interpretive bias (i.e., facilitated
processing of negative endings primed by the initial word and ambiguous sentence).
Once more, the study failed to find support for a negative interpretive bias in depressed
outpatients using this priming task (Mogg et al., 2006). Patients with depression did not
differ from control participants in their reaction time responses to continuation sentences,
irrespective of the prime cue word type, other than being slower across all conditions
(benign, negative, and no cue).
Taken together, these results suggest that there may not be a depression-related
negative interpretive bias measurable in response times to ambiguous sentences.
However, these null findings may be due to the type of ambiguous stimuli used in the
studies. Because the negative self-schema is integral to depression (Dozois & Beck,
2008), self-referent content may be necessary for appropriately exploring depressive
cognitions, especially interpretive biases (Wisco, 2009). In fact, individuals with
depression show stronger interpretive biases when presented with self-referent material
than when presented with general or other-referent material (Dineen & Hadwin, 2004;
Hertel & El-Messidi, 2006; Wisco & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010; see Wisco, 2009 for a
review).
Bearing this criticism in mind, researchers have further attempted to examine
response latencies as an index of interpretive bias using self-referent stimuli (Dearing &
Gotlib, 2009; Sears, Bisson, & Nielsen, 2011). One sample that is known to be
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particularly at-risk for developing depression is the children of mothers who themselves
have been depressed (Goodman, 2007; Goodman & Gotlib, 1999). Previous research has
shown that children of mothers with depression display depressotypic information
processing and cognitive vulnerabilities when compared to daughters of never-depressed
mothers (Hammen, 1988; Hammen & Goodman-Brown, 1990; Ingram & Ritter, 2000;
Jaenicke et al., 1987; Murray, Woolgar, Cooper, & Hipwell, 2001; Taylor & Ingram,
1999). Dearing and Gotlib (2009) were the first researchers to examine interpretive bias
comparing 10- to 14-year-old never-disordered daughters of mothers with histories of
recurrent major depression (high risk) and daughters of never-disordered mothers (low
risk). These researchers compared interpretations of ambiguous stories using a priming
paradigm in which participants were presented with three sentence self-referential
scenarios (e.g., In math class, you are given time to work on an extra credit problem. You
read the problem carefully but can’t figure out how to start it, so you decide to ask your
teacher for help. As you ask for help, you’re sure your teacher will think you are
____________) that remained ambiguous until the last word of the third sentence. The
final word was either negative (e.g., dumb), benign (e.g., hardworking), or grammatically
impossible (e.g., death), and participants were asked to indicate if the word was a
grammatically possible ending to the story (yes/no response). In the case of a negative
interpretation bias, response latencies for the negative words were expected to be faster
than response latencies for the benign words or grammatically impossible story endings,
suggestive that the negative interpretations were primed by the scenarios. High risk
daughters were more likely than low risk daughters to interpret ambiguous stories
negatively (i.e., showed faster reaction times for negative endings; Dearing & Gotlib,
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2009). This study provides some support that interpretive biases may be present prior to
the onset of depressive disorders in at-risk populations, suggesting that it may be a latent
risk factor. However, this study did not examine interpretive bias in currently dysphoric
or depressed samples.
Sears and colleagues (2011) utilized self-referent stimuli in a semantic relatedness
task. Similar to their earlier study (Bisson & Sears, 2007), participants were asked to
listen to ambiguous sentences (e.g., My boyfriend said that I am unlike his past
girlfriends), and required to respond to target words that were either related to negative
(jealous), positive (attractive), or neutral (relationship) interpretations of the sentence or
were unrelated (democracy). Respondents were asked to indicate whether or not the
target word was related to the prime sentence (yes/no response). It was expected that a
negative interpretive bias would be revealed as faster response latencies and lower error
rates for target words related to negative interpretations of the prime sentences. Contrary
to hypotheses, dysphoric participants did not show faster reaction times for negative
target words relative to non-dysphoric participants, and instead showed consistently
slower reaction times across all targets (Sears et al., 2011). The authors further examined
participants’ error rates for failing to detect that the ambiguous prime sentence and target
word were related. Dysphoric participants were more likely than non-dysphoric
participants to miss targets related to positive interpretations and less likely to miss
targets related to negative interpretation. These findings suggest that dysphoria is related
to an increased tendency to interpret the ambiguous primes in a negative manner and
decreased tendency to interpret the ambiguous primes in a positive manner (Sears et al.,
2011).
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In summary, it remains unclear whether interpretive bias can be assessed reliably
in depression. Studies using ambiguous scenarios with forced-choice options or
homonym paradigms, while demonstrating the most consistent support, also seem most
open to response bias (Butler & Mathews, 1983; Dineen & Hadwin, 2004; Eley et al.,
2008; Mogg et al., 2006; Nunn et al., 1997; Voncken et al., 2007; for exceptions see
Holmes et al., 2008; Pury, 2002). The SST has had consistent success in revealing
differences in clinical and non-clinical samples, yet has not been widely adopted beyond
certain research groups (Hedlund & Rude, 1995; Rude et al., 2001; Wenzlaff & Bates,
1998). Response latency indices have shown no support for an interpretive bias in
dysphoria and depression using non-self-referent stimuli (Bisson & Sears, 2007; Lawson
& MacLeod, 1999; Mogg et al., 2006), but more promising results are obtained when
self-referent stimuli are utilized (Dearing & Gotlib, 2009; Sears et al., 2011). However,
further research is required to determine if and how interpretive bias may be related to
stress and changes in mood state over time.
Interpretive bias as a causal factor in depression. Aside from the equivocal
nature of the cross-sectional research that has attempted to characterize interpretive bias
in depression, there are theoretical reasons to predict that interpretive biases may lead to a
worsening of emotional states, particularly when repeated over time (e.g., Beck & Clark,
1991). Specifically, cognitive theory of depression posits that activation of enduring
latent cognitive template or representation of the self, referred to as the self-schema, leads
to negative information processing biases (e.g., attention, memory, interpretation,
inhibition) which may initiate and/or maintain a dysphoric mood state, leading to greater
negative thinking and worsening depressed mood (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; D.
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A. Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Over time, this reciprocal
exchange of negative information processing and the accompanying negative mood state
lead to the downward spiral of depression.
According to cognitive theories, stressful life events are the trigger that activates
these latent cognitive vulnerabilities, in a diathesis-stress relationship (Abramson et al.,
1989, 1978; Beck, 1967, 1976; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Teasdale, 1983, 1988).
However, the criteria for what constitutes a stressful life event may shift over the course
of an individual’s life. For example, vulnerable individuals may become sensitized to
stress over time, such that less life stress is required to trigger depressogenic cognitive
patterns and the accompanying increases in dysphoria and onset of a depressive episode
(Monroe & Harkness, 2005). This especially may be the case in instances where major
life stressors occurred during childhood (Espejo et al., 2007; Hammen, Henry, & Daley,
2000; Harkness, Bruce, & Lumley, 2006). A lowered threshold could lead to more
frequent activation of negative information processing biases (i.e., interpretive bias) in
the face of daily experiences (e.g., not getting an expected raise at work, being stuck in a
traffic jam) and their accompanying negative mood state. Hence, major life events may
not be required to trigger negative interpretive bias in the downward spiral to depression;
daily experiences may be sufficient in and of themselves.
In addition, vulnerable individuals may also perceive a wider range of events as
stressful, leading to increased numbers of potential triggers for depressogenic information
processing (Ingram et al., 1998). Repeated activation of negative interpretations of
ambiguous events may lead individuals to develop a well-practiced tendency to view
ambiguity in a negative light, such that they then perceive nonthreatening events as
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stressful. When repeated on a day-to-day basis, these misperceptions help to selfperpetuate the negative interpretations (Hill, Lewicki, Czyzewska, & Boss, 1989; Hill,
Lewicki, & Neubauer, 1991; Lewicki, Hill, & Sasaki, 1989) and could lead to dysphoric
emotional reactions and/or trigger other depressogenic cognitive vulnerabilities (e.g.,
rumination) and the onset of depression.
Hence, over brief and longer duration longitudinal designs, one might find that
interpretive bias predicts increases in depressive symptoms and/or the onset of a major
depressive episode. For example, during the course of an experiment, dysphoric
participants experienced increased negative mood in response to generating and selecting
interpretations to ambiguity for self-referent situations (Wisco & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010,
2011). Similarly, evidence shows that interpretive bias, as assessed by the SST, predicts
increases in depressive symptoms over a four to six week period, controlling for past and
concurrent depression (Rude et al., 2002). Furthermore, interpretive bias is predictive of
the onset of clinically significant major depressive episodes over an 18 to 28 month
follow-up period, controlling for baseline self-reported depressive symptoms and worst
lifetime symptoms (Rude, Valdez, Odom, & Ebrahimi, 2003; Rude et al., 2010). Hence,
there is some evidence that interpretive bias predicts negative shifts in mood and the
onset of clinically significant episodes of depressive episodes over varying durations.
Although the results of such prospective studies are encouraging, they are not
definitive regarding the causal status of interpretive bias in the mediation of depression
vulnerability. In theory, it is possible that both the information processing tendency
manifested as interpretive bias and emotional vulnerability to depression may represent
independent correlates of another third factor (such as neuroticism or negative affectivity;
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Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). Such an association would provide the impression that
interpretive bias has predictive validity, without necessarily causal significance. A more
powerful test as to whether or not interpretive bias plays a causal role in vulnerability to
depression comes from experimental studies that directly manipulate interpretations and
then observe the impact of such manipulations on emotion (for reviews, see Mathews &
MacLeod, 1994, 2005). As an alternate paradigm for exploring interpretive bias, some
researchers have sought to experimentally manipulate and test whether particular forms
of interpretive bias can be trained. In these cognitive bias modification of interpretation
(CBM-I) paradigms, participants are intentionally trained to limit interpretations of
ambiguous information in a particular direction (positive or negative; Grey & Mathews,
2000; Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000; Tran, Hertel, & Joormann, 2011; for reviews, see
Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; Field & Lester, 2010). With sufficient practice, it is believed
that habitual biases in interpretation will generalize to novel ambiguous information (Hill
et al., 1989, see 1991; Lewicki et al., 1989 for details of the self-perpetuation of
interpretation biases). Indeed, several studies of positive interpretation training have been
able to increase positive affect and increase subsequent positive interpretations of
ambiguity in adults and adolescents (Holmes, Lang, & Shah, 2009; Holmes et al., 2006;
Lothmann, Holmes, Chan, & Lau, 2011; Salemink & Wiers, 2011; Standage, Ashwin, &
Fox, 2010; Tran et al., 2011), with some preliminary evidence emerging in child samples
(Muris, Huijding, Mayer, & Hameetman, 2008; Muris, Huijding, Mayer, Remmerswaal,
& Vreden, 2009). The results of these studies suggest that interpretive biases are directly
associated with mood state and are modifiable. Interestingly, many of these studies use
the SST as an index of interpretive bias (e.g., Holmes et al., 2009; Standage et al., 2010).
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Therapeutically, repeated sessions of CBM-I have also shown promise at helping to
improve mood, interpretive bias, and mental health in persons with current clinical
depression (Blackwell & Holmes, 2010).
Interpretive bias and the role of stress. The prospective and CBM-I studies
suggest that interpretive bias may be a causal vulnerability factor for depression. Beyond
this inference, there is also suggestion of a potential role of environmental context in
helping to explain how interpretive bias may contribute to the development of dysphoria
and depression. For example, there is evidence from CBM-I studies that the modification
of interpretive bias can also lead to attenuated emotional reactivity when experiencing
subsequent stressors. Specifically, in cases where participants were trained to interpret
ambiguity in a nonthreatening or positive way, there is evidence of attenuated emotional
reactions following subsequent video stressors or imagined social situations (Lester,
Mathews, Davison, Burgess, & Yiend, 2011; Mackintosh, Mathews, Yiend, Ridgeway, &
Cook, 2006; Wilson, MacLeod, Mathews, & Rutherford, 2006). Additionally, there is
evidence that training positive biases using imagery buffered the impact of a negative
mood induction procedure in a nonclinical sample (Holmes et al., 2009). These CBM-I
studies provide support for a protective influence of positive interpretations in preventing
or alleviating the expected negative effects of stressors. On the other hand, the tendency
to interpret ambiguous homonyms in a more negative manner predicted later dysphoric
reactions in response to school examination stress one month later (Pury, 2002). Hence,
there may be an interactional/moderation role (diathesis-stress model) for interpretive
bias in the context of stress. More specifically, negative interpretive bias in the context of
stress may contribute to dysphoric reactions. Likewise, the absence of negative
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interpretive bias may attenuate or buffer against stress’s adverse consequences on mood.
This hypothesis is consistent with the previously described cognitive diathesis-stress
theory (interactional/moderation models), which proposes that individuals with particular
cognitive tendencies will interpret and react to stressful life events in ways which
increase the likelihood of developing depression (e.g., Abramson et al., 1989; Beck,
1987).
At the same time, an individual’s exposure to stressors does not appear to be
completely due to chance or fate (Hammen, 2006). Rather than viewing individuals as
passive recipients of life experiences, one can view them as active participants in
selecting or avoiding specific situations or environments, and evoking certain responses
from others around them (Buss, 1987; Hammen, 1991; Magnus, Diener, Fujita, & Pavot,
1993). Stress generation theory (mediation model) suggests that vulnerable individuals
act in ways that inadvertently cause more stressful life experiences, and further worsen
their mood (Hammen, 1991; see also Alloy, Liu, & Bender, 2010; Hammen, 2006; Liu &
Alloy, 2010, for reviews). Hence, there may be a place for interpretive bias to act as the
vulnerability factor that influences the generation of and/or interacts with life stress to
predict depression. In the following sections, prior research on the relationship between
stress and depression is reviewed, with particular focus on the role of cognitive
vulnerabilities in stress generation and diathesis-stress models. Following this overview,
the objectives of the current study are highlighted which situate interpretive bias as the
cognitive vulnerability factor under examination.
Stress and Depression
The association between stressful life events and depression has been a focus of
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research for some time. Depression is known to be a frequent outcome of exposure to
stress (Brown & Harris, 1978; Hammen, 2005; Kessler, 1997); however, this relationship
is not always consistent (e.g., Rutter, 2000). The vast majority of individuals with
depression report having experienced acute stressors immediately prior to the onset of
their depressive episode (Horesh, Klomek, & Apter, 2008; Mazure, 1998; Stroud, Davila,
& Moyer, 2008). In particular, women report significantly more life events prior to the
onset of depression than do men (Harkness et al., 2010). Nonetheless, not all individuals
who experience a stressful life event go on to develop a depression, suggesting that there
may be individual vulnerability factors (e.g., temperamental or personality
characteristics, genetic factors, depressogenic cognitive styles) which make some people
more susceptible to the negative impact of stressors. In fact, only 20% to 50% of
individuals who experience a significant negative life event develop clinically significant
levels of depression (Goodyer, Tamplin, Herbert, & Altham, 2000; Lewinsohn et al.,
1994). Furthermore, as stress generation theory suggests, individuals may be at increased
risk of contributing to and/or causing the occurrence of stressors in their lives due to
similar pre-existing vulnerability factors (Hammen, 1991, 2005, 2006). In particular,
there is evidence that women experience higher levels of stressful life events, especially
in the interpersonal area, than men (Hankin, Mermelstein, & Roesch, 2007; Kendler,
Thornton, & Prescott, 2001; Shih, Eberhart, Hammen, & Brennan, 2006). Thus, stress
and depression (or depressogenic vulnerabilities) likely share a transactional,
bidirectional relation (Alloy et al., 2010). Stress may be a strongly implicated factor in
the development of depression; however, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to cause
depression without some other form of underlying vulnerability (Hankin & Abela, 2005).

24
In some instances, a diathesis-stress relationship exists wherein pre-existing
vulnerabilities interact with the occurrence of stressors to produce depression
(interactional/moderation model). In other cases, pre-existing vulnerabilities may lead to
the generation of stressors, which in turn predict depression (stress generation/mediation
model). Examining the possible convergence of these perspectives may provide insight
into how interpretive bias leads to dysphoria and depression in women over time.
Stress Generation and Depression
The stress-generation hypothesis was originally investigated in relation to clinical
depression, and deemed a potential mechanism for explaining the maintenance and
recurrence of the disorder (Hammen, 1991, 1992). Compared to individuals without a
psychiatric history, or those who experienced a first onset of the disorder, individuals
with a history of depression reported a higher frequency and/or severity of life events that
were (at least partially) dependent or contingent on their own behaviour (e.g., fired from
job, break up with romantic partner). At the same time, the frequency and severity of
events which were independent, fateful or non-contingent, (e.g., grandparent died,
earthquake) did not differ among individuals with a history, in their first episode or
without a history of depression (Brostedt & Pedersen, 2003; Chun, Cronkite, & Moos,
2004; Cui & Vaillant, 1997; Daley et al., 1997; Hammen, 1991; Harkness, Monroe,
Simons, & Thase, 1999; Holahan, Moos, Holahan, Brennan, & Schutte, 2005; Rudolph et
al., 2000; Williamson, Birmaher, Anderson, Al-Shabbout, & Ryan, 1995). This result has
been replicated in samples of both adults (Chun et al., 2004; Hammen, 1991; Harkness et
al., 1999; Potthoff, Holahan, & Joiner, 1995) and youth (Daley et al., 1997; Davila,
Hammen, Burge, Paley, & Daley, 1995; Rudolph et al., 2000; Rudolph, Flynn, Abaied,
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Groot, & Thompson, 2009; Williamson et al., 1995) with diagnosed depression or
interview-rated subclinical levels of depressive symptoms.
More recently, researchers have begun to distinguish between stress generation
that results from the spectrum of depressive symptoms or syndrome versus that which
results from other factors, such as genetics, personality factors, life stressors,
interpersonal behaviour patterns, and cognitive vulnerabilities (for reviews, see Alloy et
al., 2010; Hammen, 2006; Liu & Alloy, 2010). For example, it has been well-established
that genetic factors play a significant aetiological role in exposure to dependent life
events, but not independent life events (Bemmels, Burt, Legrand, Iacono, & McGue,
2008; Kendler, Karkowski, & Prescott, 1999; Kendler & Karkowski-Shuman, 1997;
Rijsdijk et al., 2001). Research also suggests that a large proportion of the genetic
association between dependent stressors and risk of depression may be mediated by
enduring personality characteristics, such as neuroticism, extraversion, and openness to
experiences (Billig, Hershberger, Iacono, & McGue, 1996; Saudino, Pedersen,
Lichtenstein, McClearn, & Plomin, 1997). Past experiences with stressful experiences,
such as chronic stressors or childhood maltreatment, also are implicated in the generation
of subsequent life events (Daley et al., 1997; Hammen, Kim, Eberhart, & Brennan, 2009;
Harkness et al., 2006). At the same time, there are several interpersonal factors that are
predictive of stress generation, including insecure attachment styles, excessive
reassurance seeking, and sociotropy/dependency (Bottonari, Roberts, Kelly, Kashdan, &
Ciesla, 2007; Eberhart & Hammen, 2009; Hankin, Kassel, & Abela, 2005; Nelson,
Hammen, Daley, Burge, & Davila, 2001; Potthoff et al., 1995; Shahar, Joiner, Zuroff, &
Blatt, 2004; Shahar & Priel, 2003; Shih, 2006; Shih, Abela, & Starrs, 2009; Shih &
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Auerbach, 2010).
Integrating this broadened application of the stress-generation hypothesis with the
genetic, personality, cognitive, and interpersonal theories yields a new framework
whereby individuals may be not only more reactive to stressors, but may also play a role
in creating those very stressors through their thoughts, behaviours, interpersonal
interactions, and situations they select (Caspi & Shiner, 2006; Kendler & KarkowskiShuman, 1997; Shih et al., 2009; Simons, Angell, Monroe, & Thase, 1993). Individuals
with a pre-existing vulnerability to depression may be generating the stressors which will
activate their vulnerability in a diathesis-stress context (e.g., Hankin & Abramson, 2001;
Hankin, Kassel, et al., 2005; Shih, 2006). Individuals with a pre-existing cognitive
vulnerability may be at risk of causing stressful life events in their lives and may be more
reactive to those events when they do occur (Shih & Auerbach, 2010).
Stress generation and cognitive vulnerabilities to depression. Notwithstanding
the substantial evidence supporting the stress generation effect based on depressive
symptoms/syndrome, genetics, personality, and interpersonal factors, researchers have
now begun to explore what specific cognitive vulnerability factors might contribute to the
generation of stressful life events. Numerous cognitive variables have been suggested as
potential mechanisms explaining the generation of stress in depression-prone individuals.
In this context, a handful of studies have examined the main cognitive factors proposed
by cognitive theories of depression (Abramson et al., 1978; Beck, 1987; NolenHoeksema, 1991). To date, however, no one has examined information processing biases,
such as interpretive bias, in the context of stress generation.
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In the earliest of the studies exploring cognitive predictors of stress generation,
Simons and colleagues (1993) examined the cross-sectional relationships among two
cognitive vulnerability factors – dysfunctional attitudes from Beck’s cognitive model
(1987) and attributional/inferential styles from hopelessness theory (Abramson et al.,
1978) – and life events as assessed by both subjective self-report and objective interviewbased methods in a sample of participants experiencing clinical depression. Interpersonal
and achievement attributions predicted a greater number of interview-derived dependent
life events in the year prior to the onset of the index depressive episode, particularly for
those individuals experiencing their first onset. Dysfunctional attitudes in the domain of
achievement were significant predictors of self-reported achievement events, controlling
for current self-reported depressive symptoms and objective stress. This relationship did
not hold for interpersonal events or when using attributional style as a predictor.
Prospective studies have also attempted to examine the role of various cognitive
vulnerabilities in the generation of life stress. Using a high-risk sample of children of
mood-disordered parents, Shih and colleagues (2009) found that children’s “weakest
link” score on inferential style (i.e., children’s highest standardized subscale score or
most depressogenic inferential style) predicted dependent interpersonal stress over a one
year follow-up (as assessed by a combination of self-report and interview-based
measures). In this study, “weakest link” inferential style did not predict level of
independent stress, consistent with predictions of stress generation theory. In contrast,
using a college sample Gibb and colleagues (2006) found no evidence that inferential
style prospectively predicted subsequent stress over a six-week period. Thus, although
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there is some support for the role of attributional/inferential styles in stress generation,
the prospective research findings are mixed.
Studies examining rumination as the cognitive vulnerability factor of interest have
found more consistent support for a stress generation effect. In a multi-wave study of
undergraduate students, Flynn and colleagues (2010) explored the role of depressive
rumination in the generation of life stress, and their prospective contribution to
depressive symptoms over a 27-month period. Depressive rumination was defined as the
tendency to passively and repetitively focus on the experience of negative moods, as well
as their causes and consequences (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow,
1991). Consistent with the stress generation hypothesis, depressive rumination was
predictive of dependent interpersonal stress and dependent achievement stress, but not
independent life events. A similar multi-wave study with adolescents found that higher
levels of rumination were associated with a greater number of negative events in the
future, and that rumination levels moderated the impact of negative events on the
development of subsequent depressive symptoms and episodes (i.e., diathesis-stress
model; Abela & Hankin, 2011).
Studies using composite measures of cognitive vulnerabilities have also explored
stress generational models in undergraduates and adolescents. One study, which utilized
an interview-based measure of life events, found that undergraduate women with a more
negative cognitive style (a composite measure combining attributional/inferential style
and dysfunctional attitudes) experienced a greater number of dependent and interpersonal
life events over a 6-month period than did women with a more positive cognitive style, or
men with any form of cognitive style (Safford, Alloy, Abramson, & Crossfield, 2007).
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Cognitive style was not related to the occurrence of independent or achievement-related
life events. This pattern of relationships remained consistent, even when participants with
current or past depression diagnoses were excluded from the analyses, providing stronger
support for the link between cognitive vulnerability to depression and stress generation.
Likewise, Kercher and Rapee (2009) tested an integrated diathesis-stress generation
model using a large community sample of young adolescents. Consistent with the stress
generation hypothesis, initial cognitive vulnerability (a composite measure combining
negative attributional/ inferential style and ruminative response style) predicted
dependent stressors at follow-up. This composite score also interacted with stressors to
predict depressive symptoms at 6-month follow-up, partially mediating the relation
between baseline and follow-up depression (i.e., diathesis-stress/interactional/moderation
model).
Many of these abovementioned studies, however, were limited because they failed
to fully test the stress generation model (Abela & Hankin, 2011; Auerbach, Eberhart, &
Abela, 2010; Gibb et al., 2006; Kercher & Rapee, 2009). More specifically, these
researchers failed to differentiate between events that were dependent as opposed to
independent of the participants’ behaviour, or did not test the whether the cognitive
variable(s) of interest uniquely predicted dependent life stress but not independent life
stress. Research has consistently shown that individuals with depression or those who are
vulnerable to depression are exposed to a greater number of life stressors (e.g., Fergusson
& Horwood, 1987; Magnus et al., 1993; Patton, Coffey, Posterino, Carlin, & Bowes,
2003; Van Os & Jones, 1999). Hence, it would not be surprising for cognitively
vulnerable individuals to also be exposed to a greater number of total stressors by virtue
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of their underlying vulnerability. Stress generation theory specifies that such individuals
are specifically exposed to greater levels of dependent stress, and do not differ from
nondepressed individuals or individuals vulnerable to depression in their levels of
exposure to independent events (Hammen, 2006). Hence, to truly test stress generation,
multiple models comparing the prediction of dependent versus independent life stress are
warranted.
Overall, the above studies suggest that a variety of cognitive vulnerability factors
may influence the generation of stress and subsequent depressive symptoms.
Unfortunately, all previous studies in this area have relied exclusively on self-report
questionnaires, which may only tap surface level cognitions that result from effortful
information processing and may be influenced by participants’ expectation, motivation,
and mood state (Beevers, 2005; Rude et al., 2010). For example, one of the more
common used assessment tools for maladaptive beliefs is the Dysfunctional Attitudes
Scale (DAS; Weissman & Beck, 1978). These types of constructs often ebb and flow
with depression itself (e.g., Dobson & Shaw, 1987; Lewinsohn, Steinmetz, Larson, &
Franklin, 1981), making it difficult to determine if they represent vulnerability factors,
concomitants, or “scars” of depression (see Haaga, Dyck, & Ernst, 1991; Scher, Ingram,
& Segal, 2005). This uncertainty potentially limits researchers’ ability to disentangle the
influence of participant mood state from cognition, to examine the unique contribution of
cognition to stress generation. Alternatively, depressive cognitions assessed using selfreport questionnaires may be actively suppressed by participants through mental thought
control (Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). In these instances, it is only under conditions of
reduced cognitive capacity that depressive cognitions may become measureable. An
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alternative to self-report measures involves the use of more automatic information
processing, such as interpretive bias, which may less influenced by effortful mental
control (Mathews & MacLeod, 2005), may be taxed by experimental manipulations to
decrease cognitive capacity (i.e., through the use of cognitive loads; Van der Does, 2005;
Watkins & Moulds, 2007; Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998), and may continue to persist and be
detectable even when participants are not currently in a dysphoric or depressed mood
state (Hedlund & Rude, 1995; Rude et al., 2001).
Stress generation and information processing biases. Interpretation of
ambiguity is one information processing variable that may impact stress generation.
Certain cognitive predispositions may cause people to respond in positive or negative
ways to vague or ambiguous social situations based on their previous experiences,
personality traits, and pre-existing attentional and memory biases. For individuals who
are in a dysphoric state or are vulnerable to depression by virtue of their depressive selfschema, this tendency can involve noticing and attaching negativity and personal
relevance to ambiguous events (Tse & Bond, 2004). In the context of ambiguous
interpersonal interactions, the nonverbal behaviours of others may be interpreted as
negative or rejecting (Demenescu, Kortekaas, den Boer, & Aleman, 2010; Hokanson,
Hummer, & Butler, 1991; Marcus & Askari, 1999; Raes, Hermans, & Williams, 2006).
Theoretically, interpretive bias may lead to the generation of life stressors, which
in turn induces depression (see Figure 1). In this model, interpretive biases play a more
proximal role in the creation of life stress. When a cognitively vulnerable individual
experiences indifference from others, or subtle social ambiguities (e.g., not returning a
phone call promptly, not waving hello from across campus, and not smiling
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immediately), he or she may interpret these behaviours as intentional signs of dislike,
displeasure, or disappointment, and react in ways that lead to additional stressors. For
example, the individual may then give his or her friend the “cold shoulder”, behave in an
irritated manner or withdraw from further social contact. All these behaviours have the
unfortunate potential consequence of creating an argument or disagreement with a friend,
simply because of the interpretation the individual attached to the original behaviour. If
instead, he or she had thought “They are just busy” or “They must not have seen me”,
such potential implications could have been prevented.
Empirical evidence on interpersonal behaviours associated with stress generation
supports some of these hypothetical pathways from negative interpretations of ambiguity
to stress generation via specific interpersonal competencies and behaviours. For women,
interpersonal behaviours such as excessively seeking reassurance, putting others needs
first, and depending on interpersonal relationships are especially predictive of dependent
life event stress generation (Eberhart & Hammen, 2009; Shih & Auerbach, 2010; Shih &
Eberhart, 2010). Furthermore, lower interpersonal competence in the areas of initiating
social interactions, conflict management, and hostility were predictive of stress
generation at a daily level (Cummings, Hayes, Laurenceau, & Cohen, 2010; Sahl, Cohen,
& Dasch, 2009). To the investigator’s knowledge, no research has yet examined any
forms of information processes biases in the context of stress generation, despite the fact
that cognitive theory purports that information processing pathways are the most
proximal cognitive link to depression (Beck, 1967, 1987). Hence, one of the main
objectives of the current study was to examine interpretive bias as a predictor of stress
generation.
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Diathesis-Stress, Cognitive Vulnerabilities, and Depression
At the same time, it is important to situate the current study within the context of
previous cognition and stress research. One of the most influential models integrating
cognitive vulnerabilities and stress in the understanding of depression has been the
diathesis-stress model (Beck, 1987; Riskind & Alloy, 2006). From a diathesis-stress
perspective, individuals who are vulnerable to depression are indistinguishable in their
responses on self-report measures compared to those who are not vulnerable, during
regular circumstances (Segal & Ingram, 1994). Cognitive vulnerability emerges and is
distinguishable from non-vulnerable individuals, however, when such individuals face
situations that activate their depressive self-schemas (Ingram & Luxton, 2005; Monroe &
Simons, 1991). From this perspective, the depressive self-schema influences how
individuals interpret and experience stressful events, thereby moderating the impact of
stressful events (Riskind & Alloy, 2006). When triggered by a stressful event, the
depressive self-schema leads to automatic and systematic negative information
processing biases (e.g., attention, memory, interpretation, inhibition) which may initiate
and/or maintain a dysphoric mood state, leading to greater negative thinking and
worsening depressed mood (Ingram et al., 1998). Stated another way, the diathesis-stress
model proposes that individuals with particular cognitive tendencies will interpret and
react to stressful life events in ways which increase the likelihood of developing
depression (e.g., Abramson et al., 1989; Beck, 1987). Hence, the cognitive vulnerabilities
moderate the impact of stressful life events on the development of depression.
Empirically, a majority of studies have found support for this proposition in child,
adolescent, and adult samples using a variety of cognitive vulnerability variables such as
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dysfunctional attitudes, attributional/inferential style, and rumination (for reviews, see
Abela & Hankin, 2008; Abramson et al., 2002; D. A. Clark et al., 1999; Garber &
Hilsman, 1992; Haaga et al., 1991; Hankin & Abela, 2005; Ingram et al., 1998;
Lakdawalla, Hankin, & Mermelstein, 2007; Scher et al., 2005; Segal & Ingram, 1994).
For example, Seeds and Dozois (2010) found that the interaction of self-schema structure
and negative life events in undergraduate students predicted depressive symptoms over a
1-year period. Beyond simple two-point prospective assessments, multiwave, timelagged, and daily diary studies have also examined diathesis-stress models to provide a
more stringent exploration of this hypothesis (e.g., Abela & Hankin, 2011; Abela &
Skitch, 2007; Hankin, 2010; Hankin, Wetter, Cheely, & Oppenheimer, 2008; Klocek,
Oliver, & Ross, 1997; Mezulis, Funasaki, Charbonneau, & Hyde, 2010). For instance, in
a three-wave study with community youth, Mezulis and colleagues (2010) found that the
interactions between attributional/inferential style and both total and dependent life stress
were significant in predicting depression symptom trajectories in girls, but not boys, over
a four-year period. The most compelling evidence supporting the diathesis-stress
hypothesis, however, comes from studies that have examined the interaction between
cognitive vulnerability and stressful life events to prospectively predict the onset of major
depressive episodes (Alloy et al., 2006; Carter & Garber, 2011; Evans, Heron, Lewis,
Araya, & Wolke, 2005; Hankin, Abramson, Miller, & Haeffel, 2004, study 2; Lewinsohn,
Joiner, & Rohde, 2001). In the most recent of these, the interaction of negative cognitions
and interpersonal stress predicted the first onset of a major depressive episode in
adolescents (Carter & Garber, 2011). Together, these results provide strong support for a
cognitive diathesis-stress model of depression.
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Unfortunately, similar to the issue noted in the review of cognitive vulnerabilities
and stress generation, no one has examined information processing biases, such as
interpretive bias, in the context of diathesis-stress models (Ingram et al., 2008). As with
the cognitive vulnerability research in the area of stress generation, all previous studies
applying a diathesis-stress model have relied exclusively on self-report questionnaires
which are open to response biases. Theoretically, interpretive biases may function as
cognitive diatheses that interact with stress to produce increases in depressive symptoms
and potential depressive episodes (diathesis-stress/moderation framework). One might
imagine that a cognitively vulnerable individual interprets ambiguous social information
in a persistently negative manner. Stressful life events may give rise to a pattern of
maladaptive self-referent information processing and increased negative interpretation of
ambiguity that begins the downward cycle toward depression (Riskind & Alloy, 2006).
Such individuals may start to be more critical of themselves, their future, and others.
They may start to view other’s indifference or subtle social ambiguities (e.g., not
returning a phone call promptly, not waving hello from across campus, and not smiling
immediately) as intentional signs of dislike, displeasure, or disappointment. These
negative interpretations and subsequent catastrophic thinking would serve to further
worsen the person’s mood. In contrast, individuals without interpretive biases would
experience negative mood and related thoughts that are commensurate to the nature of the
stressful life event (Ingram, Miranda, & Segal, 2006).
As previously discussed, there is some indirect evidence from CBM-I studies that
interpretive bias operates as a diathesis within this type of model, with experimental
manipulation of interpretation resulting in attenuated emotional reactions following
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subsequent stressors (Lester et al., 2011; Mackintosh et al., 2006; Wilson et al., 2006),
buffering against the impact of a negative mood induction procedure (Holmes et al.,
2009), and improving mood in individuals with clinical depression (Blackwell & Holmes,
2010). Prospectively, interpretive bias, in the context of one form of stress (i.e., school
examinations), has also been shown to predict dysphoric reactions up to one month later
(Pury, 2002). Hence, a further objective of the current study was to examine interpretive
bias in the context of a diathesis-stress model using the occurrence of naturalistic life
events.
Rationale and Objectives for the Current Study
At this point, it is unknown if interpretive biases may lead to stress generation,
and how the combination of interpretive biases and stress may contribute to depression.
The main rationale for the current study is to investigate these two theoretically and
empirically supported models, as a way of integrating the information processing variable
of interpretive bias, with the broader cognitive vulnerability literature. Although some
forms of interpretive bias appear to lead to depression, the mechanism by which this may
occur and in what contexts is not known. Interpretive biases themselves may lead to the
generation of life stressors, which in turn contribute to depression. Interpretive biases
may also function as cognitive diatheses that interact with stress to produce increases in
depressive symptoms and potential depressive episodes (diathesis-stress/moderation
framework). While there is some evidence that interpretive bias may moderate
individuals’ reactions to stress (e.g., Holmes et al., 2009; Mackintosh et al., 2006; Wilson
et al., 2006), this has never been examined in non-experimentally manipulated samples or
in the additional context of stress generation. Furthermore, no studies of interpretive bias
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have examined both diathesis-stress and stress generation models in the same sample,
despite the fact that studies of cognitive vulnerability routinely do so (e.g., Abela &
Hankin, 2011; Gibb et al., 2006; Hankin, Stone, & Ann Wright, 2010; Kercher & Rapee,
2009; Mezulis et al., 2010). Hence, the current study aims to examine interpretive bias in
the context of these two models. If both models hold, it would provide further evidence
for the problematic situation which cognitively vulnerable individuals face—not only are
they more likely to develop depression following stressors, but they may, in part, be
contributing to the creation of the stressors that will trigger, maintain, and/or exacerbate
their depression.
Therefore, the overarching goal of this project was to examine interpretive bias
for ambiguous social information within the context of stress and depression. Two
measures of interpretive bias were employed, as is standard in this research literature
(Dearing & Gotlib, 2009; Eley et al., 2008; Mogg et al., 2006). The currently most
reliable and valid measures were selected assess the construct of interpretive bias. First,
the Scrambled Sentences Task (SST) was selected since it is the most widely used
measure of interpretive bias and had been shown to have a causal relationship with
depressive symptoms and syndrome over time (Phillips, Hine, & Thorsteinsson, 2010;
Rude et al., 2002, 2003, 2010). Second, the ambiguous stories priming paradigm (called
the Ambiguous Stories Task; AST) utilized by Dearing and Gotlib (2009) was selected
because it used self-referent material and derived reaction-time indicators of interpretive
bias which are least open to response bias and demand characteristics of participants
(Dearing & Gotlib, 2009; Wisco, 2009; Wisco & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010).
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Given the importance of assessing whether interpretive bias could predict future
stressful life events and depressive symptoms, the current study utilized a two-wave
prospective design over a five-week period. This length of follow-up was selected based
on previous research examining stress generation and changes in depressive symptoms
(e.g., Abela & Hankin, 2008; Auerbach et al., 2010; Gibb et al., 2006; Shih, 2006). This
design allowed for multiple points of measurement of depressive symptoms using a wellvalidated instrument (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). To control for past lifetime
experiences with depression, participants’ worst prior history of depressive symptoms
was also ascertained using a psychometrically strong measure and current diagnostic
criteria for MDD (Zimmerman & Coryell, 1987). Additionally, this study utilized a
comprehensive list of life events that was scored for independence and dependence by
Ph.D.-level raters with experience in contextual rating systems (Brown & Harris, 1978).
Young adult women were recruited for this study because of the heightened
period of risk during the transition to adulthood, their higher likelihood of exposure to
stressful life events, and their increased risk of developing depression (e.g., Burke, Burke,
Regier, & Rae, 1990; Hankin et al., 1998; Harkness et al., 2010; Safford et al., 2007;
Shih, 2006; Shih et al., 2006). Many studies on stress generation or interpretive bias have
focused their investigations solely on women (e.g., Daley et al., 1997; Davila et al., 1995;
Eberhart & Hammen, 2009; Hammen, 1991; Rude et al., 2010). Consequently, sampling
exclusively women provided a promising starting point to detect stress generation and
diathesis-stress effects, if they existed.
Question 1 - Does interpretive bias predict changes in depressive symptoms?
Given mixed findings in previous research (e.g., Bisson & Sears, 2007; Dearing &
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Gotlib, 2009; Lawson et al., 2002; Mogg et al., 2006; Nunn et al., 1997; Sears et al.,
2011), the first objective of the current study was to explore whether interpretive bias, as
measured by the SST and AST, was related to concurrent depressive symptoms and
depression symptom history. The extent to which interpretive biases predicted changes in
depressive symptoms over the 5-week follow-up was also examined (e.g., Rude et al.,
2002). In the prospective analyses, both prior depression symptom severity and baseline
depressive symptoms were controlled statistically, which is consistent with previous
studies in this area (Rude et al., 2002, 2003, 2010). This procedure allowed for an
investigation of the unique effects of interpretive bias above and beyond the effects of
previous depressive symptomatology (e.g., Rude et al., 2002).
In general, interpretive biases assessed at Time 1, as measured by the SST and
AST, were expected to be related to Time 1 depressive symptomatology and depression
symptom history. More specifically, concurrent depressive symptoms and positive
depression symptom history were expected to be related to a greater proportion of
negative sentences constructed on the SST and to faster response latencies for negative
story endings (and slower reactions times for benign or positive story endings) on the
AST.
Interpretive biases were also hypothesized to predict Time 2 depression
symptoms, over and above the effects of Time 1 depression symptoms and depression
symptom history (Rude et al., 2002, 2003, 2010). In particular, a higher proportion of
negative sentences constructed on the SST, as well as faster response latencies for
negative story endings and slower response latencies for benign or positive story endings
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on the AST, were hypothesized to predict greater increases in depressive symptoms over
the 5-week period.
Question 2 - Does interpretive bias predict stress generation? The second
objective of this project was to examine interpretive bias for ambiguous social
information as a contributor to stress generation. More specifically, whether interpretive
biases to ambiguous scenarios contribute to the generation of dependent (but not
independent) life events was examined over a prospective interval of five weeks. Given
that prior depression (e.g., Davila et al., 1995) and current depressive symptoms (Potthoff
et al., 1995) both predict stress generation, these variables were controlled statistically.
This procedure helped to safeguard against potential mood-congruent biases in reporting
and allowed for an examination of the effects of interpretive bias beyond any effects of
depression.
Generally, interpretive bias was expected to uniquely predict the occurrence of
dependent life events, and be unrelated to the frequency of independent life events
reported by participants. Specifically, a higher proportion of negative sentences
constructed on the SST, as well as faster response latencies for negative story endings
and slower response latencies for benign or positive story endings on the AST, were
hypothesized to predict the occurrence of more life stressors at least partially dependent
on participants’ behaviours (i.e., dependent events) by Time 2. The indices of interpretive
bias were not expected to be predictive of the occurrence of fateful stressors (i.e.,
independent events), as is consistent with the stress generation hypothesis (Hammen,
1991, 1992, 2006). These relationships were hypothesized to exist, controlling for the
effects of Time 1 depression symptoms and depression symptom history.
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Question 3 - Does interpretive bias interact with stressful life events to
predict changes in depressive symptoms? As a complement to the stress generation
model, the third aim of this study was to examine interpretive bias within the context of a
diathesis-stress framework (interactional/moderation model; Beck, 1987). Within this
model, interpretive biases were expected to interact with life stressors to predict increases
in depressive symptoms across time. In particular, individuals with negative interpretive
biases, in the context of heightened life stressors, were expected to experience greater
increases in depressive symptomatology compared to those with fewer life stressors or
with more adaptive forms of interpretive bias (i.e., moderation). More specifically,
participants who solved a higher proportion of sentences with negative solutions on the
SST, and participants who displayed faster response latencies for negative story endings
and slower response latencies for benign or positive story endings on the AST, in the
context of higher frequencies of life events, were hypothesized to be at the most elevated
risk for increases in depressive symptoms, compared to participants with lower
frequencies of life events or more positive patterns of interpretive bias. Given the wellknown fact that past depression is the best predictor of future depression (Hankin et al.,
1998; Harrington, Fudge, Rutter, Pickles, & Hill, 1990; Lewinsohn, Zeiss, & Duncan,
1989; Rao, Hammen, & Daley, 1999; for review, see Burcusa & Iacono, 2007), the
analyses for this hypothesis also statistically controlled for prior depression symptom
severity and baseline depressive symptoms.
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Method
Participants
Two-hundred-and-sixteen first-year psychology undergraduate women2
completed the first wave of data collection of this study (Time 1). This sample size was
selected to be consistent with previous sample sizes used in cognitive vulnerability to
depression studies using undergraduate student populations (e.g., Gibb et al., 2006;
Hankin, 2010; Shih et al., 2009; Uhrlass & Gibb, 2007), as well as sample sizes typically
utilized in our research laboratory (e.g., Brinker & Dozois, 2009; Covin, Dozois,
Ogniewicz, & Seeds, 2011; Frewen & Dozois, 2006a, 2006b). At the second wave of data
collection (Time 2), 209 participants completed at least a portion of the measures and 207
participants completed all Time 2 measures (96% retention rate)3. Psychology 1000/1200
students were recruited using the Psychology Research Participant Pool (nTime 1 = 205;
nTime 2 = 196). Other students enrolled in first-year courses (nTime 1 = 11; nTime 2 = 11) were
recruited using posters that were distributed at different locations throughout the

2

The rationale for the gender-specific sampling method is fourfold: (1) the transition period from late
adolescence to early adulthood is a heightened period of vulnerability for depression in women (Burke,
Burke, Regier, & Rae, 1990); (2) women are twice as likely to encounter significant experiences with
depression compared to men in general (Hankin et al., 1998); (3) vulnerable women are more likely to
experience life events and the stress generation effect compared to men (Safford, Alloy, Abramson, &
Crossfield, 2007; Shih, 2006; Shih, Eberhart, Hammen, & Brennan, 2006); (4) young adulthood is the main
period when the women’s rates of life events prior to the onset of a depressive episode are particularly
elevated compared to men (Harkness et al., 2010). Many studies on stress generation or interpretive bias
have focused their investigations solely on women (e.g., Daley et al., 1997; Davila, Hammen, Burge, Paley,
& Daley, 1995; Eberhart & Hammen, 2009; Hammen, 1991; Rude, Durham-Fowler, Baum, Rooney, &
Maestas, 2010). Consequently, sampling exclusively women provided a promising starting point to detect
stress generation effects, if they existed.
3
Comparison statistics were conducted to investigate any differences between those participants who
completed both waves of data collection and those who did not. For details of these analyses, please refer to
Appendix A. Based on the very small attrition rate and the minor differences found, it is unlikely that the
results of this study were significantly influenced by the 9 dropouts.
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university campus4.
Measures
Demographic Questionnaire. A standard questionnaire was administered to
participants to assess various demographic (e.g., age, gender, ethnicity, marital status)
and clinical (i.e., personal history of previous mental disorder; previous treatment
received) characteristics (see Appendix C for a copy).
Beck Depression Inventory – II (BDI-II). The BDI-II was completed by all
participants to assess the current severity of their depressive symptoms (Beck et al.,
1996). The BDI-II is a standardized 21-item self-report measure of depression.
Participants rate each item on a 4-point (0 to 3) scale by selecting the statement for a
given question that best matches their experience in the preceding two weeks. An
example of these types of questions is "sadness", and the participants choose one of “I do
not feel sad”, “I feel sad much of the time”, “I am sad all of the time”, or “I am so sad or
unhappy that I can’t stand it” (Beck et al., 1996). A total score is calculated by summing
across the items, with higher scores indicating a greater severity of depression. The BDIII has excellent internal reliability (average coefficient alpha = .91; Dozois & Covin,
2004) and good test-retest reliability (ranging from .60 to .83 for non-psychiatric
samples; Dozois & Covin, 2004), as well as excellent content, construct, concurrent, and
discriminant validity (see Dozois & Covin, 2004, for a comprehensive review of the
psychometric properties). The BDI-II exhibited excellent internal consistency in the
current study (α = .91 for Time 1 and α = .93 for Time 2).
4

Comparison statistics were conducted to investigate any differences between participants recruited via
different methods. For details of these analyses, please refer to Appendix B. Based on the very small
sample size and minor differences found, it is unlikely that the results of this study were significantly
influenced by the 11 participants recruited by posters on campus.
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Inventory to Diagnose Depression, Lifetime Version (IDD-L). The IDD-L was
used to assess participants’ worst prior experience of depression (Zimmerman & Coryell,
1987). For the purposes of the current study, 21 symptom items and 21 duration items
from the IDD-L were used (out of the original 22), which are originally based on the
diagnostic criteria for a major depressive episode in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders-III (DSM-III; American Psychiatric Association, 1980).
Only the items consistent with the more recent edition of the DSM (DSM-IV-TR;
American Psychiatric Association, 2000) criteria for depression were used. Participants
were asked to recall the most depressed week in their lives and then rate the 21 symptom
items on a 5-point scale, by choosing the statement that best matched the symptom
severity during the time in their lives when they “felt the most depressed.” Participants
also indicated whether this symptom lasted for two weeks or longer, using the duration
items. For the purposes of the current study, the IDD-L was scored in a continuous
format. Only those symptoms which were endorsed for longer than 2 weeks were
included in the total score, as is consistent with previous utilization of this measure
(Cummings et al., 2010; Rude et al., 2002, 2003, 2010). The IDD-L has strong reliability
and validity (e.g., Goldston, O’Hara, & Schartz, 1990; Sakado, Sato, Uehara, Sato, &
Kameda, 1996; Sato et al., 1996; Zimmerman & Coryell, 1987). Internal reliability in the
current study was excellent (α = .94).
Scrambled Sentences Test (SST). The SST (Wenzlaff, 1988, 1993) was used to
measure participants’ tendency to interpret ambiguous information (e.g., winner born I
am loser a) in a positive (e.g., I am a born winner) or negative (e.g., I am a born loser)
manner. Several studies have shown differences between currently depressed, previously
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depressed, and never-depressed participants on this task (e.g., Hedlund & Rude, 1995;
Rude, Covich, Jarrold, Hedlund, & Zentner, 2001; Wenzlaff, 1988; Wenzlaff & Bates,
1998). Participants were presented with two blocks of up to 20 scrambled sentences (in
random order) and were instructed to click a number below five of the six words of each
scrambled sentence to produce a grammatically correct sentence (see Appendix D for
these stimuli). Participants were instructed to complete as many of the sentences as
possible during each 2.5-minute block, consistent with previous studies utilizing this task
(e.g., Holmes et al., 2009; Rude et al., 2002, 2003). A count-down clock and number of
trials completed out of 20 was presented at the top of the computer screen which allowed
participants to see their progress. The purposes of the time limit was to create consistency
across participants in their available time to solve the sentences and to encourage them to
work as quickly as possible, thereby interfering with effortful deliberation on their
solutions to the sentences (Phillips et al., 2010).
Consistent with previous uses of the SST (e.g., Rude et al., 2002, 2003; Wenzlaff,
1993), a cognitive load procedure was used in either the first or second block of the task.
The rationale for providing a cognitive load to participants (versus no-load) was to help
mitigate against potential demand characteristics and self-presentation biases and access
more fundamental information processing vulnerability (e.g., Rude et al., 2002, 2003,
2010; Wenzlaff, Rude, Taylor, Stultz, & Sweatt, 2001). In the cognitive load condition,
participants were given a six-digit number to remember while they completed the task.
Although the size of the cognitive load was not calibrated for each participant
individually, the current procedure had the advantage of allowing group administration
and has shown the predicted effects in previous studies (e.g., Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000).
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Participants were asked to provide the six-digit cognitive load number at the end of the
2.5-minute block and their accuracy was examined. Eighty-seven percent of participants
reported the number with perfect accuracy.5
The order of the load and no-load conditions was counterbalanced, with
approximately half of the participants (n = 103) completing the first block of scrambled
sentences under cognitive load followed by the second block without load. A negativity
score for each block was calculated by computing the ratio of negative sentences divided
by total sentences completed (out of 20 possible). Consistent with previous studies using
this measure, interpretive bias for the SST was operationally defined as a higher
negativity score on the cognitive load and no-load conditions (Holmes et al., 2009; Rude
et al., 2003, 2002).
Ambiguous Stories Task (AST). The AST was adapted from Dearing and Gotlib
(2009) and derived from a procedure used by Mathews and his colleagues (e.g., Hirsch &
Mathews, 1997; Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000). In this task, participants were presented
with short stories in which the emotional valence remained ambiguous until the final
word was presented. On some trials, the target word resolved the ambiguity in a valenced
manner (positive or negative), whereas in other trials grammatically impossible foil items
were presented. Participants were asked to indicate with a key press whether the word
presented was grammatically correct, and response latencies were recorded.
Participants were provided with 65 three-sentence stories written in a selfreferent, second-person narrative style (e.g., “You are…”). The application of a self-

5

Participants who made errors in the recall (n = 28) were excluded from all subsequent analyses using this
measure of interpretive bias. In most instances, participants either substituted one or more of the 6 digits for
a different digit, or only recalled 5 out of 6 digits.
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referent narrative is important because information processing biases in depression are
stronger when stimuli are self-referent (Dineen & Hadwin, 2004; Nunn et al., 1997;
Wisco, 2009). Stories were presented one sentence at a time, self-paced by having the
participant press the space bar to move to the next sentence. Each story’s final word was
missing from the third sentence, and participants were encouraged to think of an ending
for each story. Once they had the ending in mind, participants were instructed to press the
space bar to see a single probe word appear on the screen. At this point, participants had
to press a key to indicate whether or not the word represented a grammatically possible
ending to the story. After the probe word, participants were asked to respond to a
comprehension (yes/no) question that was unrelated to the story ending. Answers to the
comprehension questions were followed by immediate feedback (e.g., “Right!” or
“Wrong, try again next time”) in order to emphasize the importance of reading and
understanding the story. In other words, the expected semantic meaning of the stories was
primed by asking participants to think of a possible ending. This true purpose was veiled
by requiring participants to make grammatical and reading comprehension decisions
during the task, rather they semantic ones (Dearing & Gotlib, 2009; Hirsch & Mathews,
1997; Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000). Please refer to Appendix E for a complete version
of the stories and their possible endings.
Control items on this task consisted of unambiguously neutral stories with a
neutral final word (n = 5) or grammatically impossible foil (n = 10). An example of a
control story reads:
1. You have planned to meet a friend at the mall.
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2. When you arrive, she’s not there, so you call her cell phone to find out where she
is.
3. She explains that her mom was late picking her up because she got stuck in
________________.
4. Probe word: traffic (participant should press “yes” key)
5. Comprehension check: Did you call your friend to find out where she was?
(participants should press the “yes” key).
Test items allowed for a positive or negative interpretation of the story. An example of a
test item reads:
1. You have been writing to your new roommate over the summer.
2. Tomorrow you are going to meet your roommate for the first time.
3. As you think about meeting her for the first time, you feel that she will think you
are ____________________.
4. Probe word: Friendly (friendly - positive ending; annoying - negative ending;
pleasure – grammatically impossible foil)
5. Comprehension check: Had you met your roommate before? (participants should
press the “no” key).
The number of possible and impossible endings was counterbalanced across the entire
stimulus set. For test items, one third of the test sample set contained endings that
resolved the story in a negative, positive, or grammatically impossible manner. Stories
from Dearing and Gotlib’s study (2009) of pre-adolescent girls were adapted for the
current study to be more age-appropriate for a post-secondary school sample. This task
was evaluated in a pilot study to ensure that the control stimuli were indeed unambiguous
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and that the test stimuli were amenable to both positive and negative interpretations.
Sixteen graduate-level students were presented with all 65 stories and asked to fill in the
blank at the end of each story with a positive and/or negative word that would complete
the story in a grammatically possible way. Pilot responses to control stories were
completely consistent with the developed endings, with participants recording the
expected ending or a grammatically equivalent synonym 93% of the time. Responses to
test (ambiguous) stories showed that alternate interpretations were possible, with
participants writing down identical or similar positive and negative endings 62% and
38% of the time, respectively. These findings suggested that control stimuli were
unambiguous and test stimuli were amenable to multiple interpretations (Dearing &
Gotlib, 2009).
Positive, negative, and impossible endings were randomized across participants,
and the order of presentation of stories was fully randomized for each participant. Stimuli
were presented in three blocks, each consisting of 21 or 22 trials, on an IBM-compatible
personal computer and a Samsung 17 inch colour monitor. Interpretation bias for this task
was operationally defined in relation to the response latencies for test trials. Participants
were expected to be slower to respond “yes” to grammatically possible endings that were
inconsistent with their interpretation of the story than grammatically possible endings that
were consistent with their interpretation (see MacLeod & Cohen, 1993). Therefore, the
main trials of interest were response latencies on test trials in which participants
responded “yes” to negative endings or “yes” to positive endings (Dearing & Gotlib,
2009). Responses in which they replied “no” to possible endings (either negative or
positive), or “yes” to grammatically impossible endings, were considered errors and were
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not relevant to the current investigation. In the current study, it was expected that
interpretive bias would be manifested as faster response times for test trials with negative
endings (facilitation) and slower response times for test trials with positive endings
(interference). Previous work has shown that girls at-risk for depression are more likely
to impose negative interpretations and less likely to impose positive interpretations on
ambiguous information, compared to girls at low-risk for depression (Dearing & Gotlib,
2009).
Stressful Life Experiences Questionnaire (SLEQ). A 260-item measure of
negative life events and hassles was created for the current study. Items for this
composite measure were drawn from existing life event checklists and interviews, to
ensure that coverage of all potential themes and domains of life events (e.g., school,
home, family and friends, marriage and dating, parenting, crime/legal, work, finances,
migration, bereavement, other) were captured and to ensure that a sufficient number of
events could be differentiated clearly as dependent and independent. Dependent events
were operationalized as at least in part dependent on the actions of the individual (e.g.,
intentional act by participant, negligence, argument, end of contact/breakup; Brown &
Harris, 1978). Independent events were operationalized as events that are independent of
the participant’s actions (e.g., family moves away, victim of natural disaster, witness to
fight but not involved, physically ill).
Life events and hassles were drawn from the Adolescent Life Events
Questionnaire – Revised (Hankin & Abramson, 2002), the College Student Life Event
Schedule (Sandler & Lakey, 1982), the Daily Hassles and Uplifts Scale (Kanner, Coyne,
Schaefer, & Lazarus, 1981), the Hassles and Uplifts Scale (DeLongis, Folkman, &
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Lazarus, 1988), the Life Experiences Survey (Sarason, Johnson, & Siegel, 1978), the
Negative Daily Stressors Checklist (Sahl et al., 2009), the Negative Life Events
Questionnaire (Metalsky & Joiner, 1992) and the Positive and Negative Event Scales
(Maybery, 2003). For each of the items on the life events measure, participants were
asked to indicate if the event occurred during the five weeks between the Time 1 and
Time 2 assessment and, if so, the degree of its impact on their lives. To reduce potential
response bias associated with depressive symptoms, the number of events endorsed over
the 5-week period (rather than the subjective impact ratings) was emphasized. A sum of
dependent and independent events was calculated.
Using a procedure similar to several previous studies that have utilized
questionnaire-based methods to assess life events, the final list of life events was coded a
priori for independence/dependence (e.g., Auerbach et al., 2010; Iacoviello, Grant, Alloy,
& Abramson, 2009). Ratings were independently conducted by the study author and a
Ph.D. level psychologist, both with experience and training as raters for the gold standard
contextual life event rating system (i.e., The Life Events and Difficulties Schedule
[LEDS; G. W. Brown & Harris, 1978]) and highly familiar with concepts of
independence and dependence of life events. The LEDS rating system provides over
5,000 examples of contextual life events and rating rules, with which rating teams must
apply ratings based on a specific example that seems most similar to the event being
currently rated. In the present study, both raters had over two years of experience
working on consensus teams, making ratings about independence/dependence based on
the context of events using the LEDS-II manual with adolescent and adult samples
(Bifulco et al., 1989; Brown et al., 1992; Brown & Harris, 1989; Frank, Matty, &
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Anderson, 1997). Items whose coding was agreed upon were retained. Items which were
not categorized into dependent versus independent were excluded from statistical
analyses (see Appendix F). Cohen’s kappa coefficient, as calculated for these
independent, dependent, and neither/unsure event codes, was 0.72, indicating a moderate
to substantial level of agreement among raters (Fleiss, 1971; Landis & Koch, 1977;
Posner, Sampson, Caplan, Ward, & Cheney, 1990; Shrout, 1998; Sim & Wright, 2005).
Including the combination of major life events and hassles in the assessment of life stress
ensured that there were sufficient events experienced by participants over the 5-week
interval, thereby enhancing statistical power (e.g., Alloy, Reilly-Harrington, Fresco,
Whitehouse, & Zechmeister, 1999).
An overall total number of life events endorsed was calculated (out of a possible
160 events). Of those items, 34 were coded as independent and 105 as dependent (20
items were not categorized and were excluded from the life event subscales). Item
response on the life event checklist varies according to the type and frequency of the life
stress experiences; thus, the calculation of internal consistency coefficients is not
appropriate for this type of scale. However, other researchers have sometimes calculated
internal consistency as a proxy of degree of stressfulness of individuals’ lives and/or their
tendency to report life events (e.g., Wingate & Joiner, 2004) and hence they can be
calculated; in the current study, the internal consistency (α) for the SLEQ dependent
events and SLEQ independent events were .92 and .77, respectively. The frequency of
life events in the current study is relatively consistent with previous studies using selfreport checklists to assess life event occurrence of a similar time interval (Gibb et al.,
2006; Hankin et al., 2010; Uhrlass & Gibb, 2007). Length of time between Time 1 and
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Time 2 appointments was not related to the number of overall life events, r(206) = -0.04,
p = 0.58, number of independent life events, r(206) = -0.03, p = 0.72, or number of
dependent life events , r(206) = -0.03, p = 0.70, which participants reported during the 5week interval.
Procedure
Participants were recruited through the Psychology Research Participant Pool or
through posters on campus at the University of Western Ontario. Permission to conduct
this investigation was provided by the university Institutional Ethics Review Board (see
Appendix G). Those individuals willing to participate were provided with a letter of
information and completed the process of informed consent, which was confirmed by
signing a consent form. Participants completed a 2-hour protocol (Time 1), in groups of
one to five. A clinical psychology graduate student or undergraduate volunteer student,
who had received training on all of the measures, conducted this assessment. Subsequent
to that assessment, participants were asked to complete an online Time 2 assessment 5
weeks (M = 34.93 days, SD = 2.13 days, Range = 32 - 46 days) later which was
approximately 30 minutes in duration (M = 23.14 minutes, SD = 12.26 minutes, Range =
6 - 88 minutes). For the second assessment point, participants were emailed a link to a
webpage where they could complete the follow-up portion of this study. A 5-week
follow-up period was selected based on past research (e.g., Abela & Hankin, 2008;
Auerbach et al., 2010; Gibb et al., 2006; Shih, 2006). This time interval appears to be
useful for examining the generation of life events and prospective changes in depressive
symptoms.
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At Time 1, participants completed all symptom questionnaires and computer tasks
at the in-person assessment meeting. At the start of the administration session, the
computer-based information processing tasks (AST and SST), as well as other
information processing measures that are not applicable to the current investigation, were
presented to participants in random order. During the second portion of the experiment,
self-report questionnaires were presented in random order along with additional measures
that are not the focus of the current study. At the 5-week follow-up session (Time 2),
participants were asked to complete a subset of the measures that they completed at the
Time 1 (including the BDI-II and the life events questionnaire) using a secure website. A
benefit of this procedure was that the exact date and time when the assessments took
place could be determined which ensured that the questionnaires were completed as
scheduled (e.g., Gibb et al., 2006). Upon completion of the study, participants were
debriefed regarding the study’s purpose, thanked for their participation, and provided
with participant credit for their introductory psychology class. For participants who
completed only the first in-person assessment, 2.0 participant credits or $20 was awarded
depending on their method of recruitment. If participants opted to complete the follow-up
assessments, they earned an additional 1.0 credit for their participation (for those in the
Research Participant Pool) or were entered in a draw for one of several $100 gift cards to
a local shopping centre with a 1 in 10 chance of winning.
Data Analytic Strategy
Only data for participants who completed both Time 1 and Time 2 assessments
were included in the analyses. All variables were standardized prior to analyses, where
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appropriate. To address each of the research questions, the following data analytic
approaches were utilized.
Question 1 - Does interpretive bias predict changes in depressive symptoms?
Bivariate and partial correlation analyses were performed to investigate the cross-sectional
relationships among interpretive bias variables (SST and AST) and Time 1 depressive
symptomatology (BDI-II) and depression symptom history (IDD-L). A series of hierarchical

linear regression analyses were conducted to examine whether interpretive bias predicted
follow-up depressive symptoms. In these regressions, scores on the BDI-II at Time 2
served as the criterion variable, and any correlated demographic characteristics (based
upon preliminary analyses), BDI-II at Time 1, and IDD-L at Time 1 were entered as
covariates. Separate regression analyses were run for each of the indices of interpretive
bias (e.g., average RT for positive target trials on the AST, negativity ratio for the
cognitive load condition on the SST).
Question 2 - Does interpretive bias predict stress generation? A series of
negative binomial regressions were conducted using Stata 11.0 to investigate whether
interpretive bias measures predicted stress generation. Hierarchical models involving a
count outcome variable (e.g., number of dependent events) are typically conducted using
a Poisson distribution rather than a normal distribution (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).
Negative binomial regressions belong to Poisson-class regression models, and were
deemed to be most appropriate in the current study (please refer to Appendix H for a
detailed description). Two sets of regressions were conducted, one with each of the count
data of independent and dependent life events serving as the criterion variable. In all
regressions, any correlated demographic characteristics (based upon preliminary
analyses), BDI-II at Time 1, and IDD-L at Time 1 were entered as covariates. Similar to
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hypothesis 1, separate regression analyses were conducted for each of the indices of
interpretive bias.
Question 3 - Does interpretive bias interact with stressful life events to
predict changes in depressive symptoms? To examine a diathesis-stress/moderation
model of depression, a series of hierarchical linear regression analyses was conducted
according to Baron and Kenny’s (1986) guidelines. In these analyses, the interaction
between each baseline interpretive bias variable and dependent stress was examined as a
predictor of follow-up BDI-II scores. Consistent with Friedrich’s (1982) procedure, the
cross-product of the standardized independent variables was used as the interaction term.
The main effects of each interpretive bias variable, dependent stress, baseline BDI-II
scores, previous depression symptom history and independent life stress were controlled
statistically. Follow-up analyses were conducted, as necessary, according to Aiken and
West’s (1991) procedure.
Influential observations. Sample sizes in the regression analyses vary due to
exclusions of influential cases (i.e., outliers), based on Cook’s D statistic (Tabachnick &
Fidell, 2007). In regression analyses, if the removal of an observation produces
substantial changes in the estimates of the regression coefficients, then that observation is
considered influential (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Influence is the product of leverage
and discrepancy, with leverage referring to how far away an observed predictor is from
its mean and discrepancy referring to how unusual an observed outcome score is given
the combination of predictor variables (Fox, 2008). Cook’s D statistic provides a
summary index of the influence that an observation has on the regression coefficients. In
all subsequent linear regression analyses, Cook’s D statistic was used to identify
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participants who could be excluded from analyses to produce more stable regression
coefficients. In each instance, analyses were rerun removing cases with extreme values of
Cook’s D to determine whether the results changed with the removal of the influential
case(s). In most analyses, the removal of the most influential cases did not alter the
significance of the model statistics but did alter the level of significance for the regression
coefficients. As such, participants were excluded from each analysis repeatedly and
systematically, until no significant influential cases were detected using Cook’s D
statistic.6

6

Some researchers suggest that all statistical analyses should also be conducted including any observations
that were eliminated (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). As such, each of the main statistical
analyses was repeated including all observations (n = 207). Please see each hypothesis in the results section
for the outcome of these analyses.
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Results
Descriptive Characteristics of the Sample
The average age of participants was 18.57 years (SD = 2.83, Range = 16 - 47).
Consistent with the ethnic variability within the university, most of the students reported
that their ethnicity was White/Caucasian (n = 142; 68.6%). Other ethnicities represented
in the sample included Asian (n = 42; 20.3%), Black/African Canadian (n = 7; 3.2%),
East Indian (n = 4; 1.9%), and Aboriginal/Native Canadian (n = 2; 1.0%). Ten
participants (4.8%) categorized themselves in an “Other” ethnic group, and provided
descriptions of ethnic categories not covered in the main questionnaire (e.g., Muslim,
Middle Eastern, Arabic) or mixed ethnicities (e.g., Part Lebanese/Part Indian;
Canadian/Trinidadian). Most of the women reported that they were single (n = 202;
97.6%), but a few were married/common-law/engaged (n = 3; 1.4%) or
divorced/separated (n = 2; 1.0%).
Ten participants (4.8%) reported that they have been diagnosed with one or more
mental disorders in the past. The description of these diagnoses included depression,
obsessive compulsive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder and social phobia. Sixteen
participants (7.7%) reported that they had received medication(s) for an emotional or
psychological problem. Thirty-nine participants (18.8%) reported that they had received
therapy or counselling for an emotional or psychological problem.
Preliminary Analyses
Data reduction. Response latencies on the AST were analyzed to test the
hypotheses that interpretations bias, defined as a greater tendency to impose negative
interpretations and a decreased tendency to impose positive interpretation on ambiguous
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information, would predict depressive symptoms and life stressors. Only response
latencies from correct responses to both the target word and the comprehension question
were analyzed (Dearing & Gotlib, 2009). Error rates across all conditions were low
(mean for target word accuracy = 0.09; mean for comprehension accuracy = 0.08). Error
rates did not differ as a function of Time 1 BDI-II scores (ps ranging from .06 to .11) or
depression symptom history as assessed by the IDD-L at Time 1 (ps ranging from .37 to
.87). The proportion of data lost due to errors was inspected for each participant; based
on these data, 23 participants were excluded due to an unusually high number of incorrect
answers to the questions (fewer than 70% of the target and comprehension questions
were both answered correctly), suggesting that these participants had difficulty
comprehending the task requirements or were not attentive to the task.
Furthermore, to prevent outlier data from unduly influencing participant means,
latencies greater than three standard deviations above and below each participant’s mean
were excluded. In addition, response latencies lower than 300 ms were considered
anticipation errors and were also excluded from further analyses. Response latencies
greater than 3,000 ms were excluded because they likely reflected lapses in attention to
the task. The proportion of data lost due to outliers was inspected for each participant;
based on these data, no participants were excluded due to an unusually high number of
response latencies classified as outliers. The proportion of data lost due to outliers was
less than 3%, and is comparable to the rates lost due to errors and outliers found in
similar text comprehension paradigms (Dearing & Gotlib, 2009; Mogg et al., 2006).
Preliminary analyses were conducted to examine whether participants differed in
their overall reaction times depending on the valence of the probe word (i.e., the way in
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which the stories resolved; positive or negative) and whether participants as a whole
responded more rapidly in affirmative conditions than in conditions in which the ‘no’
response was correct. There was a significant difference in the mean reaction time for
negative target trials and positive target trials on the Ambiguous Stories Task;
participants, in general, were slower to react to possible negative target trials as compared
to possible positive target trials, paired t(183) = -10.98, p < 0.001. This finding is
consistent with previous research utilizing this measure (Dearing & Gotlib, 2009).
Participants in this study responded equally quickly in the affirmative conditions (M =
1.11, SD = 0.35) and in the conditions in which a ‘no’ response was indicated (M = 1.11,
SD = .35), paired t(183) = -0.05, p = .96. This result stands in contrast to the previous
work with this measure, where it is typically found that an affirmative answer is faster
than a ‘no’ response (Dearing & Gotlib, 2009).
Study variables and demographic characteristics. Only data for participants
who completed both Time 1 and Time 2 assessments were included in the analyses.
Descriptive statistics for the symptom and interpretive bias variables are presented in
Table 1. Table 2 contains the stressful life event data, including a breakdown of the
frequency of life event occurrences for dependent and independent events.
The average level of current depressive symptoms reported on the BDI-II at Time
1 and Time 2 was somewhat higher than what is typically found in undergraduate
samples (see Kendall & Sheldrick, 2000). At Time 1, 126 participants reported total
scores on the BDI-II that reflected a level of depression in the minimal range (0-13
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Symptom and Interpretive Bias Variables
Variable

n

M

SD

Min

Max

BDI-II – Time 1

207

12.86

8.80

1

44

BDI-II – Time 2

207

12.69

9.96

0

55

IDD-L – Time 1

207

13.71

16.53

0

64

No-Load Condition

207

0.23

0.22

0.00

0.90

Cognitive Load Conditiona

180

0.24

0.23

0.00

0.82

Average RT for Positive Target Trials

184

0.96

0.25

0.51

1.72

Average RT for Negative Target Trials

184

1.10

0.29

0.64

1.94

SST – Time 1

AST – Time 1b

Note. AST = Ambiguous Stories Task; BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory – II; IDD-L
= Inventory to Diagnose Depression – Lifetime Version; RT = Reaction Time (in
seconds); SST = Scrambled Sentences Test
a

Sample size varies for this measure because only participants who correctly recalled the
6-digit cognitive load number and who completed both assessments were included.
b

Sample size varies for this measure because of participants who were excluded due to an
unusually high number of errors, suggestive of difficulty comprehending the task
requirements or inattentiveness during the task.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Stressful Life Event Variables
Variable
SLEQ total overall events – Time 2
SLEQ independent events – Time 2a

n

%

M

SD

Min

Max

207

10.28

10.86

0

129

207

1.57

2.24

0

27

6.91

7.69

0

88

No. participants with 0

57

27.5

No. participants with 1

67

32.4

No. participants with 2

41

19.8

No. participants with 3

23

11.1

No. participants with 4

13

6.3

No. participants with 5+

6

2.9

SLEQ dependent events – Time 2b

207

No. participants with 0

7

3.4

No. participants with 1

16

7.7

No. participants with 2

26

12.6

No. participants with 3

21

10.1

No. participants with 4

23

11.1

No. participants with 5

12

5.8

No. participants with 6

19

9.2

No. participants with 7

11

5.3

No. participants with 8

17

8.2

No. participants with 9

9

4.3

No. participants with 10+

46

22.3

Note. SLEQ = Stressful Life Experiences Questionnaire
a

Out of a possible 34 events coded as independent of the participants’ behaviour or
actions.
b

Out of a possible 105 events coded as at least partially dependent on the participants’
behaviour or actions.
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points); 36 reported scores in the mild range (14-19 points); 32 reported scores in the
moderate range (20-28 points); and 13 reported scores in the severe range (29-63 points;
Beck et al., 1996). Applying Dozois, Dobson, and Ahnberg’s (1998) BDI-II cutoffs for
the classification of undergraduate samples, 119 would be in the nondepressed category
(BDI-II scores from 0-12), 43 would be in the dysphoric category (BDI-II scores from
13-19) and 45 would be in the dysphoric-depressed category (BDI-II scores from 20-63).
At Time 2, similar numbers of participants fell into the BDI-II ranges as delineated
above: 129 in the minimal range, 32 in the mild range, 33 in the moderate range, 13 in the
severe range. There was not a significant difference in the average level of depressive
symptoms reported from Time 1 to Time 2, paired t(206) = 0.30, p = .76. The average
level of symptom severity as reported by the IDD-L in the current study was similar to
that reported in other studies using undergraduate students (e.g., Goldston et al., 1990;
Haaga, McDermut, & Ahrens, 1993).
Overall, participants solved a greater average number of sentences in the no-load
condition of the SST (M = 10.29, SD = 2.25) than in the cognitive load condition (M =
10.00, SD = 2.26), paired t(179) = -1.98, p < 0.05. This finding is consistent with the
assumption that the presence of a cognitive load should have increased the cognitive
demands on the participants, thereby making it more difficult for them to descramble the
sentences as quickly as in the no-load condition. The average negativity ratios on the
cognitive load, t(179) = 8.75, p < .001, and no-load conditions, t(206) = 8.09, p < .001,
were significantly higher compared to previous studies using these measures (e.g., Rude
et al., 2002), and were more consistent with ratios of individuals who were subsequently
diagnosed with a major depressive disorder after an 18 to 28 month interval (Rude et al.,
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2003). Hence, the current sample and/or their responses to the interpretive bias measures
captured by the negativity ratios of the SST in the current study may be different in some
way from those previously examined in the literature.
As stated earlier, Time 1 BDI-II scores and Time 1 IDD-L scores were used as
covariates in all analyses to control for baseline depressive symptoms and prior
depression symptom severity, as is consistent with previous studies in this area (e.g.,
Cummings et al., 2010; Rude et al., 2002; Shih & Eberhart, 2010). To examine whether
age, ethnicity, marital status, past diagnosis history, history of medication use, and/or
history of therapy use were related to any of the pertinent study variables, appropriate
preliminary tests were conducted. Please refer to Appendix I for the detailed outcomes of
these statistical analyses. To minimize the number of covariates required in subsequent
analyses to prevent residual confounding due to mismeasurement, preliminary tests to
ascertain the most ‘potent’ or necessary variables were conducted (Christenfeld, Sloan,
Carroll, & Greenland, 2004). In general, in any of the main analyses including IDD-L
symptom scores as a covariate, self-reported diagnosis, medication, or therapy history
were not also included as covariates. Based on the preliminary analyses, the following
covariates were used in conjunction with the main study variables in statistical analyses:
(a) age, marital status, and ethnicity were covariates with negativity ratio for the no-load
condition on the SST; (b) self-reported diagnosis, therapy, and medication history were
covariates with Time 1 IDD-L scores and Time 2 BDI-II scores (and were used only as
covariates when IDD-L scores were not also used as a covariate); (c) self-reported
therapy history was a covariate with Time 1 BDI-II scores (and was used only when
IDD-L scores were also not included as a covariate); and (d) diagnosis history was a
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covariate with SST ratios for the no-load and cognitive load conditions (and was used as
a covariate only when general psychological distress history, as assessed by the IDD-L,
was included as an additional covariate).
Correlations among study variables. Bivariate and partial correlations (where
applicable), controlling for any relevant covariates as described previously, were
calculated for all study variables (see Table 3). The bivariate correlations between the
baseline measures of interpretive bias ranged from |.05| to |.09| across interpretive bias
tasks (i.e., AST versus SST indices) and from |.58| to |.80| within interpretive bias tasks
(i.e., different indices from the AST or SST). Once age, marital status, ethnicity (for SST
no-load condition), and diagnosis self-reported diagnosis history (for both SST no-load
and cognitive load conditions) were controlled for, the magnitude of these associations
shifted slightly (see upper diagonal in Table 3). Previous studies using similar
interpretive bias measures have noted significant associations among measures (e.g., r =
.13, p < .001; Eley et al., 2008) and between different indices from the same measure
(e.g., r = -.28, p < .05; Hindash & Amir, 2012). Of note, the negativity ratios on the SST
cognitive load and no-load conditions typically correlate anywhere between r = .67 and r
= .74 (Rude et al., 2002, 2003). Overall, the pattern of correlations in the current study
suggested that the different measures of interpretive bias represented conceptually
related, but empirically distinct constructs.
The magnitude of the correlation observed between independent and dependent
life events in the current study (r = .79) was consistent with other stress generation
studies that have utilized questionnaire-based life event assessment (e.g., r = .76, Hankin
et al., 2010; r = .80, Sahl et al., 2009). Although these indexes are statistically related in
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Table 3
Bivariate and Partial Correlations Between Depressive Symptoms, Interpretive Bias
Measures, and Stressful Life Event Variables
Variable
1. BDI-II – Time 1

1.
--

2.
.64***

3.

4.

5.

.32***

.42***

.41***

.28***

.42***

.40***
.18*

2. BDI-II – Time 2

.66***

3. IDD-L

.34***

.36***

--

.20**

4. SST – No-Load Condition

.43***

.41***

.20**

--

5. SST – Load Conditiona

.42***

.41***

.22***

.58***

6. AST – Average RT Positiveb

.02

-.09

.04

.06

.08

7. AST – Average RT Negativeb

-.10

-.14

-.02

-.09

-.05

8. SLEQ Total – Time 2

.11

.36***

.08

.23***

.10

9. SLEQ Independent – Time 2

.07

.30***

.07

.22**

.08

10. SLEQ Dependent – Time 2

.11

.36***

.08

.23***

.10

--

.57***
--

Note. AST = Ambiguous Stories Task; BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory – II; IDD-L
= Inventory to Diagnose Depression – Lifetime Version; RT = Reaction Time (in
seconds); SST = Scrambled Sentences Test; SLEQ = Stressful Life Experiences
Questionnaire.
Note. Bivariate correlations are on the lower diagonal; partial correlations are on the
upper diagonal. Partial correlations with Time 1 BDI-II covaried out the effects of
participants’ self-reported diagnosis history. Partial correlations with Time 2 BDI-II
covaried out the effects of participants’ self-reported diagnosis, therapy, and medication
history. Partial correlations with IDD-L covaried out the effects of participants’ selfreported diagnosis, therapy, and medication history. Partial correlations with SST no-load
condition covaried out the effects of participants’ self-reported age, marital status,
ethnicity, and diagnosis history. Partial correlations with SST cognitive load condition
covaried out the effects of participants’ self-reported diagnosis history.
a
Only included the participants who correctly recalled the 6-digit remember load number
for the purposes of all analyses in this paper (n = 180).
b
Only included the participants who were not excluded because of an unusually high
error rate (n = 184).
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
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Table 3 continued
Bivariate and Partial Correlations Between Depressive Symptoms, Interpretive Bias
Measures, and Stressful Life Event Variables
Variable

6.

7.

8.

9.

1. BDI-II – Time 1

.03

-.10

.11

.07

.11

2. BDI-II – Time 2

-.11

-.15*

.38***

.31***

.37***

3. IDD-L

.04

-.03

.09

.08

.08

4. SST – No-Load Condition

.06

-.09

.24***

.23**

.24**

5. SST – Load Conditiona

.09

-.04

.10

.08

.11

.80***

-.02

-.01

-.03

--

-.10

-.07

-.10

--

.87***

.98***

6. AST – Average RT Positiveb

--

7. AST – Average RT Negativeb

.80***

8. SLEQ Total – Time 2

-.02

-.10

9. SLEQ Independent – Time 2

-.01

-.07

.87***

10. SLEQ Dependent – Time 2

-.03

-.10

.98***

-.79***

10.

.79***
--

Note. AST = Ambiguous Stories Task; BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory – II; IDD-L
= Inventory to Diagnose Depression – Lifetime Version; RT = Reaction Time (in
seconds); SST = Scrambled Sentences Test; SLEQ = Stressful Life Experiences
Questionnaire.
Note. Bivariate correlations are on the lower diagonal; partial correlations are on the
upper diagonal. Partial correlations with Time 1 BDI-II covaried out the effects of
participants’ self-reported diagnosis history. Partial correlations with Time 2 BDI-II
covaried out the effects of participants’ self-reported diagnosis, therapy, and medication
history. Partial correlations with IDD-L covaried out the effects of participants’ selfreported diagnosis, therapy, and medication history. Partial correlations with SST no-load
condition covaried out the effects of participants’ self-reported age, marital status,
ethnicity, and diagnosis history. Partial correlations with SST cognitive load condition
covaried out the effects of participants’ self-reported diagnosis history.
a
Only included the participants who correctly recalled the 6-digit remember load number
for the purposes of all analyses in this paper (n = 180).
b
Only included the participants who were not excluded because of an unusually high
error rate (n = 184).
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

68
the current study, they are conceptually different according to stress generation theory
(Hammen, 1991, 2006). In fact, previous researchers have suggested that vulnerable
individuals may live in family contexts and choose friends that increase their risk of both
dependent life and independent life events (e.g., family member’s poor health; Harkness
& Stewart, 2009). Hence, if broader social circumstances contribute to independent life
events beyond the individual’s control, they may also increase the risk of dependent life
events within that same environment.
Question 1 - Does Interpretive Bias Predict Changes in Depressive Symptoms?
The first objective of this study was to explore whether interpretive biases, as
measured by the SST and AST, were related to concurrent depressive symptoms and
depression symptom history at Time 1, and if they predicted increases in depressive
symptoms at Time 2. More specifically, concurrent depressive symptoms and depression
symptom history were expected to be related to a greater proportion of negative sentences
constructed on the SST and to faster response latencies for negative story endings (and
slower reactions times for benign or positive story endings) on the AST. Furthermore, a
higher proportion of negative sentences constructed on the SST no-load and cognitive
load conditions, as well as faster response latencies for negative story endings and slower
response latencies for benign or positive story endings on the AST, were hypothesized to
predict greater increases in depressive symptoms over the 5-week period.
Bivariate and partial correlations were used to investigate the concurrent
relationship among interpretive bias and Time 1 depressive symptom measures.
Consistent with hypotheses, negativity ratios on the SST for both the no-load and
cognitive load conditions were significantly related to higher scores on the BDI-II and
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IDD-L at Time 1, both with and without covariates. Contrary to hypotheses, neither the
average reaction time for positive target trials nor the average reaction time for negative
target trials on the AST, were significantly related to Time 1 BDI-II scores or Time 1
IDD-L scores, with or without demographic covariates.
Hierarchical linear regression analyses controlling for demographic covariates
(i.e., age and marital status, where applicable), as well as Time 1 BDI-II and IDD-L, were
used to examine whether baseline interpretive bias factors predicted depressive symptoms
at five-week follow-up. In the first step, demographic covariates related to the criterion
variable or interpretive bias predictor variable were entered, where applicable (see Tables
4 through 7).7 In all instances, Time 1 depressive symptomatology (BDI-II scores) and
Time 1 depressive symptom history (IDD-L scores) predicted Time 2 BDI-II
significantly. In the final step, the interpretive bias variables were entered individually in
a series of separate regressions predicting Time 2 depression.
Results indicated that negativity ratios for both the no-load8 and cognitive load
conditions on the SST (ps < .05) significantly predicted follow-up depressive symptoms,
as did the average reaction time for positive target trials on AST (p < .05). Consistent
with hypotheses, higher negativity ratios (i.e., higher proportion of scrambled sentences
solved in a negative way, relative to the total number of sentences solved) on the SST
predicted increased levels of depressive symptoms at Time 2, over and above baseline
covariates and Time 1 symptoms. In contrast to expectations, faster average reaction

7

No demographic covariates were necessary in the analyses contained in Tables 5 through 7, since Time 1
IDD-L scores served as the sole covariate for previous psychological distress. See Appendix L for further
details.
8
The pattern of results was identical in analyses conducted without any demographic covariates included
(Simmons et al., 2011).

Table 4
Hierarchical Linear Regression Prospectively Predicting Depressive Symptoms from Negativity Ratio on SST No-Load Condition
F

∆F

R

∆R2

df

1.03

1.03

.12

.02

3, 199

B

SE of B

β

t

Age

-0.43

0.36

-.13

-1.20

Marital Status

2.90

4.45

.07

0.65

Ethnicity

0.54

0.43

.09

1.28

BDI-II – Time 1

0.73

0.06

0.66

12.67***

IDD-L

0.08

0.03

0.14

2.66*

2.38

0.14

2.49*

Step and variable entered
Step 1: Demographic Covariates

Step 2: Baseline Depression

Step 3: Interpretive Bias Variable – SST
No-Load Condition

46.30***

40.64***

112.47***

6.21*

.74

.74

.52

.01

2, 197

1, 196
5.94

Note. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory-II; IDD-L = Inventory to Diagnose Depression, Lifetime Version; SST = Scrambled
Sentences Test
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
70

Table 5
Hierarchical Linear Regression Prospectively Predicting Depressive Symptoms from Negativity Ratios on SST Cognitive Load
Condition
Step and variable entered
Step 1: Baseline Depression

F

∆F

86.39***

86.39***

R
.71

∆R2
.50

df

B

SE of B

β

t

2, 172

BDI-II – Time 1

0.69

0.06

0.65

11.49***

IDD-L

0.07

0.03

0.13

2.28*

6.66

2.23

0.17

2.99**

Step 3: Interpretive Bias Variable – SST
Cognitive Load Condition

63.23***

8.93**

.73

.02

1, 171

Note. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory-II; IDD-L = Inventory to Diagnose Depression, Lifetime Version; SST = Scrambled
Sentences Test
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
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Table 6
Hierarchical Linear Regression Prospectively Predicting Depressive Symptoms from Average Reaction Time for Positive Target
Trials on the Ambiguous Stories Task
∆R2

df

.73

.54

2, 179

SE of B

β

t

BDI-II – Time 1

0.77

0.06

0.66

12.28***

IDD-L

0.09

0.03

0.16

3.00**

-4.40

1.97

-0.11

-2.23*

Step 1: Baseline Depression

Step 2: Interpretive Bias Variable – AST
Average RT for Positive Target Trials

F

∆F

R

B

Step and variable entered

104.57*** 104.57***

72.93***

4.99*

.74

.01

1, 178

Note. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory-II; IDD-L = Inventory to Diagnose Depression, Lifetime Version; RT = Reaction Time
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
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Table 7
Hierarchical Linear Regression Prospectively Predicting Depressive Symptoms from Average Reaction Time for Negative Target
Trials on the Ambiguous Stories Task
SE of B

β

t

BDI-II – Time 1

0.75

0.06

0.66

12.44***

IDD-L

0.10

0.03

0.18

3.32**

-2.93

1.64

-0.09

-1.79†

Step 1: Baseline Depression

Step 2: Interpretive Bias Variable – AST
Average RT for Negative Target Trials

F

∆F

∆R2

B

Step and variable entered

109.42*** 109.42***

74.93***

3.21†

R
.74

.75

.55

.01

df
2, 177

1, 176

Note. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory-II; IDD-L = Inventory to Diagnose Depression, Lifetime Version; RT = Reaction Time
†

p = .07; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
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times on AST test trials that were completed with a positive ending were also predictive
of higher levels of depressive symptomatology at Time 2, over and above the effects of
Time 1 symptoms. There was also a trend-level effect for average reaction time for
negative target trials on the AST (p = .07). This trend was in the direction hypothesized;
faster average reaction times on AST test trials completed with a negative ending were
predictive of higher levels of depressive symptomatology at Time 2, above and beyond
the effects of Time 1 symptoms.9
Question 2 - Does Interpretive Bias Predict Stress Generation?
The second primary objective was to examine interpretive bias for ambiguous
social information as a contributor to stress generation. Generally, interpretive bias was
expected to uniquely predict the occurrence of dependent life events, and be unrelated to
the frequency of independent life events reported by participants. Specifically, a higher
proportion of negative sentences constructed on the SST, as well as faster response
latencies for negative story endings and slower response latencies for benign or positive
story endings on the AST, were hypothesized to predict the occurrence of more life
stressors at least partially dependent on participants’ behaviours (i.e., dependent events)
by Time 2. The indices of interpretive bias were not expected to be predictive of the
occurrence of fateful stressors (i.e., independent events).
Four sets of negative binomial regression analyses were conducted to test whether
interpretive bias would predict dependent life stress, but not independent life stress, over
the 5-week follow-up. In each regression analysis, dependent and independent life stress

9

Inclusion of all observations (n = 207) resulted in a similar pattern of results, with a greater degree of
statistical significance across all variables.
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variables were regressed onto relevant demographic characteristic covariates (where
applicable), baseline BDI-II symptoms, and baseline IDD-L symptoms all entered in the
same step. In a second iteration of the models, an individual interpretive bias variable was
separately added to the model and the incremental gain in prediction was compared
against the initial model that did not include the interpretive bias variable.
Please refer to Appendix J for a detailed explanation of how model fit and gain in
prediction were examined in the negative binomial regression models. Appendix J also
contains the summary tables (Tables A through C) of the baseline negative binomial
models for the prediction of independent and dependent life stress from relevant
demographic covariates and baseline depressive symptoms and depression history. The
omnibus test (i.e., the LR χ2) for all of these analyses was statistically significant,
indicating that individual regression coefficients should be inspected to determine
whether any variables were significant predictors of independent and dependent life
events. In each set of negative binomial regression models, Time 1 depressive symptom
scores assessed by the BDI-II were significant predictors of both independent and
dependent life events reported at Time 2. Specifically, for each point increase in the
participants’ BDI-II scores at Time 1 (e.g., from a total symptom score of 0 to 1),
participants were expected to report 1.02 times as many independent and dependent life
events at Time 2. No other demographics or clinical covariates were significant
predictors of the frequency of independent and dependent life events reported at Time 2.
The critical test of stress generation compares the relative gain in prediction of
independent and dependent life stress by adding in the various interpretive bias variables.
The comparison of the baseline model (e.g., model with all covariates and baseline
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control variables) versus the model with the addition of an interpretive bias variable
(Table 8) yields this information. According to stress generation theory, factors that
increase vulnerability to stress generation should uniquely relate to dependent, but not
independent, life stress (Hammen, 2006; Liu & Alloy, 2010). As can be seen in Table 8,
the average reaction times for positive trials on the AST uniquely and significantly
improved prediction for dependent life stress, but not independent life stress, according to
both the Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion
(BIC). Specifically, the model including the average reaction times for positive trials on
the AST had a lower AIC and BIC than that of the model that did not contain this
additional predictor (e.g., model containing baseline depressive symptoms and depression
history), suggesting that the inclusion of the AST variable significantly improved
prediction of the occurrence of dependent life stress, but not the prediction of
independent life stress. A participant with an average reaction time score of 0.00 seconds
to positive target trials would be expected to report 0.59 times as many dependent life
events as a participant with an average reaction time of 1.00 seconds. In other words,
faster responses to ambiguous stories completed with a positive ending were associated
with greater numbers of dependent life events. In contrast, in the model containing the
average reaction times for negative trials on the AST, as well as the models for the SST
negativity ratios for the no-load and cognitive load conditions, there was no evidence that
the interpretive bias variables contributed significantly to the prediction of the outcome.
There was no evidence from decreases in the AIC or BIC scores for an improvement in
prediction, and the z-tests for the individual interpretive bias indices did not indicate
significant prediction, despite the statistically significant
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Table 8
Negative Binomial Models Predicting Life Stress from Interpretive Bias Variables
Model

IRR
(95% C.I.)

z

LR χ2

AIC

BIC

0.97

16.24*

548.51

675.09

-0.64

8.18*

554.84

570.74

-1.32

12.35**

579.02

595.04

-0.77

11.18*

580.18

596.20

0.82

25.44***

1151.13

1177.71

0.18

12.41**

988.79

1004.70

-2.31*

21.00***

1020.66

1036.68

-1.14

17.06***

1024.60

1040.62

Predicted Outcome: Rate ILS
SST Negativity
- No Loada, 10
SST Negativity
- Cognitive Loadb
AST Mean RT for
Positive Trialsc
AST Mean RT for
Negative Trialsc

1.37
(0.72-260)
0.80
(0.40-1.58)
0.69
(0.40-1.20)
0.83
(0.52-1.33)

Predicted Outcome: Rate DLS
SST Negativity
- No Loada, 10
SST Negativity
- Cognitive Loadb
AST Mean RT for
Positive Trialsc
AST Mean RT for
Negative Trialsc

1.25
(0.74-2.12)
1.05
(0.62-1.78)
0.59
(0.38-0.92)
0.81
(0.56-1.16)

Note. Each row represents a separate model for the prediction of frequency of life
stressors. To avoid redundancy, the relevant statistics for the necessary covariates
included in each model (i.e., as described in Tables A through C in Appendix J, e.g., age,
baseline depression) are not shown. z = b/SE. IRR = incidence rate ratio (i.e., the
exponentiated unstandardized regression coefficient, eb). LR = likelihood ratio. AIC =
Akaike’s information criterion. BIC = Bayesian information criterion. ILS = independent
life stress. DLS = dependent life stress. SST = Scrambled Sentences Test. AST =
Ambiguous Stories Task. AIC and BIC values in bold are those that are less than the
values obtained from the model containing only the covariates and control variables (see
Tables A through C in Appendix J for the relevant AIC and BIC for each interpretive bias
variable model).
a
n = 205, df = 8 for LR χ2; b n = 178, df = 5 for LR χ2; c n = 182, df = 5
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
10

The pattern of results was identical in analyses conducted without any demographic covariates included.
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omnibus tests for all models (LR χ2).11 This suggests that the models including the
interpretive bias variables were equally as predictive of Time 2 stressors, as the more
simplified models containing only the relevant demographic covariates and baseline
depressive symptomatology and depression symptom history; the inclusion of
interpretive bias variables did not provide increased prediction in the outcome variable.
Question 3 - Does Interpretive Bias Interact With Stressful Life Events to Predict
Changes in Depressive Symptoms?
The third, and final, objective of this study was to examine interpretive bias
within the context of a diathesis-stress framework (interactional/moderation model; Beck,
1987). Moderation hypotheses were tested according to Baron and Kenny’s (1986)
guidelines. Consistent with Friedrich’s procedure (1982), the cross-product of the
standardized independent variables was used as the interaction term, and all independent
and dependent variables were standardized. This study examined whether individuals
high in certain interpretive biases would experience higher levels of depressive symptoms
in response to dependent life events, as compared to individuals with lower levels of
these variables. If this model fits the data, the variance in depressive symptoms accounted
for by the interaction term would be significant, even after controlling for the main
effects of the interpretive bias variable and dependent life stress over a five-week period.
In particular, participants who solved a higher proportion of sentences with negative
11

Inclusion of all observations (n = 207) resulted in a similar pattern of results. The differences in
these analyses (including the 2 participants with extreme responding patterns on the SLEQ) were
that the significant effect of AST positive trials on dependent life stress fell to trend-level (p =
.064), the effect of SST cognitive load condition on dependent life stress increased to trend-level
(p = .065), and SST no-load condition significantly predicted both independent and dependent life
stress (p < .001).
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solutions on the SST, and participants who displayed faster response latencies for
negative story endings and slower response latencies for benign or positive story endings
on the AST, in the context of higher frequencies of life events, were hypothesized to be at
the most elevated risk for increases in depressive symptoms, compared to participants
with lower frequencies of life events or more positive patterns of interpretive bias.
A series of hierarchical linear regression analyses were used to examine the
interaction between each baseline interpretive bias variable and dependent stress,
predicting BDI-II at five-week follow-up. For each linear regression equation, the
standardized version of each interpretive bias variable, dependent stress, and the
interaction between interpretive bias variable and dependent stress (controlling for
baseline BDI-II, IDD-L, and independent life stress) were entered (see Tables 9 through
12 for a list of the interpretive bias indices variables used in the separate equations).
Consistent with earlier analyses, baseline depressive symptoms, previous depressive
symptom history, independent life events, and dependent life events were significant
predictors of depressive symptoms at follow-up. Additionally, negativity ratios for the
no-load and cognitive load conditions from the SST, but not average reaction times for
trials from the AST, were significant predictors of Time 2 BDI-II scores even after
controlling for other symptom and life event variables. In contrast to expectations, none
of the four interpretive bias variables was a significant predictor of depressive symptoms
in interaction with dependent stress (p > .05), when the main effects, baseline BDI-II,
baseline IDD-L and independent life stress were controlled for statistically.12

12

As per Simmons et al.’s (2011) recommendations, these analyses were also re-conducted without any
demographic covariates or including all observations (n = 207). The pattern of results was identical to those
reported above and below.

Table 9
Diathesis-Stress (Moderation) Analyses Predicting Depressive Symptoms: SST Negativity No-Load Condition
F

∆F

R

∆R2

df

1.14

1.14

.13

.02

3, 198

B

SE of B

β

t

Age

-0.05

0.04

-0.15

-1.40

Marital Status

0.38

0.47

0.09

0.82

Ethnicity

0.05

0.04

0.09

1.22

BDI-II – Time 1

0.62

0.05

0.62

12.16***

IDD-L

0.12

0.05

0.12

2.43*

SLEQ Independent Life Stress

0.28

0.05

0.28

5.83***

SST No-Load Condition

0.12

0.05

0.12

2.18*

SLEQ Dependent Life Stress

0.24

0.08

0.24

3.11**

-0.06

0.04

-0.11

-1.40

Step and variable entered
Step 1:

Step 2:

Step 3:

Step 4:
SST No-Load x SLEQ Dependent

41.85***

35.50***

31.93***

81.17***

7.76***

1.96

.75

.77

.77

.55

.03

.00

3, 195

2, 193

1, 192

Note. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory-II; IDD-L = Inventory to Diagnose Depression, Lifetime Version; SST = Scrambled
Sentences Test; SLEQ = Stressful Life Experiences Questionnaire
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
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Table 10
Diathesis-Stress (Moderation) Analyses Predicting Depressive Symptoms: SST Negativity Cognitive Load Condition
F

∆F

R

∆R2

df

78.78***

78.78***

.76

.58

3, 172

B

SE of B

β

t

BDI-II – Time 1

0.63

0.05

0.63

11.97***

IDD-L

0.13

0.05

0.13

2.54*

SLEQ Independent Life Stress

0.31

0.05

0.31

6.18***

SST Cognitive Load Condition

0.13

0.05

0.13

2.47*

SLEQ Dependent Life Stress

0.27

0.08

0.27

3.34**

-0.01

0.07

-0.01

-0.17

Step and variable entered
Step 1: 13

Step 2:

Step 3:
SST Load x SLEQ Dependent

55.10***

45.66***

8.83***

0.03

.79

.79

.04

.00

2, 170

1, 169

Note. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory-II; IDD-L = Inventory to Diagnose Depression, Lifetime Version; SST = Scrambled
Sentences Test; SLEQ = Stressful Life Experiences Questionnaire
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

13

No demographic covariates were necessary in these analyses, since Time 1 IDD-L scores served as the sole covariate for previous psychological distress. See
Appendix L for further details.
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Table 11
Diathesis-Stress (Moderation) Analyses Predicting Depressive Symptoms: AST Average Reaction Time for Positive Target Trials
F

∆F

R

∆R2

df

87.16***

87.16***

.77

.60

3, 177

B

SE of B

β

t

BDI-II – Time 1

0.63

0.05

0.63

12.34***

IDD-L

0.16

0.05

0.16

3.12**

SLEQ Independent Life Stress

0.29

0.05

0.29

6.00***

Average RT for Positive Target Trials

-0.08

0.05

-0.08

-1.67

SLEQ Dependent Life Stress

0.24

0.08

0.24

3.01**

0.05

0.09

0.3

0.54

Step and variable entered
Step 1:14

Step 2:

Step 3:
AST Positive x SLEQ Dependent

58.00***

48.18***

6.35**

0.29

.79

.79

.03

.00

2, 175

1, 174

Note. AST = Ambiguous Stories Task; BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory-II; IDD-L = Inventory to Diagnose Depression, Lifetime
Version; RT = Reaction Time; SLEQ = Stressful Life Experiences Questionnaire
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

14

No demographic covariates were necessary in these analyses, since Time 1 IDD-L scores served as the sole covariate for previous psychological distress. See
Appendix L for further details.
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Table 12
Diathesis-Stress (Moderation) Analyses Predicting Depressive Symptoms: AST Average Reaction Time for Negative Target Trials
F

∆F

R

∆R2

df

87.16***

87.16***

.77

.60

3, 177

B

SE of B

β

t

BDI-II – Time 1

0.63

0.05

0.63

12.34***

IDD-L

0.16

0.05

0.16

3.12**

SLEQ Independent Life Stress

0.29

0.05

0.29

6.00***

Average RT for Negative Target Trials

-0.08

0.05

-0.08

-1.61

SLEQ Dependent Life Stress

0.24

0.08

0.24

3.10**

-0.01

0.07

-0.01

-0.12

Step and variable entered
Step 1:15

Step 2:

Step 3:
AST Negative x SLEQ Dependent

57.90***

47.98***

6.25**

0.01

.79

.79

.03

.00

2, 175

1, 174

Note. AST = Ambiguous Stories Task; BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory-II; IDD-L = Inventory to Diagnose Depression, Lifetime
Version; RT = Reaction Time; SLEQ = Stressful Life Experiences Questionnaire
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

15

No demographic covariates were necessary in these analyses, since Time 1 IDD-L scores served as the sole covariate for previous psychological distress. See
Appendix L for further details.
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Discussion
The purpose of this study was to investigate interpretive bias for ambiguous social
information within the context of stress and depression. Two-hundred-and-seven young
women participated in a prospective study with a five-week period between the two
assessment points. This study had several methodological advantages, including the
utilization of multiple forms of assessment of interpretive bias using process-based
measurement; multiple points of measurement of depressive symptoms and depression
symptom history using well-validated instruments; and a comprehensive list of life events
that was scored for independence and dependence by Ph.D.-level raters with experience
in contextual rating systems. Importantly, this was the first study to explore interpretive
bias in the context of life stress. This research is also the first to examine both stress
generation and diathesis-stress models within the same sample as a way of integrating the
information processing variable of interpretive bias, into the broader cognitive
vulnerability literature.
Does Interpretive Bias Predict Changes in Depressive Symptoms?
To begin with, two measures of interpretive bias—the SST and AST—were
examined in relation to concurrent depressive symptoms and depression history.
Consistent with hypotheses, negativity ratios on the SST in the cognitive load and noload conditions were significantly related to Time 1 depressive symptoms and Time 1
self-reported history of depression. Specifically, increased negativity ratios (i.e., greater
negative interpretive bias) for the load and no-load conditions were related to higher
BDI-II symptoms and greater lifetime depression symptom endorsement on the IDD-L.
These results are consistent with previous studies that have examined the SST in relation
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to concurrent depression (Rude et al., 2002, 2003). Contrary to expectations, average RTs
for positive and negative target trials on the AST were unrelated to either concurrent
depressive symptoms or depression history at Time 1. This finding is consistent with
previous work that has shown that RTs on this task are not contingent on participant’s
past or current mental disorder, but instead may distinguish participants in their
vulnerability to subsequent depression (e.g., risk status as the daughter of a mother with a
history of depression versus the daughter of a never-disordered mother; Dearing &
Gotlib, 2009). This finding is also consistent with many of the negative results of
researchers who have used reaction time indices with non-self-referential stimuli (Bisson
& Sears, 2007; Lawson & MacLeod, 1999; Mogg et al., 2006). However, RTs on the
AST, while not related to depression concurrently, may predict depression over time or
predict the stressors which subsequently lead to later depression.
Beyond concurrent relationships, the extent to which interpretive biases predicted
changes in depressive symptoms over the 5-week follow-up was also examined.
Consistent with expectation, the results demonstrated that three of the four indices of
interpretive bias were significantly predictive of Time 2 depression symptoms, over and
above the effects of baseline covariates and Time 1 symptoms. As would be expected,
higher negativity ratios on the SST cognitive load and no-load conditions predicted
increases in depressive symptomatology over the follow-up interval. Thus, increased
negative bias in the interpretation of ambiguity was related to changes in depressive
symptoms over the 5-week period. This finding suggests that negative interpretive bias
may be a risk factor for the development of depression, and is consistent with previous
studies that have shown that interpretive bias can predict negative shifts in mood (Wisco
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& Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010, 2011), changes in depressive symptoms (Rude et al., 2002),
and the eventual onset of major depressive episodes (Rude et al., 2003, 2010).
These results provide additional support for the theoretical claim of cognitive
models of depression that information processing biases—in this case, biases in resolving
ambiguous social information—predict subsequent symptoms of depression (Beck, 1964;
D. A. Clark et al., 1999). Importantly, these results were obtained while controlling for
concurrent depressive symptoms (Time 1 BDI-II scores) and reported worst lifetime
symptoms of depression (Time 1 IDD-L scores). This finding is significant, given that
prior depression is the single best predictor of subsequent depression (e.g., Hankin et al.,
1998; Harrington et al., 1990; Lewinsohn et al., 1989; Rao et al., 1999). These results
suggest the importance of the presence of a negative processing bias in predicting
subsequent depression. Moreover, scores on the SST did predict changes in depressive
symptoms, despite the fact that a relatively short follow-up period was used. This finding
suggests that a theoretically significant role exists for interpretive biases in depression
vulnerability. Further, it provides additional rationale for the importance of therapeutic
efforts, through CBM-I (e.g., Blackwell & Holmes, 2010; Holmes et al., 2009) and
cognitive behavioural therapy (Beck & Dozois, 2011), to modify interpretive bias to treat
and/or prevent the onset and recurrence of MDE.
At the same time, one cannot conclude definitively that these interpretive biases
caused subsequent depressive symptoms. For instance, the results may have been
impacted by remnant “scars” from previous experiences with dysphoria and depression
(Lewinsohn et al., 1981; Rohde, Lewinsohn, & Seeley, 1990; Zeiss & Lewinsohn, 1988).
According to the “scar” hypothesis, depression may remit but leave psychological scars,
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such as negative cognitive patterns, that were not present prior to the depressive episode
and therefore could not have caused it in the first place. Unfortunately, almost all studies
that have examined this hypothesis in depression have failed to find evidence of scars
despite the theoretical and conceptual logic for the existence of them (for review, see
Wichers, Geschwind, van Os, & Peeters, 2010). In the current study, interpretive biases
would not be expected to add uniquely to the prediction of subsequent depression
symptoms if they were simply the result of past experiences of dysphoria or depression,
especially given that the most powerful predictors of depression – concurrent and worst
lifetime symptom reports – were statistically controlled for in earlier steps of the analyses
(e.g., Hankin et al., 1998; Harrington et al., 1990; Lewinsohn et al., 1989; Rao et al.,
1999). Hence, the results found may provide important information about the role of
interpretive bias in depression risk.
These results could also be suggestive of a common causal risk factor for both
interpretive bias and depression. One such third factor could be the personality or
temperamental predisposition of neuroticism or negative affectivity/negative emotionality
(Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). Individuals high on neuroticism are more emotionally
reactive; have a proclivity for experiencing negative mood states, such as anxiety,
depression, and anger; have difficulty regulating their negative emotional reactions; and
may interpret ordinary situations in a threatening manner (e.g., Costa & McCrae, 1992;
Espejo et al., 2011; H. J. Eysenck, 1970). Indeed, by its very definition, the personality
disposition of neuroticism can be manifested as a cognitive process (M. Martin, 1985).
Research examining other forms of information processing biases (e.g., attention,
memory) have found support for the association between neuroticism and cognitive

88
biases (e.g., Chan et al., 2007; M. Martin, Ward, & Clark, 1983; Reed & Derryberry,
1995; Ruiz-Caballero & Bermúdez, 1995). In the two studies that have examined
personality and interpretive bias, results have been mixed (Dodd, Hudson, Morris, &
Wise, 2012; Muris, Meesters, & Rompelberg, 2007), but there is the suggestion that
personality may be positively associated with interpretive bias in child samples.
Furthermore, recent research demonstrates that cognitive factors may be a proximalspecific mechanism mediating the relationship between distal temperamental
vulnerabilities and depression (e.g., Barnhofer & Chittka, 2010; Hong & Paunonen, 2011;
Kercher, Rapee, & Schniering, 2009; Lakdawalla & Hankin, 2008). Hence, it may be the
case that interpretive bias is one such mediator variable in this type of relationship. At the
same time, current research examining the distinctness and independent contribution of
personality traits and cognitive vulnerability factors to depression supports the notion that
they are separate, distinguishable and not a theoretically overlapping, single generic
vulnerability to depression (L. A. Clark, Watson, & Mineka, 1994; Hankin, Fraley, &
Abela, 2005; Hankin, Lakdawalla, Carter, Abela, & Adams, 2007; Zuroff, Mongrain, &
Santor, 2004). Future studies should examine the relationship between
temperament/personality vulnerabilities and interpretive bias in adult samples to gain a
better understanding of their unique and combined influences in the development of
depression.
Interestingly, faster average reaction times on positive AST trials were related to
higher levels of depressive symptoms at Time 2, above and beyond the effects of
covariates and Time 1 symptoms. This result suggests that individuals vulnerable to
depression have enhanced processing of ambiguous information, such as social stories
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that resolve in a positive manner, and hence may be quicker to resolve the ambiguity in a
positive way. The direction of this result was opposite to what was predicted, based on
the hypothesis that participants should be slower to response to positive endings which
are inconsistent with their negatively biased interpretation of the scenarios (Dearing &
Gotlib, 2009; MacLeod & Cohen, 1993). Follow-up analyses, examining general
information processing tendencies on this measure, revealed that participants were
somewhat atypical in their response patterns compared to previous work using this
measure (e.g., Dearing & Gotlib, 2009).
Similarly, the apparent facilitated processing of positive story endings in those
individuals who went on to experience increases in depressive symptoms is inconsistent
with previous work on interpretive biases (e.g., Lawson & MacLeod, 1999; Sears et al.,
2011) and other information processing tendencies in depression (e.g., Azorin, Benhaïm,
Hasbroucq, & Possamaï, 1995; Bruder, Yozawitz, Berenhaus, & Sutton, 1980; D. G.
Byrne, 1976; Siegle, Granholm, Ingram, & Matt, 2001). Specifically, depression is
associated with a general slowing of reaction times to execute voluntary responses
(Azorin et al., 1995; Bruder et al., 1980) and greater variability in individuals’ response
latencies (D. G. Byrne, 1976). Hence, some researchers have suggested that reaction time
indices may be insensitive to cognitive processing biases in depressed populations
(Moretti et al., 1996). Furthermore, depression is more typically characterized by both a
presence of negative biases and absence of protective biases that facilitate the processing
of positive information (for review, see Trew, 2011). Hence, it may be the case that the
current sample is anomalous and this result is uninterpretable, or that this statistically
significant result is due to chance or Type I error.
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This counterintuitive result also may be indicative of the variability and
inconsistency related to examining interpretive bias in the context of depression.
Numerous other studies have had difficulty finding expected relations between
interpretive bias and depression, especially in studies that rely on reaction time indices
(Bisson & Sears, 2007; Lawson & MacLeod, 1999; Mogg et al., 2006; Sears et al., 2011).
This may be because individuals currently in a dysphoric state demonstrate repressor
effects or attempts at mood repair when faced with ambiguous social information
(Creswell & Myers, 2002; Kovacs, Rottenberg, & George, 2009; Weinberger, Schwartz,
& Davidson, 1979). For example, those individuals with a repressive coping style
(repressors) tend to avoid negative affect. As a result, direct self-report measures may not
be able to elicit accurate information about interpretive bias from individuals with this
tendency (see Myers, 2000, for a review) and reaction time measures may be
systematically biased towards increased latencies for repressors (e.g., Weinberger et al.,
1979). However, if mood repair or repressor effects were impacting these results
participants would display longer rather than shorter reaction times in relation to
depressive symptoms (Detweiler-Bedell & Salovey, 2003; Joormann & Siemer, 2004;
Josephson, 1996; Rusting & DeHart, 2000; Weinberger et al., 1979).
These findings, together with the results of other studies that have failed to
support the validity of reaction time based assessment, suggest that alternate methods for
assessing interpretive bias may be necessary. One potential avenue that has recently been
investigated is differential error rates in response to positive and negative targets (Sears et
al., 2011) and psychophysiological correlates of interpretive bias (Lawson et al., 2002).
Future studies, using multiple indices of interpretive bias, are needed to determine under
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what circumstances reaction times provide a good indicator of interpretation of ambiguity
tendencies.
Does Interpretive Bias Predict Stress Generation?
Interpretive bias was also examined as a contributor to the generation of
dependent, but not independent, life stress. Because of the strong relationship between
previous experiences of depression and stress generation (e.g., Davila et al., 1995;
Hammen, 1991; Potthoff et al., 1995), all analyses statistically controlled for Time 1
depressive symptoms and Time 1 depression history to eliminate the potential of
confound due to mood-congruent effects of depression on memory. This analytic strategy
provided a powerful way to test the unique contribution of interpretive bias on stress
generation beyond any effects of depression.
The current study found evidence for a role of interpretive bias in stress
generation. In particular, facilitated processing of positive endings to ambiguous stories
(i.e., faster reaction times) was associated with increases in the occurrence of dependent
life stressors, but not independent life stressors. This result was found, even after
controlling for the significant influence of past depression symptom history and baseline
depressive symptoms. This finding suggests that individuals’ tendencies in reacting to
positive story endings were related to an increase in reporting subsequent dependent life
events, preferentially, over the 5-week study interval. This facilitation for processing of
positive story endings stands in opposition to what was originally hypothesized and may
be due to anomalies with this particular index of interpretive bias (see discussion in
previous section about potential challenges with this index of interpretive bias and the
possibility of Type I error). It also contrasts the general body of literature supporting
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compromised information processing of positively-valenced affective material in those
at-risk for depression and those currently depressed (e.g., Joormann & Gotlib, 2006,
2007; Joormann, Talbot, & Gotlib, 2007; Suslow, Junghanns, & Arolt, 2001), who may
also be at-risk for stress generation by virtue of that same information processing
vulnerability.
At the same time, if this result is replicable, it presents a novel finding that may be
related to research demonstrating that dysphoric individuals are particularly vigilant in
their social-information processing (Weary & Edwards, 1994; Yost & Weary, 1996). In
the current sample, facilitated reaction times to positive story endings could be one
manifestation of motivated information-seeking and -processing required for the
enhanced ability to draw inferences following ambiguous social information in those who
may be dysphoric or at-risk for depression (Harkness, Jacobson, Sinclair, Chan, &
Sabbagh, 2011; Harkness, Sabbagh, Jacobson, Chowdrey, & Chen, 2005). In contrast to
the hypothesized interference effect due to a greater tendency to make negative
interpretations, it may be the case that faster response times for positive story endings
represent an indicator of hypersensitivity to the personality and behaviour of others that
enables them to more accurately decode their mental states. However, if this were the
case, response facilitation to all valences of story endings (i.e., for both positive and
negative story endings) would be expected, given a generalized social information
processing hypervigilance. Theoretically, this hypersensitivity could inadvertently lead to
dependent life stress through problematic interpersonal behaviours related to socialcognition that are already known to be related to stress generation and/or depression, such
as excessive reassurance seeking and negative feedback seeking (Borelli & Prinstein,
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2006; Evraire & Dozois, 2011; Joiner & Metalsky, 2001; Joiner, Metalsky, Katz, &
Beach, 1999; Nepon, Flett, Hewitt, & Molnar, 2011; Pettit & Joiner, 2001; Potthoff et al.,
1995; Shih & Eberhart, 2008, 2010). Future research should explore the possible
associations between interpretive bias, theory of mind, and interpersonal behaviours to
determine if the suggested pathways from interpretation of an ambiguous situation to
stress generation are valid. Additionally, studies should examine the convergence and
discrepancy between interpretive bias for positive and negative information to ascertain if
and under what circumstances one or both relate to stress generation.
Alternately, this facilitation for positive story endings on the AST could be a
manifestation of the perfectionistic tendency for facilitated information processing of
stimuli that is not self-descriptive of the ideal-self (Hewitt & Genest, 1990). Individuals
with high levels of self-criticism or perfectionism may have developed an expertise and
heightened sensitivity for the ideal outcome to situations. Their interpretations of
ambiguity may be coloured by this perspective of what they believe should happen. They
may generate life stress inadvertently due to these overly self-critical or perfectionistic
personality features, which result in difficulties in their interpersonal relationships
(increased conflict, lack of social support) or academic/occupational functioning (trying
to accomplish too much and becoming overloaded; Priel & Shahar, 2000; Shahar et al.,
2004; Shahar & Priel, 2003). Future studies should examine the role of perfectionism and
other personality factors to determine potential moderating and mediating relationships
with interpretive bias and life stress.
In contrast, no additional evidence for a role of interpretive bias in stress
generation was found. Instead, negative proportion scores for the no-load and cognitive
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load conditions on the SST, as well as the reaction times for negative target trials on the
AST, did not contribute additional prediction to either independent or dependent life
stress. Contrary to hypotheses, there was no association between the tendency to
unscrambled sentences in a negative manner or in facilitated processing of negative
endings to ambiguous stories and the likelihood of experiencing stressful life events over
the 5-week interval. However, this is consistent with the bivariate and partial correlations
(see Table 3) which also suggest that these indices of interpretive bias may not all be
related to life stress, especially once the impact of past depression history and baseline
depressive symptoms were controlled for statistically (Rude et al., 2002). The lack of
results for the other indices of interpretive bias as significant predictors of stress
generation was somewhat surprising, given the extant empirical support for other
cognitive factors (Abela & Hankin, 2011; Auerbach et al., 2010; Flynn et al., 2010;
Kercher & Rapee, 2009; Safford et al., 2007; Shih et al., 2009; Simons et al., 1993).
Upon closer inspection, the current study differed from previous work in that the sample
consisted of undergraduate students and the method of life assessment was a self-report
checklist. The majority of studies with affirmative results for the stress generation effect
were conducted on younger adolescent samples, did not fully examine stress generation
per se (e.g., tested on the prediction of general life stress and failed to
differentiate/compare the prediction of dependent versus independent life events), or
were over lengthy time periods (e.g., 1 year). Any of the previous studies with positive
results in undergraduate samples used an interview measure of life events and were
conducted over a much longer time interval (e.g., 27 months, Flynn et al., 2010; 6
months, Safford et al., 2007). Hence, it may be the case that alternate length intervals and
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additional methods for assessing life stress may be required to detect the stress generation
effect in undergraduates. For example, Gibb and colleagues (2006) failed to show that
inferential style predicted stress generation over a 6-week period, despite demonstrating
the basic stress generation effect of dysphoria and diathesis-stress effects in
undergraduates.
Together, the current results may also provide evidence that interpretive biases do
not directly predict stress generation. Instead, interpretive bias may represent an
intermediate step towards depression that is enacted via alternate pathways. For example,
interpretive biases may contribute to the development of subsequent memory biases and
associated negative self-relevant information processing (Hertel & Brozovich, 2010;
Salemink, Hertel, & Mackintosh, 2010; Tran et al., 2011). Alternately, interpretive biases
may lead to maladaptive interpersonal behaviours and reactions, which may themselves
contribute to stressful life circumstances or directly to dysphoria (Barrett & Holmes,
2001; Barrett, Rapee, Dadds, & Ryan, 1996; Cummings et al., 2010; Sahl et al., 2009).
Future studies should investigate these possibilities to gain a more full understanding of
the relationships between interpretive bias and stress.
Does Interpretive Bias Interact With Stressful Life Events to Predict Changes in
Depressive Symptoms?
As a complement to the stress generation model, this study also examined
interpretive bias within the context of a diathesis-stress framework (Beck, 1987). None of
the interpretive bias variables interacted with dependent life stress to predict depressive
symptoms at follow-up. The lack of significant results is surprising given the history of
prior empirical research that has found support for diathesis-stress models of the
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relationship between cognition, stress, and depression (e.g., Abela & Hankin, 2011;
Abela & Skitch, 2007; Gibb et al., 2006; Hankin et al., 2004, 2008; Lewinsohn et al.,
2001; Metalsky & Joiner, 1992; Seeds & Dozois, 2010). These null findings are also
contrasted against the promising research on cognitive bias modification of interpretation
(CBM-I) techniques and their associated outcomes (for reviews, see Hallion & Ruscio,
2011; Field & Lester, 2010). While there is mounting evidence that modifications in
interpretive bias may moderate individuals’ reactions to stress (e.g., Holmes et al., 2009;
Mackintosh et al., 2006; Wilson et al., 2006), this does not necessarily imply that
interpretive bias is itself a diathesis. Perhaps the current investigation uncovered
contradictory findings because it focused on a particular form of cognitive bias one that
has rarely been investigated in the context of diathesis-stress models (Ingram et al.,
2008). Future research should investigate alternate roles of interpretive bias in the context
of stress and the trajectory towards depression, and examine potential moderating
variables in more integrated models.
Strengths, Limitations, and Future Directions
As with all empirical research, this study is not without its strengths and
limitations. In the present study, the 5-week interval between Time 1 and Time 2 was
selected to optimize participant retention and responding (e.g., Auerbach et al., 2010;
Gibb et al., 2006; Shih, 2006). This time frame was selected based on the knowledge that
variability in participants’ reporting of life events depends on the time interval being
asked about (e.g., participants tend to respond “yes” to fewer events the longer the
interval; Klein & Rubovits, 1987). Additionally, the life stressors inquired about in the
current study included both major life events and minor hassles to maximize statistical
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power (e.g., Alloy et al., 1999). However, the relatively short interval between Time 1
and Time 2 may have prevented the discovery of significant effects due to the length of
time that it sometimes takes for stress generation effects to unfold (Abela & Hankin,
2011; Flynn et al., 2010; Kercher & Rapee, 2009; Safford et al., 2007; Shih et al., 2009).
At the same time, the opposite may also have been true—that the biases captured by the
interpretive bias indices at Time 1 reflected early indicators of an impending depression
or a prodromal phase. A longer follow-up interval would provide a more powerful test of
these hypotheses.
Given that the current study presented an novel preliminary examination of
interpretive bias in the context of life stress and depression, the experiment-wise/familywise error rate was not modified a priori from α = .05. Although it is possible that some
of the findings may be due to Type I error, if reliable and valid, these findings offer an
innovative examination of multiple indices of interpretive bias in the context of life stress
and depression. In part, providing evidence for the problematic situation which
cognitively vulnerable individuals face—not only are they more likely to develop
depression following stressors, but they may, in part, be contributing to the creation of
the very stressors that will trigger, maintain, and/or exacerbate their depression. It will be
important for future research to examine the replicability of the current study’s findings
to ascertain their validity.
The relationship between interpretive bias, life stress, and depression is complex
and not necessarily unidirectional (Hankin & Abramson, 2001; Simons et al., 1993). In
the current study, the interval of the prospective assessment periods differed, such that
depressive symptoms were rated over the past 2 weeks and negative life events over a 5-
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week period. While this methodology is consistent with the different measurement
intervals used in previous studies (e.g., Cole et al., 2008; Gibb & Alloy, 2006; Hankin et
al., 2004 study 2; Holahan & Moos, 1991; Kwon & Oei, 1992), this timing does not
allow one to precisely determine the temporal sequence of interpretive bias, stressors, and
changes in depressive symptoms. Other research using multiple waves of data collection
has demonstrated that stressors do, indeed, precede and predict prospective changes in
internalizing symptomatology (e.g., Hankin, 2008a, 2008b; Hankin et al., 2008; Hawley,
Ho, Zuroff, & Blatt, 2007; Lee, Hankin, & Mermelstein, 2010). In the current study,
elevations in dysphoria may have preceded interpretive biases and contributed to the
occurrence of life stressors. Multiple time points of measurement follow-up or macrolevel examination of daily fluctuations in stress, mood, and interpretive biases would
allow for a more thorough exploration of the direction and nature of these pathways to
elucidate temporal precedence and causal directionality in the generation of dependent
life stressors and onset of depressive mood (e.g., Cummings et al., 2010; Hankin, 2008a,
2010; Hankin et al., 2008; Sahl et al., 2009).
The use of multiple methods for assessing interpretive bias represented a
particular strength in the design of the current study; however, there were also limitations
inherent with this methodology. The interpretive bias indices themselves may be called
into question, as the current study’s results were sometimes counterintuitive.
Furthermore, the results of the current study did not demonstrate the expected
differentiation between the no-load and cognitive load conditions on the SST, suggesting
that performance in both conditions was associated with concurrent symptoms and
predictive of subsequent depressive symptoms. This result, while opposing the theorized
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impact of volitional thought control on responses to the SST (Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998), is
consistent with previous work that has used similar undergraduate student samples (Rude
et al., 2002). It may be the case that differences in the predictive significance of the
cognitive load condition only emerge with clinically significant depressive episodes, and
not merely subthreshold depressive symptom changes (Rude et al., 2003, 2010).
Compared to previous undergraduate samples, the current study’s participants had
significantly higher negativity ratios across conditions, suggesting that they may have
been particular adept at unscrambling sentences. Given that the participants were drawn
from a university student population, higher average levels of intelligence could have
impacted the effectiveness of the cognitive load (Fink & Neubauer, 2001). Additionally,
the cognitive load used in the current study may have been insufficient in size to interfere
with participants’ cognitive-processing capacity (Engle, 2002). Future studies should
examine the effect of more complex cognitive loads on results on the SST and should
investigate whether participants’ cognitive ability (i.e., intelligence) moderates the
effectiveness of cognitive load manipulations.
There may also be concerns about the ecological validity of laboratory-based
measures of interpretive bias. Individuals make interpretations of ambiguous information
in the social world. Laboratory measures, such as unscrambling sentences or being asked
the put yourself in the place of the narrator of stories, unfortunately cannot necessarily
reflect the full scope of contextual factors that contribute to an interpretation.
Furthermore, even though experimental stimuli were presumed to be self-referent or were
worded in second-person narrative (“you are...”), participants likely varied in the extent
to which they typically found themselves in the described situations and contexts. As a
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result, the findings of the current investigation may not generalize to the types of
interpretations that young women make in real life situations. Other studies have
struggled with concerns about the ecological validity of assessing interpretive biases in
anxiety disorders and have refined their methodologies to increase generalizability (e.g.,
Amir, Beard, & Bower, 2005; Voncken, Bögels, & de Vries, 2003; Wilson et al., 2006).
Future studies on interpretive bias should investigate the comparability of written stimuli
to other forms of socially-relevant stimuli (e.g., faces, pictures), stimulus presentation
methods (e.g., video, audio), and real life events and situations to determine how alternate
forms of interpretive bias assessment can predict stress generation and depression
(Peckham et al., 2010).
According to Beck’s cognitive theory, cognitive vulnerability factors are latent
until activated, and are therefore undetectable in current asymptomatic individuals (Beck
et al., 1979; D. A. Clark et al., 1999). Hence, negative mood induction procedures have
been used prior to the assessment of interpretive bias in some previous studies (Bisson &
Sears, 2007; Dearing & Gotlib, 2009; Lawson & MacLeod, 1999). In real-world settings,
however, interpretive bias could be activated by the mere presence of ambiguity. In a
sense, the presence of ambiguity itself may act as a mood prime. There is some empirical
work to support this notion. For example, ambiguity in social situations generally leads
individuals to engage in information seeking or tension reducing activities (BallRokeach, 1973). Furthermore, ambiguity or uncertainty appears to intensify affective
reactions to events (Bar-Anan, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2009; A. R. Cohen, Stotland, & Wolfe,
1955). Furthermore, intolerance of ambiguity interacts with negative life events to predict
depressive symptoms over time (Andersen & Schwartz, 1992). Neurological
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investigations have also uncovered enhanced prefrontal activation in brain areas known
to be associated with task-induced ambiguity in individuals with depression compared to
healthy controls (Diener, Kuehner, Brusniak, Struve, & Flor, 2009). Overall, these results
suggest that ambiguity itself is distressing and stressful for individuals, and may thereby
potentially be sufficient to activate any latent diathesis, such as interpretive bias.
However, empirical research has yet to investigate whether mood induction is necessary
prior to the assessment of interpretive bias. Future research should disentangle the
activating effects of ambiguity on interpretive bias, and its potential moderation by other
relevant trait-like factors such as intolerance of uncertainty (Buhr & Dugas, 2002;
Deschenes, Dugas, Radomsky, & Buhr, 2010; Miranda, Fontes, & Marroquin, 2008),
intolerance of ambiguity (Frenkel‐Brunswik, 1949; Furnham & Ribchester, 1995;
Grenier, Barrette, & Ladouceur, 2005), or indecisiveness (Rassin & Muris, 2005). In
doing so, studies may determine the necessity of activating stimuli and importance of
moderating variables, which may help to explain the equivocal nature of interpretive bias
in depression research.
The current study relied on a self-report measure of depressive symptoms (i.e.,
BDI-II) in a sample of undergraduates. As such, the effects observed here may not
necessarily generalize to the prediction of diagnosable episodes of depression. Moreover,
adolescents and young adults who attend university may differ in important ways from
those who do not, and may consequently show differences in their information processing
tendencies, exposure to stressful life events, and dysphoria (e.g., Coyne, 1994; J. Ruscio,
Brown, & Ruscio, 2009; J. Ruscio, Zimmerman, McGlinchey, Chelminski, & Young,
2007; Solomon, Ruscio, Seeley, & Lewinsohn, 2006). Notwithstanding this criticism,
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samples such as the current one are appropriate to study in their own right, given the
reasonable continuity of depression between student and clinical samples and the
incidence of depression for individuals in this age range (e.g., Flett, Vredenburg, &
Krames, 1997; Hankin, Fraley, Lahey, & Waldman, 2005; A. M. Ruscio & Ruscio,
2002). It is also prudent to examine such samples, given the broader research that
supports depression as a continuous, rather than discrete, construct across the lifespan
(Ayuso-Mateos, Nuevo, Verdes, Naidoo, & Chatterji, 2010; Franklin, Strong, & Greene,
2002; Holland, Schutte, Brennan, & Moos, 2010; Klein, 2008; Prisciandaro & Roberts,
2005, 2009; J. Ruscio & Ruscio, 2000; Slade, 2007; Slade & Andrews, 2005; for recent
review, see Haslam, Holland, & Kuppens, 2012). In addition, the conceptual questions
raised in this study pertain to the prediction of future depressive symptoms vis-à-vis
cognition via stress generation or cognition by stress interactions. The extent to which
these findings generalize to clinical samples (although interesting) does not detract from
the importance of understanding stress generation and diathesis-stress models themselves
(cf. Haaga & Solomon, 1993). We know, for instance, that subthreshold depression
results in significant disruption in functioning (Boulenger, Fournier, Rosales, & Lavallée,
1997; Judd, Paulus, Wells, & Rapaport, 1996; Rai, Skapinakis, Wiles, Lewis, & Araya,
2010; Rivas-Vazquez, Saffa-Biller, Ruiz, Blais, & Rivas-Vazquez, 2004), and predicts
future diagnosable depression (Fergusson, Horwood, Ridder, & Beautrais, 2005; Gotlib,
Lewinsohn, & Seeley, 1995; Iacoviello, Alloy, Abramson, & Choi, 2010; Judd et al.,
2000) and, as such, is an important entity to test using diathesis-stress models. Future
studies in this area should incorporate semi-structured diagnostic interviews, such as the
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV-TR Axis I Disorders (SCID; First, Spitzer,

103
Gibbon, & Williams, 2005) or clinician-rating scales of symptoms, including the
Hamilton Rating Scale of Depression (HAM-D; Hamilton, 1960), when conceptualizing
depression in this context. This would allow for greater certainty about the causal
sequence from cognitive biases to diagnosable episodes of depression.
For decades, there has debate around the theoretical and methodological issues
related to the assessment of life stress (Depue & Monroe, 1986; Monroe & McQuaid,
1994; Monroe & Roberts, 1990; Paykel, 1983; Tausig, 1982). Reliance on self-report
measures of stress is a common methodological limitation of stress generation and
diathesis-stress studies (Liu & Alloy, 2010). In addition to a general concern that
depressive mood state biases affect the retrospective recall of life events, is the issue
regarding the reliability of self-report checklists to quantifying stressors objectively (for
reviews, see Dohrenwend, 2006; Mazure, 1998; Monroe, 2008). Compared to interviewbased assessments, self-report measures of stress are more susceptible to participants’
biases in over-reporting of life events, and do not allow researchers to differentiate
between actual versus perceived events (Brown & Harris, 1978; Monroe & Simons,
1991; Simons, 1992). For example, some studies have shown that individuals with
depression and those with vulnerabilities to depression have a tendency to perceive or
report benign events as stressful (e.g., Joiner, Wingate, Gencoz, & Gencoz, 2005). In a
sense, depression and cognitive vulnerability to depression generate the perception that
life has become more stressful, whereas in actuality it may not. However, many studies
have found no mood-state association between depressed mood and increased reporting
or severity ratings on life event checklists (e.g., Lakey & Heller, 1985; Siegel, Johnson,
& Sarason, 1979; Wagner, Abela, & Brozina, 2006), although some have (e.g., L. H.
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Cohen, Towbes, & Flocco, 1988; Shrout et al., 1989). At the same time, self-report
measures allow for a greater ease in collecting data, with less intensive time involvement
and burden for participants. Some recent research even suggests that self-reported
checklists of stressors and interviewer-based measures of negative life events may be
comparable for the purposes of research studies (e.g., Lewinsohn, Rohde, & Gau, 2003;
Wagner et al., 2006). In the current investigation, baseline depressive symptoms and
worst lifetime depression history were controlled for in all the aforementioned analyses to
address the concern of mood state biases. Furthermore, analyses were conducted to
compare the frequency of life events in the current study against other studies using
similar follow-up periods. The rates of life event endorsement in the present study were
consistent with previous empirical work (e.g., Gibb et al., 2006; Hankin et al., 2010;
Uhrlass & Gibb, 2007). Future studies should obtain informant data on participants life
events to corroborate the occurrence and impact of actual life stressors (Joiner et al.,
2005; Lakey & Heller, 1985), and should gather measures of perceived levels of stress in
addition to stressor frequency data to compare the unique role of each (Linn, 1986;
Masuda & Holmes, 1978) . Alternately, research could incorporate semi-structured
contextual life stress interviews, such as the LEDS (Brown & Harris, 1978), to assess for
objective stressors in different thematic domains (e.g., achievement and interpersonal)
and of differing severities and durations (e.g., severe vs. mild; chronic vs. acute).
A second concern is that self-report measures of life stress do not allow for goldstandard assessment of the dependence or independence of events because they fail to
provide the rich contextual information essential to differentiate precisely between
dependent and independent life events. For example, “getting laid off from a job” can
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result both from poor performance by the employee—an example of a clearly dependent
event—or from downsizing of the company in general—an example of a clearly
independent event. To try to compensate for this limitation, the comprehensive list of life
events in the current study was scored for independence and dependence by Ph.D.-level
raters with experience in contextual life event rating systems, and any events that did not
fit clearly into a category were excluded from all analyses. Contextual stress interviews,
such as the LEDS, or newer hybrid systems combining self-report formats with follow-up
probes (Slavich, personal communication) may also help to ascertain and categorize
events more precisely. A more fine-grained analysis of the severity or perceived impact
of particular stressors may elucidate the instances or mechanisms through which
diathesis-stress interactions lead to depression (Hammen, 2005; Monroe & Simons,
1991).
Because this sample consisted only of women, it is difficult to determine whether
the results of the current investigation would generalize to men as well. There is some
evidence that cognitive vulnerabilities display gender-specific associations with stress
generation and depression, especially for women (e.g., Safford et al., 2007; Shih, 2006;
Shih & Eberhart, 2010). Future studies would need to examine gender as a moderator to
determine if men display the same associations between interpretive bias, stress, and
depression. At the same time, other moderators should be considered. For example, not
all individuals who experience a stressful life event go on to develop depression.
Therefore, it would not be expected that everyone with a negative interpretive bias would
develop depression to the same degree in response to similar stressors. Hence, protective
factors (e.g., social support, coping strategies; S. Cohen & Wills, 1985; Coyne &
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Downey, 1991; Paykel, 1994) or other risk factors (e.g., maladaptive personality traits,
increased sensitivity to stress; Flett, Blankstein, & Hewitt, 2009; Kendler, Kuhn, &
Prescott, 2004; Kercher et al., 2009; Monroe & Harkness, 2005) may need to be
considered in an integrated model of interpretive bias in the context of life stress and
depression.
Conclusion
This study advances the literature, first by extending the knowledge base on the
influence of cognitive vulnerability to depression and information processing factors that
may more directly lead to stress generation and depression. Importantly, the influence of
interpretive bias on stress generation has never been investigated previously, and its
exploration offers a more fulsome understanding of the manner in which cognitive factors
potentially have their influence on the generation of life stress. Furthermore, by
incorporating multiple forms of assessment of interpretive bias using self-referential
stimuli, this study improves upon previous studies which have relied on primarily selfreport measures that are influenced by participant mood state and accompanying response
biases (Beevers, 2005; Rude et al., 2010) or have utilized non-self-referential stimuli
(Bisson & Sears, 2007; Lawson & MacLeod, 1999; Mogg et al., 2006). By examining
interpretive bias in the context of life stress and depression we may better understand
how pre-existing cognitive vulnerabilities may be enacted through thoughts and actions
in real life situations.
From a practical standpoint, understanding what thoughts individuals might
exhibit in ambiguous situations may provide a target for intervention by helping clients to
see how their thoughts and behaviour to situations may be biased or more negative than
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they should be, given the amount of information they are presented with. Clinically,
working with clients to generate alternative explanations, and teaching them to determine
an appropriate reaction to the most likely explanation based on evidence, may help to
alleviate some of the stress generation in their lives. In fact, recent research on children
with clinical anxiety disorder diagnoses has shown that successful treatment with
cognitive behavioural therapy was also associated with significant decreases in negative
interpretation biases (Creswell, Schniering, & Rapee, 2005; Waters, Wharton, ZimmerGembeck, & Craske, 2008). Beyond conventional clinical work, CBM-I techniques also
pose a promising experimental therapeutic intervention that may also help to prevent the
generation of life stress, the negative consequences of stress, and the development of
depression. For example, in cases where participants were trained to interpret ambiguity
in a nonthreatening or positive way, there is evidence of attenuated emotional reactions
following subsequent video stressors or imagined social situations (Lester et al., 2011;
Mackintosh et al., 2006; Wilson et al., 2006). Furthermore, repeated sessions of CBM-I
have also shown promise at helping to improve mood, interpretive bias, and mental
health in persons with current clinical depression (Blackwell & Holmes, 2010).
Beyond its role in stress generation, interpretive bias has never been incorporated
into diathesis-stress models of depression. Integrating interpretive bias into these wellestablished cognitive models provides a preliminary step toward understanding how
information processing biases may lead to depression (Ingram et al., 2008). Such
integration may also provide a starting point for helping to move research beyond merely
characterizing the forms of interpretive bias possessed by individuals with current
depression/dysphoria or depression histories. Other idiosyncratic factors, such as the
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occurrence of stressors, may help to explain the equivocal nature of interpretive bias in
the depression literature. As many researchers have pointed out, simplistic models that
fail to account for the environment may not be sufficient to describe the complexities of
human experience or psychopathology (Bronfenbrenner, 1979; Hammen, 1992; Rutter &
Sroufe, 2000; Sameroff, 2000; Zahn-Waxler, Klimes-Dougan, & Slattery, 2000). It is
only by understanding the risk factors for depression that we can ever hope to prevent
and intervene with one of the most economically, socially, and interpersonally costly of
all disorders (Richards, 2011).
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Appendix A
Statistical Comparisons Between Dropouts and Completers of Time 2
A total of 9 participants (4% of the original sample) participated at Time 1 but did not
complete any portion of the Time 2 assessment. This attrition rate is somewhat lower
than the typical attrition rates observed in other prospective studies using similar followup intervals (e.g., 8-11% across Studies 1 to 3, Joiner et al., 2005; 11%, Metalsky &
Joiner, 1992). Participants who opted not to complete the Time 2 assessment had a
significantly higher average level of depressive symptomatology at Time 1 (M = 19.11,
SD = 10.54) than did those who completed the Time 2 assessment (M = 12.85, SD =
8.80), t(214) = -2.07, p = 0.04. Not surprisingly, participants who failed to complete the
Time 2 assessment were also more likely to have reported a history of a mental disorder
diagnosis, χ2(1) = 22.33, p < 0.001, Phi = -0.32, and history of therapy or counselling
treatment for an emotional or psychological problem, χ2(1) = 7.17, p = 0.01, Phi = -0.18,
than those who completed both Time 1 and Time 2. The students who did not complete
the follow-up assessment did not differ from the final sample on any of the other
demographic characteristics, cognitive tasks, or symptoms measures at Time 1. Because
of the very small attrition rate and the minor differences, it is unlikely that the results of
this study were significantly influenced by the 9 dropouts.
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Appendix B
Statistical Comparisons Based on Participant Recruitment Source
A total of 11 participants (5% of the Time 1 and Time 2 samples) were recruited using
posters on the university campus requiring that they be registered in a first-year class at
the University of Western Ontario, as compared to the majority of the sample which was
recruited through the Psychology Research Participant Pool for students enrolled in the
Psychology 1000/1200 course (95% of the Time 1 and Time 2 samples). Participants who
were recruited from posters on campus had significantly lower average depression
symptom history levels (M = 3.91, SD = 8.72), as assessed by the IDD-L, compared to
participants who were recruited through the Psychology Research Participant Pool (M =
14.60, SD = 16.98), t(14.45) = 3.71, p = 0.002. Additionally, participants who were
recruited from posters were more likely to be of non-Caucasian ethnic descent (e.g.,
Asian, Black/African Canadian, etc.) than students recruited through the PSYC
1000/1200, χ2(5) = 14.99, p < 0.05, Phi = 0.26. The students who were recruited using
posters on campus did not differ from the participants recruited through the Psychology
Research Participant Pool on any of the other demographic characteristics or study
measures at Time 1 or Time 2. Because of the very small sample size and the minor
differences, it is unlikely that the results of the current study were significantly influenced
by the 11 general campus recruits.
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Appendix C
Demographic Questionnaire

Participant #: __________________________ Date of Testing: _________________

Date of Birth: _____________________________
Day/Month/Year

Age: ________

Gender:

□ Male □ Female

Ethnicity:

□ Black/African Canadian
□ Asian
□ Hispanic or Latino
□ Aboriginal/Native Canadian
□ East Indian □ White/Caucasian
□ Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
□ Other
please specify: ______________________________

Marital Status:

□ Single
□ Divorced/Separated

□ Married/Common-law/Engaged
□ Widowed

Have you ever been diagnosed with a mental disorder?

□ Yes

□ No

If so, which one(s)? ________________________________________________________
Have you ever received any therapy or counselling for an
emotional or psychological problem?

□ Yes

□ No

Please describe what type of therapy or counselling you received:
________________________________________________________________________
Have you ever received any medication for an emotional or
psychological problem?

□ Yes

□ No

Please describe what type of medication you received:
________________________________________________________________________
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Appendix D
Scrambled Sentences Test Stimuli
water is sometimes very hot cold
cat the has fur black yellow
arrived she home after six before
movie the somewhat funny tragic was
interesting life my boring generally is
usually like people not me do
equal am others I inferior to
worthwhile I worthless am a person
failure I a am generally success
love I others' don't deserve generally
about do care people me don't
have I my friends lost helped
is appearance physical my unchanged worsening
well me people of poorly think
am I ruining life improving my
person an am inadequate I adequate
others' cannot I can meet expectations
I little offer to have much
my wasted I utilized have opportunities
have life succeeded failed I at
happy miserable be I expect to
curious I person bad a am
will goals I cannot achieve my
me to is life cruel good
disappointed have I friends pleased my
trying keep to stop want I
good feel very bad I usually
myself in disappointed am confident I
life makes good nothing me feel
I fail will once succeed more
something I give nothing to have
usually feel I energetic tired very
who I dislike I am like
good mostly memories my sad are
is stressful life interesting my very
personal satisfying my disappointing relationships are
things can't I get can together
born I loser a winner am
quite generally incapable I capable am
person good a am defective I
my boring is interesting life usually
often crying like I laughing feel
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seldom death often of think I
decisions problems making I confidence have
is my good health physical poor
concentration worse now my is better
ruining I life improving am my
think I future worry the about
acceptable physical appearance worsening my is
most happy me unhappy things make

Appendix E
Ambiguous Stories Task Stimuli
Item
#

1

2

3

As you are
walking into
the cafeteria,
you see your
friend sitting
on the other
side.
When you
walk into the
arena for a
hockey game,
you see your
friends sitting
toward the
front.
One day, you
walk into the
crowded
cafeteria
looking for a
place to sit.

Sentence 2

Sentence 3

Negative
Target

Busy

Foil

Comprehension Comp
Check
Answer
(Y=1,
N=0)
Successful Was your friend 1
sitting on the
other side of the
cafeteria?

You call out
her name, but
she does not
answer you.

You think that she
doesn’t answer
because she is
____________ .

You call to
them from the
door, but no
one looks at
you.

You think no one
Annoyed
responds because
they are __________.

Occupied

Smile

Were your
friends sitting
in the back of
the arena?

0

The fact that they
don't have a seat
saved for you is
______________.

Rude

Fine

Misery

Was the
cafeteria
crowded?

1

Her reason for

Fake

Believable

Excited

Did she call

0

Your friends
are all sitting
together but
there are no
seats next to
them for you
to sit in.
You have plans She says she

Annoyed

Positive
Target
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4

Sentence 1

5

6

7

to go to a
movie with a
friend of yours,
and you are at
home getting
ready to meet
her when she
calls you.
Recently, you
had a fight
with a friend of
yours, and you
decide to invite
her over to
watch a movie
as a way of
making up.
In your first
lecture, your
professor
informs the
class that you
will be doing
group projects.

cancelling seems
____________.

At first, she
says she’ll
come, but
then later she
calls to say
she can’t
make it.

You think she
cancelled because
she is __________.

Angry

Busy

Guilt

Did you invite
0
your friend over
to play a game?

Your
professor
picks group
leaders, and
tells them to
take turns
picking group
members.
They smile at
each other
and giggle,
and then your
friend looks at
you.

You are certain that
you will be picked
___________.

Last

First

Funny

Did your
0
classmates elect
the group
leaders?

Included

Loser

Did your friend
and the stranger
smile at each
other?

you the day
before to
cancel?

You think your friend Jealous
wants you to feel
____________.

1
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One day, you
notice your
best friend
sharing notes
with a stranger
in class.

can’t make it
after all
because she
needs to
study.

8

9

10

11

One day, you
are walking
down the hall,
when you see
your best
friend talking
to a girl you
really dislike.
You are giving
a presentation
in your a class
and during
your
presentation,
you hear a few
students
whispering to
each other.
You are in
class and your
instructor is
handing back
tests.

Because of the way
she looks at you, you
think she is trying to
make you feel
____________.

When you
look at your
test grade,
you are
surprised
because it is
not the grade
you had
expected.
You read the
assignment
carefully but
can’t figure

Excluded

Welcomed

Caring

Was your friend 0
talking to
someone you
like?

The student next to
Boring
you passes you a note
that says, “Your
report was really
____________.”

Great

Ashamed

Did you sit
down after you
finished your
presentation?

1

Your instructor leans
over and tells you
that this is because,
on this test, your
work was
___________.

Dreadful

Terrific

Pleasure

Did you look at
your test after
the instructor
handed it to
you?

1

As you ask for help,
you’re sure your
professor will think
you are

Dumb

Hardworking Death

Did you read
the assignment
before you
asked for help?

1
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In psychology
class, you are
given an extra
credit

As you walk
toward them,
you hear them
talking and
laughing, and
then your
friend looks at
you.
When you are
through, you
take your seat
in class.

assignment.

12

13

14

____________.

After stating your
answer, you are sure
that everyone in the
class thinks you
sounded
___________.

Stupid

Smart

You worked
very hard on
it, but after
you turn it in,
you realize
you made one
small mistake.

As you think about
this, you are sure that
your TA will think
you are __________.

Careless

The morning
of your
presentation,
you practice
in front of the
mirror before

You think that your
professor will judge
your work as
____________.

Sloppy

Loved

Were you in
psychology
class?

0

Hardworking Ugly

Did other
students turn in
their
assignments
before you?

0

Terrific

Did you
practice your
presentation
before class?

1

Happy
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In psychology
class, you are
feeling tired
when,
suddenly, your
instructor asks
a question and
calls on you to
give the
answer.
Your TA gives
an assignment
in class to be
completed by
the end of the
tutorial, and
you are the
first student to
finish it and
turn it in.
You are
required to
give a
presentation in
class.

out how to
start it, so you
decide to ask
your professor
for help.
As everyone
looks at you
waiting for
you to
answer, you
think hard and
fast.

15

16

You are
supposed to
write a 1000
word essay for
a class, and
you start to
work on it a
week before it
is due.
You just got a
new haircut,
and your hair is
shorter than it
used to be.

You arrive in
class one
morning in a
new outfit.

18

A
neighbourhood
friend of yours
invites you to a
party.

19

You and a
neighbour of

When you see
your friends
for the first
time, you
notice them
looking at
your hair.
Everyone
turns around
to look at you
as you walk
in.
You’ve never
met any of her
other friends
before.

You try on a
dress at one

As you think about
how you will do, you
feel that the grade
you will get will be
______________.

Bad

Good

Talent

Did you wait
until the night
before it was
due to start
your essay?

0

You can tell by their
faces that they think
your hair looks
____________.

Horrible

Stylish

Bored

Did you change
the color of
your hair?

0

Great

Talent

Pretty

Smelly

Did everyone
0
ignore you
when you
entered the
classroom?
Were you
0
expecting to see
someone you
know at the
party?

Cute

Glad

Because of their
Awful
stares, you decide
that they must think
you look
__________.
As you take one last
Ugly
look at yourself in
the mirror, you’re
sure that her friends
will think you look
______________.
She looks at the dress Bad
on you and says,

Did you show
the dress to

1

155

17

you head to
class.
At first, you
have a hard
time coming
up with a
topic, but then
work hard and
finish it in
time.

yours decide to
go to the mall
to shop for
clothes.
It’s the first
day of the new
school year.

21

You arrive at
school one day
wearing a new
outfit that you
got for your
birthday.

22

It is Halloween
and your
residence is
having a huge
costume party.

23

You were
recently a

“That dress looks
really
___________.”

You are sure that
your classmates will
think that, compared
to last year, you look
__________.

your
neighbour?

Worse

Better

Hated

Did you hair
grow over the
summer?

1

One of them waves at Awful
you and says, “You
look really
___________.”

Cute

Kind

Did you get the
new outfit for
Christmas?

0

Because of their
Ridiculous
stares, you decide
that they must think
your costume is
_________________.

Creative

Helpless

Was the
Halloween
party for your
residence?

1

As you look at the
Ridiculous
picture you are taking

Beautiful

Successful Was the
wedding for

0
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20

store and
come out of
the dressing
room to show
it to her.
Over the
summer, your
hair grew a lot
and think you
look really
different.
As you walk
into class, two
guys sitting in
the back of
the room look
at you and
whisper
something to
each other.
You spend all
week working
on your
costume, and
when you
arrive at the
party, all the
people turn to
look at you.
Since you
don’t usually

24

25

26

On your first
day of a new
class, you
realize that you
don’t know
anyone there.
You arrange to
meet a new
classmate at
the movie
theater, and
when you
arrive at the
theater, she's
not there.
You have been

dress up, your
friend wants
to see pictures
of you in the
dress.

to show her, you are
certain she’ll think
you look
_________________.

your sister?

Your
instructor asks
you to
introduce
yourself and
tell the class
something
about
yourself.
You spot a
group of guys
talking on one
side of the
room.

After you speak, you Shy
guess the others think
you seem
____________.

Nice

Doom

Did you know
anyone in the
class?

0

When you say “hi” to Irritated
them, you can see
that they look
_____________.

Friendly

Joyful

Was it your
first day in
class?

1

While you
You decide that she
wait, you
must think you are
think about
___________.
how you
sounded when
you made
plans with her
to meet.

Strange

Kind

Guilty

Were you the
first one to
arrive for the
movie?

1

Tomorrow,

Annoying

Friendly

Pleasure

Had you met

0

As you think about
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27

bridesmaid in
your cousin’s
wedding and
the dress you
wore was very
fancy.
It’s your first
day of class
and you don't
know anyone
there.

writing to your
new roommate
over the
summer.

you are going
to meet your
roommate for
the first time.

28

On your floor
there is a new
foreign
exchange
student.

29

Today in class,
your teacher
assigns a new
group project
where you
have to pretend
you are
married to
another student
and having a
baby.
Your family
just moved
here from
Newfoundland
and you talk
differently than
the students.

Your resident
advisor has
asked you to
show him
around the
campus.
You get
paired with
the cutest guy
in class.

30

For your class,

While getting ready,
you think about how
the night will go, and
you decide that your
neighbour’s friends
will think the way
you talk is
___________.
You decide that

your roommate
before?

Boring

Funny

Cry

Did your
1
resident advisor
ask you to show
him around
campus?

Weird

Cool

Colourful

Does the
project require
you to work
with another
student?

1

Strange

Cool

Crying

Did you move
here from
Newfoundland?

1

Nervous

Confident

Sorrow

Did you have to 1
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31

One day, your
neighbour
invites you to
go to a
hockey game
with her and
some of her
friends.
As you

meeting her for the
first time, you feel
that she will think
you are
____________.
After spending
almost the entire day
with him, you feel
that he must think
you are
___________.
You are sure that,
after working on the
assignment together,
he will think you are
___________.

you have to
give an oral
presentation in
front of your
class of 400
students.

You are taking
a writing class,
and your
teacher wants
everyone in the
class to read
their work out
loud.

33

Last week you
took your
midterm in
psychology
class.

34

During class
you learn that

everyone will think
you seem
______________.

give your
presentation in
front of the
whole class?

She says that she
thought your essay
was ___________.

Boring

Funny

Pretty

Were you the
only one who
had to read
your work to
the class?

0

You know other
students will look at
your grade, and you
are sure they will
think you did
___________.

Well

Badly

Tired

Was the exam
you took in
psychology?

1

Because of this, you
are sure your friends

Nerdy

Brainy

Athletic

Did you receive
the lowest mark

0
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practice, you
think about
what all the
other students
will think
when you do
your
presentation.
After you
read your
essay to the
class, one of
the other
students
whispers
something to
you.
When you
walk into
class today,
you see that
the exam
grades are
posted at the
front of the
classroom and
everyone is
looking at
them.
Your friends
look over

35

36

you received
the highest
grade on the
midterm.
Your best
friend is
having a pool
party for her
birthday and
has invited lots
of people from
school.
As an
assignment,
you have to
give a short
speech to the
whole class.

Your instructor
just gave you a
surprise quiz.

38

You are asked

will think you are
___________.

in the class?

Before you go You think the other
to the party,
people will think you
you try on
look ___________.
your swimsuit
and look at
yourself in the
mirror.

Fat

Skinny

Sloppy

Was your friend 0
having a roller
skating party?

After you
give your
speech, you
are packing
up your
backpack
when a guy
from class
comes up to
you.
Now she
wants
everyone to
trade quizzes
with the
person sitting
next to them
for grading.
Your team

He tells you that,
when you gave your
speech, you seemed
really
_____________.

Nervous

Confident

Skinny

Did you give a
speech?

1

As you give your
quiz to another
student, you are sure
you got most of the
questions
___________.

Wrong

Right

Fat

Was the quiz a
surprise?

1

They all say you

Terribly

Brilliantly

Deadly

Did your team

1
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your shoulder
and see your
test mark.

to join a game
of beach
volleyball with
your floor.

39

40

You are asked
to play a solo
at open mike
night at the
Spoke.
Your professor
asks you to
organize a
sign-up system
for mentoring
high school
students.

You are
playing
softball.

42

Your swim

played
_____________.

lose the game?

Afterwards, your
roommate tells you
your playing was
___________.

Shaky

Promising

Caring

Did you
perform
perfectly while
rehearsing?

0

They say that the
way your sign-up
sheet is organized is
very ____________.

Confusing

Clear

Deadly

Did your
professor ask
you to create
the sign-up
system?

1

You think they might
be talking about your
skill at batting and
saying that you are
___________.

Terrible

Talented

Clean

Were the
students who
were talking
sitting in the
dugout?

0

As you get out of the

Badly

Well

Hated

Was this the

1
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loses and
afterwards,
your
teammates
talk about
how everyone
played.
While
rehearsing,
you make two
or three
mistakes.
After you put
it on the
Facebook,
several of
your
classmates
comment
about the way
it is
organized.
While you are
up at bat, you
see two of the
outfielders
talking and
looking in
your
direction.
This is the

43

44

45

46

team coach
asks you to
swim a new,
much shorter
race in the next
competition.
You join the
debating club
and are asked
to participate
in a debating
competition
with ten other
students.
In philosophy,
your professor
assigns a
debate about
assisted suicide
(euthanasia).
You are sitting
at a table in the
library working
hard on an
assignment.

pool, one of your
teammates walks up
to you and tells you
that you swam
__________.

Suddenly, one
of your
classmates
walks by and
knocks the
book you are
reading on the
floor.
You are
talking to a
friend as you

first time you
had raced in a
sprint?

Later one of your
teammates tells you
that he thinks your
performance was
_______________.

Terrible

Great

Happy

Did you finish
last in the
debate?

0

After the debate you
are sure the other
students will think
you are
______________.

Stupid

Smart

Angry

Did you debate
gun control?

0

You think her actions
were
_______________.

Intentional

Accidental

Protected

Were you
sitting in the
library when
your classmate
walked by?

1

You think that the
person who pushed
you was being

Mean

Clumsy

Tired

Were you
walking alone
when your tray

0
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After standing
in line at lunch
to get your

first time you
have ever
raced in a
sprint, and
you finish
fourth.
The debating
competition is
held in front
of a large
audience, and
in the end,
you finish
fifth.
You have to
debate against
the smartest
student in the
class.

food, you are
entering the
cafeteria to
find a place to
sit.

47

48

49

____________.

was knocked to
the floor?

When you hear about
what she has been
saying, you think she
is very
_____________.

Gossipy

Concerned

Bravery

Has one of your 1
classmates been
telling people
that your
mother is ill?

You can't hear what
else they say, but you
are sure it must be
___________.

Nasty

Nice

Scared

Were the girls
talking in the
hallway?

You think that this
must have happened
___________.

Deliberately Accidentally

Cheerful

Did you just
0
start the biology
project
yesterday?

1
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walk when,
suddenly, you
get pushed
from behind,
and your tray
of food falls
to the floor.
You are talking She’s has
to a classmate
been telling
and you learn
people about
that one of
your mother’s
your friends
illness.
has been
talking about
your mother.
In the hallway, When they
you hear some see you, one
other girls
of them
talking and one smiles at you.
of them
mentions your
name.
You have been One day, you
working on a
arrive at your
project for
room to find
biology class
that your
every day for
project
the past two
materials have
weeks.
been dropped
on the floor,
and some of

50

51

52

53

As you enter
the cafeteria
one day, you
notice your
friends sitting
at a table
across the way.
One day, you
hear about tryouts for the
Varsity field
hockey team.
You just

One of them
looks at you
and calls your
name.

You played in
high school
and decide to
try out.

You are sure you
must be one of the
people that they
___________.

As you are waiting,
you look around the
theater and notice
that the movie you
had hoped to see is
not ___________.
You see her but can’t
hear her because the
cafeteria is very
_________.

After try-outs, you
wait to hear the
coach’s decisions and
hope that you get
__________.
On most days, But today, no one is

Dislike

Like

Scare

Do you think
you hear them
mention your
name?

1

Playing

Sunny

Did your friend
arrive before
you?

0

Noisy

Purple

Were your
0
friends standing
in line to get
food?

Picked

Hungry

Did you play
field hockey in
high school?

1

Cold

Busy

Do a lot of

1
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them have
been
completely
destroyed.
You overhear
You can't
some
really hear
classmates
what they are
discussing who saying, but
they like and
you think you
who they don't hear one of
like.
them mention
your name.
You arrange to You arrive
meet a friend at before she
the movies one does.
night.

moved to a
new school and
don’t know
anyone there.

55

56

57

outside, and you
guess this is because
it is winter and the
weather is very
________.

students live in
the
neighbourhood?

She then asks you
where you went to
get it ________.

Cut

Jumped

Did you just get 0
your nails
painted?

Naturally you hope
the next name he
calls is
_____________.

Yours

Funny

Was the group
project for
psychology
class?

0

When you arrive, you
are surprised because
her room, which used
to be blue, has been
_____________.

Painted

Playing

Did your
friend’s room
use to be red?

0

So the two of you

Music

Popcorn

Was it too loud

0
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you see a lot
of students
walking
around, and
you think
about trying
to meet some
of them.
You just got
When you see
your hair cut
your group of
and you’re not friends, one of
sure about how them
it looks.
comments on
your hair.
Your TA is
You hear him
breaking the
call out your
tutorial up into best friend’s
groups of three name, and
for a project he you know the
is assigning.
next person
he calls will
be in your
friend’s
group.
You arrange to You are
meet a friend at nervous about
her house after the test
school to study because the
for a test.
grade counts
for a lot.
You are at a
You both

59

60

61

62

classmate’s
dorm room
studying and
you both agree
that it is far too
quiet.
You are at a
concert with
some friends.

agree to turn on some
____________.

while you were
studying?

In between
musical acts
your friend
announces
that she is
hungry.
You look up
to see what
happened and
lose your
place in the
book.

Since the next act
doesn’t start for
another hour, you all
decide to go find
something to
______________.
Your classmate turns
to you and says she is
very ____________.

Eat

Party

Were you at a
swim meet?

0

Sorry

Bored

Did you lose
your place in
your book?

1

You decide to
dress up as a
clown.

When you arrive,
several other people
comment on your
coloured hair and big
red ___________.

Nose

Table

Did you decide
to dress up as a
pirate?

0

Suddenly, one
of your
teammates
kicks the ball

You turn and kick the
ball into the
__________.

Goal

Room

Had you played
soccer a lot
before?

0
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You are
reading quietly
in class when
one of your
classmates
bumps into
your desk.
Another
student in your
residence is
having a
costume party
for her
birthday and
you are invited.
You are
playing soccer
one day, and
you try your

usually like to
do work with
some noise in
the
background.

63

64

65

best even
though you’ve
never really
played before.
In the hallway,
you hear a
group of girls
talking about
the guys that
they think are
cute.
You have
planned to
meet a friend at
the mall.

One day you
are a little late
getting to
psychology
class.

to you as you
stand near the
other team’s
goal.
One of them
notices you
listening and
says “hi.”

When you
arrive, she’s
not there yet,
so you call
her cell phone
to find out
where she is.
When you get
there, you
look for a seat
near your
friends but
there aren't
any.

You decide to walk
up to the group and
join the
_____________.

Discussion

Picture

Did one of the
girls notice you
listening?

1

She explains that her
ride was late picking
her up because they
got stuck in
____________.

Traffic

Garden

Did you call
your friend to
find out where
she was?

1

The professor has
already started class,
so you decide to
enter quietly and just
take a seat in the
back of the
_____________.

Classroom

Stadium

Were some of
your friends in
your
psychology
class?

1
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Appendix F
Stressful Life Experiences Questionnaire (SLEQ)
Independence/Dependence Coding

Item Number

Item Wording

Coding

1

You did poorly on, or failed, a test, exam, or major
class project in an important course (i.e., grade less
than or equal to C).

Dependent

2

Received a negative reaction from family or friends
about not doing well in school (e.g., got silent
treatment, criticized, etc.)

Dependent

3

Doing worse academically than usually did in
previous semesters or than did in high school
(difference of at least one grade; e.g., C rather than
B).

Dependent

4

Negative consequences from studying for long
periods of time (e.g., exhaustion, ill health, loss of
friends, etc.)

Dependent

5

You did not have time to do well in school (e.g.,
because you worked too many hours at a job).

Dependent

6

Dislike school in general, but have to stay (e.g.,
forced by parents to stay, have no skills to get a job,
etc.).

Neither/Unsure

7

Not doing as well in school as you would like.

Neither/Unsure

8

Difficulties with your study or work load.

9

Difficulty mastering academic material.

Dependent

10

Negative personal encounter with a professor.

Dependent

11
12
13
14

Not accepted (or not expected to be) into
program/major of your choice.
Unable to complete an assignment for school (not due
to medical or excusable reason, etc., funeral, etc.)
Tried to accomplish something (e.g., homework) but
had too many interruptions.
Received feedback or evaluation that I needed to work
harder/perform better in my classes or job.

Independent

Dependent
Dependent
Independent
Dependent
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Item Number

Item Wording

Coding

15

Prolonged absence from school (not due to medical or
other excusable reason, e.g., funeral, etc.)

Neither/Unsure

16

Tried to accomplish something (e.g., homework) but
wasted too much time on other activities.

Dependent

17

You didn’t complete the required homework for class.

Dependent

18

You didn’t get to take a class you wanted to take.

19

You didn’t get accepted for an extracurricular activity
you wanted to be part of.

Dependent

20

Quit a job.

Dependent

21

Laid off or fired from job.

Neither/Unsure

22

Unable to find work and need a job very much for
financial or other reasons.

Neither/Unsure

23

Reprimanded or were yelled at at work.

24

Significant negative change in financial circumstances
(e.g., large amount of money or valuables lost or
stolen, significant decrease in financial support, etc.).

Independent

25

Did not have enough money for one or more
necessities and had to do without them. Or, when
living with family, family did not have enough money
for one or more necessities (necessities are: health
care, food, housing, or necessary clothing).

Independent

26

Have not been achieving or accomplishing as much as
would like.

Dependent

27

Difficulty with the nature of your work.

28

Difficulty meeting deadlines or goals on the job.

Dependent

29

Problems at work with co-workers or employer.

Dependent

30

Major change in work or school hours.

31

Organization you belong to (e.g., club, team) failed to
accomplish an important goal.

Neither/Unsure

32

Parents upset with me for not living up to their
standards/expectations (e.g., not doing well in school,
sports, etc.).

Dependent

Neither/Unsure

Dependent

Neither/Unsure

Independent
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Item Number

33

34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Item Wording
Significant fight or argument with close family
member that led to serious consequences such as self
or family member crying, temporary loss of
privileges, emotional distance, etc.
Close family member became so upset with you that
she/he ended the relationship.
Trying but can't seem to please your mother and/or
father.
Can't tell how family member really feels about you.
Trying but can't seem to get close to one or more
family members.
You did something you didn’t want to do in order to
please a close family member.
A close family member (parent, sibling) died.
Found out that close family member has been
criticizing you behind your back.
Fights or disagreements with one or more close
family members (parent, sibling).

Coding

Dependent

Dependent
Dependent
Neither/Unsure
Dependent
Dependent
Independent
Dependent
Dependent

42

Put down by your parents or parents showed dislike.

Dependent

43

It seemed like your parents were disappointed with
you.

Dependent

44

A close family member (parent, sibling) had
significant medical or emotional problems (e.g., heart
disease, cancer, depression, etc.)

Independent

45

Family member has life threatening illness.

Independent

46

Conflicts with your parents over your personal goals,
desires, or choice of friends.

Dependent

47

You didn’t receive the love, respect, or interest from
your parents that you wanted (e.g., did not receive
compliments or praise from parents, parents did not
call or write, parents did not listen or show interest,
etc.).

Dependent

48

Forced by parents to achieve things that you could not
or did not want to achieve (e.g., have to be a star
athlete even though would rather concentrate on other
interests, punished if do not excel in everything
undertaken, etc.)

Dependent
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Item Number
49
50
51
52
53

Item Wording
A close family member (parent, sibling) withdrew
love or affection from you.
A close family member (parent, sibling) was arrested.
A close family member (parent, sibling) was
hospitalized for serious injury or illness.
Relationship with close relative (parents, siblings,
etc.) became worse.
Your parents separated or divorced.

Coding
Dependent
Independent
Independent
Dependent
Independent

You didn’t spend as much time with close family
members as you wanted to.
A close family member (parent, sibling) couldn’t
work due to injury or illness.
A family member let me down (e.g., didn’t call, meet
me, or do as promised).

Independent

57

Remarriage of parent.

Independent

58

A close family member (parent, sibling) lost their job.

Independent

59

Family member(s) were too busy to talk, help, or
spend time.

60

Close family member(s) moved away.

Independent

61

You had to take care of brothers/sisters when you
didn’t want to.

Independent

62

Trying but can't seem to fully please roommate.

Dependent

63

Criticized by one or more roommates.

Dependent

54
55
56

64
65
66
67

Can't tell how one or more roommates really feel
about you.
Trying but can't seem to get close to one or more
roommates.
Did something you did not want to in order to please
roommate.
Found out that roommate has been criticizing you
behind your back.

Dependent

Dependent

Dependent

Neither/Unsure
Dependent
Dependent
Dependent

68

Fight or disagreement with one or more roommates.

Dependent

69

Roommate has been withdrawing affection from you.

Dependent

70

Friend(s)/roommate(s) were too busy to talk, help, or
spend time.

Dependent
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Item Number

Item Wording

Coding

71

A close friend had significant medical or emotional
problems (e.g., heart disease, cancer, depression, etc.)

Independent

72

Close friend becomes so upset with you that she/he
ends relationship.

Dependent

73

Trying but can't seem to fully please friend.

Dependent

74

Criticized by one or more friends.

Dependent

75
76
77

Can't tell how one or more friends really feel about
you.
Trying but can't seem to get close to one or more
friends.
Found out that friend has been criticizing you behind
your back.

Neither/Unsure
Dependent
Dependent

78

Death of pet.

Independent

79

A close friend died.

Independent

80

Have hardly any friends.

81
82
83

Not sought out by others for activities or friendships
(e.g., not called by others and asked to do something
fun, etc.)
Close friend has been withdrawing affection from
you.
Did not receive an expected visit from (or couldn't
visit) family or friends (e.g., from outside city).

84

Decrease in amount of leisure time.

85

You didn’t talk or share feelings with friends.

86
87
88
89
90
91

You aren’t friends with the people you want to be
friends with.
Did something awkward or embarrassing in a social
situation.
Chose to terminate relationship with close friend.
You didn’t have time to spend with your friends when
you wanted to be with them.
A friend let me down (e.g., didn’t call, meet me, or do
as promised).
You had a fight or argument with a close friend.

Dependent
Dependent
Dependent
Neither/Unsure
Neither/Unsure
Dependent
Dependent
Dependent
Dependent
Dependent
Dependent
Dependent
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Item Number

Item Wording

Coding

92

Your friends pressured you to do things you didn’t
want to.

Dependent

93

A close friend did not treat you as well as he/she used
to.

Dependent

94

A close friend moved away.

95

Found out friend(s) had a negative belief about you.

Dependent

96

Found out friend(s) spread negative gossip about you.

Dependent

97

A close friend was hospitalized for serious injury or
illness.

Independent

98

A close friend was arrested.

Independent

99

Decreased number of friends.

100

Learning that a close friend or relative is very
different than you thought (e.g., sexual behaviour,
involvement with serious drugs, criminal activities,
etc.)

Independent

101

Not accepted into social organization you desired.

Dependent

102

Not invited to an important social event.

Dependent

103

You didn’t have anyone to go out with on the
weekends when you wanted to go out.

Dependent

104

Your friends didn’t seem to understand you.

Dependent

105

Found out I was gossiped about.

Dependent

106

Close friend or relative encountered serious trouble or
failure experience.

107

Tried to share something important with a friend,
family member, or romantic partner, and they acted
disinterested.

Dependent

108

A friend, family member, or romantic partner
embarrassed me or hurt my feelings in front of others.

Dependent

109

Argument/conflict with someone other than a friend,
family member, or romantic partner.

Dependent

110

Difficulty with landlord/landlady.

Dependent

Independent

Dependent

Independent
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Item Number

111

112
113
114
115
116
117
118

Item Wording
Significant fight or argument with
boyfriend/girlfriend/spouse that that led to serious
consequence(s) such as self or
boyfriend/girlfriend/spouse crying, leaving common
residence for one night, etc.
Boyfriend/girlfriend/spouse ends relationship, but you
still want to be with them.
Boyfriend/girlfriend/spouse says he/she is not sure
whether wants relationship to continue.
Trying but can't seem to fully please your
girlfriend/boyfriend/spouse.
Criticized by your boyfriend/girlfriend/spouse.
Trying but can't seem to get close to
boyfriend/girlfriend/spouse.
Found out that boyfriend/girlfriend/spouse has been
criticizing you behind your back.
You found out that your boyfriend/girlfriend/spouse
has been cheating on you.

Coding

Dependent

Dependent
Dependent
Dependent
Dependent
Dependent
Dependent
Dependent

119

You did something to please your
girlfriend/boyfriend/spouse that you didn’t want to do.

Dependent

120

While still involved with boyfriend/girlfriend/spouse,
she/he had a date with someone else.

Dependent

121

Death of boyfriend/girlfriend/spouse.

122
123

125

126
127

Fight or disagreement with
boyfriend/girlfriend/spouse.
Can't tell how boyfriend/girlfriend/spouse really feels
about you.
Did not receive love, respect, or interest from
boyfriend/girlfriend/spouse (e.g., did not receive
compliments or praise, boyfriend/girlfriend/spouse
did not listen or take interest in you, etc.)
Boyfriend/girlfriend/spouse withdrew affection from
you.
Boyfriend/girlfriend/spouse let me down (e.g., didn’t
call, meet me, or do as promised).

Independent
Dependent
Dependent

Dependent

Dependent
Dependent

128

Decreased amount of dating.

Dependent

129

Showed interest in someone and they rejected me.

Dependent
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Item Number
130
131
132
133
134

Item Wording
You terminated an intimate relationship
(boyfriend/girlfriend/partner).
Infidelity toward boyfriend/girlfriend/spouse (i.e., you
cheated on them).
Breakup of affair.
Conflicts with your boyfriend's/girlfriend's/spouse's
family.
Loss of virginity which was completely or partially
unwanted.

Coding
Dependent
Dependent
Dependent
Dependent
Dependent

135

You had to do chores or work you didn’t want to do.

Dependent

136

Physical appearance became worse or much worse.

Neither/Unsure

137

Failed to meet a daily fitness goal.

138

Had a minor illness, injury, or some other physical
discomfort.

139

Female: Possibility of an unwanted pregnancy; Male:
Possibility of a girlfriend/wife/partner's unwanted
pregnancy.

Dependent

140

Female: Had an abortion; Male:
girlfriend/wife/partner had an abortion.

Dependent

141

Involvement in serious accident (e.g., automobile,
work, home, etc.).

142

Hospitalization of self.

Independent

143

Physical health became worse or much worse (due to
illness or accident).

Independent

144

Worsening of personal health/habits.

145

Victim or serious threat of natural disaster (e.g., flood,
tornado, hurricane, earthquake, drought, avalanche,
etc.)

Independent

146

Difficulty taking care of paperwork (e.g., paying bills,
filling out forms).

Dependent

147

Poor weather.

Independent

148

Experienced a transportation problem (e.g. , car
problems, late bus).

Independent

149

Misplaced or lost something.

Dependent
Independent

Neither/Unsure

Dependent

Dependent
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Item Number

Item Wording

Coding

150

Someone cancelled an important appointment with
little or no advanced notice.

Neither/Unsure

151

Was concerned about an event on the news.

Neither/Unsure

152
153
154

Was delayed/late due to circumstances beyond my
control.
Committed a minor law violation (e.g. traffic ticket,
disturbing the peace, dormitory violation).
Significant problem with the law (e.g., arrested,
detained, etc.)

Independent
Dependent
Dependent

155

Was the victim of a crime (e.g. theft, assault).

Independent

156

Witness an accident or act of violence

Independent

157
158
159
160

Had a financial difficulty (e.g. unexpected expense,
overspent, etc).
No enough money for extras (e.g., entertainment,
recreation, vacations, etc.).
Significantly increased you level of debt beyond
means of repayment.
Has anything happened to you in the past 5 weeks that
has not been covered, but that you feel was
important?

Neither/Unsure
Neither/Unsure
Neither/Unsure
Neither/Unsure

177
Appendix G
Institutional Ethics Review Board Ethics Approval Notice

178
Appendix H
Data Analytic Strategy and Rationale for Question 2 - Does Interpretive Bias
Predict Stress Generation?
Because the present study examined the frequency of dependent and independent
life events that participants experienced over the course of a 5-week period, the
dependent variables of interest represent count data. Count variables reflect the
occurrence of discrete events and thus can only take the form of non-negative integers
(e.g., 0, 1, 2, 3…). Count data present a significant challenge to researchers; however,
these challenges can be overcome with statistical techniques specifically designed for this
sort of data (Atkins & Gallop, 2007; Coxe, West, & Aiken, 2009; Hutchinson &
Holtman, 2005). Despite the fact that appropriate techniques are available, many
researchers fail to use them (Atkins & Gallop, 2007; Walters, 2007). For example, count
data are often treated as continuous variables and analyzed through ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression. The problem with analyzing count data in this way is that, because
such data are comprised of non-negative integers, they typically form a positively skewed
heteroskedastic distribution (Coxe et al., 2009; Walters, 2007). Given this non-normal
distribution, the three fundamental assumptions of OLS are violated which can introduce
discrepancies between the stated and actual Type I error rates and/or reduce statistical
power (Coxe et al., 2009).
As an alternative to the OLS approach, Poisson-class regression models, utilizing
a Poisson distribution, may represent a more appropriate approach for examining count
data. Poisson regression can be defined by only nonnegative discrete values, uses a log
transformation that adjusts for the skewness of the data, and estimates with maximum
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likelihood (Gardner, Mulvey, & Shaw, 1995; Walters, 2007). However, as with OLS,
Poisson regression also has its own set of assumptions that must be satisfied to be applied
appropriately. The application of Poisson regression is limited by the assumptions of
population homogeneity (i.e., that changes in the outcome variable are completely
accounted for by the predictors included in the model) and equidispersion (i.e., that the
conditional mean is equal to the conditional variance). These assumptions limit the use of
Poisson regression in situations where the data are characterized by unobserved
population heterogeneity (i.e., the difference between individual outcomes is not
completely accounted for by the predictors), and overdispersion (i.e., when the
conditional variance is greater than the conditional mean). In situations of population
heterogeneity and overdispersion, Poisson regression will underestimate the regression
coefficient standard errors and thereby inflate the Type I error rate (Coxe et al., 2009;
Gardner et al., 1995).
Negative binomial regression falls within the class of Poisson distributions and
possesses similar strengths but fewer restrictions. Negative binomial regression includes
an error term to allow for unobserved heterogeneity, and a dispersion parameter (α) to
allow for a larger conditional variance than is expected in a Poisson regression
(Hutchinson & Holtman, 2005; Walters, 2007). If the data are equidispersed (i.e., when α
= 0), a negative binomial and Poisson regression produce identical results and the
Poisson is preferred because is produces a more parsimonious model. However, if the
data are overdispersed (i.e., when α >0), a negative binomial regression is preferred
because it produces more robust standard errors (Coxe et al., 2009; Long, 1997; Sturman,
1999). An estimate of the dispersion parameter can be calculated through Stata which
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indicates whether a Poisson or negative binomial model is more appropriate. This statistic
indicated that a negative binomial model was most appropriate for the present data (all ps
< .001).
An additional concern when examining life event data is the possibility of
excessive zero counts. Zero-inflated models for Poisson and negative binomial regression
allow for an excessive number of observed zeros (Coxe et al., 2009; Ridout, Demétrio, &
Hinde, 1998; Ridout, Hinde, & Demétrio, 2001). In the current sample, a high proportion
of participants reported that they experienced no independent life events (see Table 1 for
frequency of life event counts); however, it was difficult to ascertain whether this number
of zeros was ‘excessive’ for the purposes of the analyses. Consequentially a zero-inflated
negative binomial regression was conducted to test whether this index provided a better
fit than the standard model.
The Vuong test, a product of the zero-inflated negative binomial regression,
compares the zero-inflated model to the standard model to determine which model is a
better fit for the data (Long, 1997). The z-values in each interpretive bias model were not
significant when the predicted outcome involved the frequency of independent or
dependent life events (all ps > .05) indicating that the zero-inflated negative binomial
regression was not a better fit than the standard negative binomial regression. As such, a
standard model of negative binomial regression was determined to be most appropriate
for the present analyses.
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Appendix I
Preliminary Analyses Examining Relations Between
Demographic Characteristics and Study Variables
Current Depressive Symptom Severity
There was no significant association between participant self-reported age and
Time 1 BDI-II scores, r(206) = -.10, p = .16, or Time 2 BDI-II scores, r(206) = -.08, p =
.26. There was no significant differences among self-reported ethnicity and Time 1 BDIII score, F(5, 201) = 0.77, p = .58, or Time 2 BDI-II scores, F(5, 201) = 0.97, p = .44.
Marital status also did not vary significantly with Time 1 BDI-II scores, F(2, 204) = 2.28,
p = .11, or Time 2 BDI-II scores, F(2, 204) = 0.34, p = .72.
Surprisingly, current depressive symptoms did not vary as a function of selfreported history of a diagnosis for a mental disorder. Participants who reported that they
had a history of mental disorder had similar Time 1 BDI-II scores, t(9.35) = 1.23, p =
0.23, as those without such a history. In contrast, Time 2 BDI-II scores did vary as a
function of self-reported history of a diagnosis for a mental disorder. Participants who
reported that they had received a previous diagnosis had higher Time 2 BDI-II scores (M
= 19.00, SD = 14.59) than those without such a history (M = 12.37, SD = 9.61), t(205) =
2.07, p = .04.
As would be expected given the pattern of results based on self-reported diagnosis
history, individuals who had used medication did not differ from those without a
medication history on Time 1 BDI-II scores, t(16.16) = 1.91, p = .07. Individuals who
reported receiving medication for an emotional or psychological problem did, however,
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report higher Time 2 BDI-II scores (M = 19.37, SD = 13.18) than did those without a
medication history (M = 12.13, SD = 9.48), t(205) = 2.84, p = .005.
Individuals receiving therapy or counselling for an emotional or psychological
problem had higher Time 1 BDI-II scores (M = 16.56, SD = 11.58) than did those without
a therapy history (M = 11.99, SD = 7.81), t(46.34) = 2.34, p = .02.These individuals also
had higher Time 2 BDI-II scores (M = 17.44, SD = 13.61) than those without a therapy
history (M = 11.59, SD = 8.59), t(45.27) = 2.57, p = .01.
Depression Symptom History
Age was not significantly related to Time 1 IDD-L scores, r(206) = -.01, p = .95.
There was no significant differences between Time 1 IDD-L scores and ethnicity, H(5) =
10.36, p = .07, or marital status, F(2, 204) = 0.13, p = .88.
Participants who reported that they did have a history of a diagnosis had higher
Time 1 IDD-L scores (M = 32.00, SD = 17.24) than those without such a history (M =
12.79, SD = 15.99), t(205) = 3.69, p < .001. Individuals who reported receiving
medication for an emotional or psychological problem also reported higher Time 1 IDDL scores (M = 32.44, SD = 19.56) than did those without a medication history (M =
12.15, SD = 15.30), t(205) = 4.98, p < .001. Individuals receiving therapy or counselling
for an emotional or psychological problem had higher Time 1 IDD-L scores (M = 28.08,
SD = 21.07) than those without a therapy history (M = 10.38, SD = 13.29), t(45.26) =
5.02, p < .001.
Interpretive Bias – SST
Participant’s self-report age was significantly related to the negativity ratio on the
no-load condition, r(206) = -.14, p = .04. There was, however, no significant association
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between age and the negativity, r(179) = -.07, p = .33, ratio on the cognitive load
condition. Ethnicity was not significantly related to the negativity ratio in the cognitive
load condition H(5) = 9.58, p = 0.09. In contrast, ethnicity was related to the negativity
ratio for the no-load condition, H(5) = 11.14, p = 0.049. Marital status was related to the
negativity ratio for the no-load condition, H(2) = 6.70, p = 0.04. Marital status was not
related to the negativity ratio in the cognitive load condition, F(2, 177) = 1.28, p = 0.28.
Similarly, there were no significant differences in the negativity ratios for the noload or cognitive load conditions based on participants’ self-reported medication history
(ps ranging from .19 to .44) or therapy/counselling history (ps ranging from .10 to .97).
Negativity ratios on the no-load and cognitive load conditions did, however, differ as a
function of the participants’ self-reported diagnostic history. More specifically,
individuals who reported a history of a diagnosis for a mental disorder tended to have
higher negativity ratios in the no-load condition (M = 0.39, SD = 0.25) than those who
did not report a history of a diagnosis of a mental disorder (M = 0.22, SD = 0.21), t(205)
= 2.34, p = .02. For the cognitive load condition, the same pattern of results was
observed. Participants who reported a history of a diagnosis for a mental disorder tended
to have higher negativity ratios (M = 0.42, SD = 0.25) than those without such a history
(M = 0.23, SD = 0.23), t(178) = 2.48, p = 0.01.
Interpretive Bias – AST
There was no significant association between age and average reaction time for
positive target trials, r(183) = .05, p = .47, or negative target trials, r(183) = .01, p = .92.
Similarly, reaction time for positive target trials (F[2, 181] = 0.68, p = .51) and negative
target trials (F[2, 181] = 1.04, p = .36) did not vary as a function of participants’ marital
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status. Participants ethnicity was also not associated with reaction time performance on
the positive (F[5, 178] = 1.45, p = .21) or negative (F5, 178] = 1.67, p = .14) target trials.
As well, there were no significant differences in positive or negative target trials for
diagnostic history (ps = .36 to .95), medication history (ps = .23 to .27), or therapy
history (ps = .82 to .98).
Stressful Life Events
There was no significant association between any of the life event totals (overall,
dependent, independent) and age (ps = .60 to .86), marital status (ps = .55 to .93), or
ethnicity (ps = .67 to .85). In addition, there was no differences in life event totals
depending on participants’ diagnostic history (ps = .65 to .86), medication history (ps =
.71 to .99), or therapy history (ps = .88 to .96).
Covariates for Main Data Analyses
To minimize the number of covariates required in subsequent analyses,
preliminary tests to ascertain the most ‘potent’ or necessary variables were conducted.
This was done to minimize the potential for residual confounding due to mismeasurement
(Christenfeld et al., 2004) and to provide stronger justification for the potential inclusion
of covariates, should their inclusion influence the results of the main statistical analyses
(Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011).
The main function of Time 1 IDD-L scores in the current study was to serve as a
covariate variable in all analyses, to control for a past history of a significant depressive
experience. In the case of covariates for Time 1 IDD-L scores, it is not surprising that
self-reported history of a diagnosis, self-reported history of medication use for an
emotional or psychological problem, and self-reported history of receiving therapy or
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counselling for an emotional or psychological problem were all significantly related to
worst prior depressive symptom history. All of these self-reported signs point to
significant psychological distress at some point in the lives of a sub-set of participants.
The inclusion of these additional self-report questions was to ensure that previous
psychological distress could be partialled out during statistical analyses. In fact, when
entered simultaneously in a linear regression, only therapy history (β = -.24, t(203) =
-3.18, p = .002) emerges as a significant predictor of IDD-L scores in the context of
diagnosis and medication history. Hence, the three variables did not seem to explain a
significant amount of variance in IDD-L scores at Time 1.
Similarly, self-reported history of a diagnosis, self-reported history of medication
use for an emotional or psychological problem, and self-reported history of receiving
therapy or counselling for an emotional or psychological problem were all significantly
related to Time 2 depression symptom severity as measured by the BDI-II, and therapy
history was also related to Time 1 BDI-II scores. This is again, unsurprising, given that
the best predictor of current and future depression, is past psychological distress (e.g.,
Burcusa & Iacono, 2007; Hammen, Davila, Brown, Ellicott, & Gitlin, 1992). Given that
the IDD-L scores was used as a covariate in all analyses, the relationship between selfreported diagnostic, medication, and therapy history were examined in a further set of
hierarchical linear regression analyses. In those regressions, IDD-L scores were entered
on step one of models predicting Time 1 or Time 2 BDI-II scores, followed by the
potential demographic covariate(s) on step two to examine incremental prediction above
and beyond IDD-L scores. In both sets of analyses, the demographic self-reported history
of psychological distress variables did not predict a significant amount of variance
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beyond that predicted by Time 1 IDD-L scores (p = .47 for ΔF in both instances). Hence,
it did not appear that these variables contributed additional predictive power over and
above that predicted by IDD-L scores alone.
As the earlier described preliminary analyses demonstrated, self-reported
diagnosis history was also significant related to negative ratios on the no-load and
cognitive load conditions of the SST. Two sets of hierarchical linear regression analyses
were conducted to determine if both IDD-L scores and diagnostic history were required
in the main analyses, or whether IDD-L scores would suffice as the sole covariate
subsuming the construct of ‘previous psychological distress’ relevant to the current study.
Separate models were conducted predicting SST no-load and cognitive load scores,
respectively. In the first set of analyses, IDD-L scores were entered on step one, followed
by self-reported diagnosis history on step two. In these analyses, diagnosis history did not
significantly predict variance in SST scores in either the no-load (p = .08) or cognitive
load condition (p = .08), above and beyond the significant effect of Time 1 IDD-L (p =
.001). In the second set of analyses, the order of entry was reversed, with diagnostic
history entered on step one and IDD-L scores entered on step two. In both of these
analyses, IDD-L scores explained additional variance to the negativity ratio scores for the
no-load (p = .004) and cognitive load (p < .001) conditions on the SST, above and
beyond the variance explained by self-reported diagnostic history (p < .05).
Given these results and original purpose of the IDD-L in the current study, IDD-L
scores was used as the sole covariate for previous psychological distress in the main
study analyses. In any of the main analyses including IDD-L symptom scores as a
covariate, self-reported diagnosis, medication, or therapy history were not also included
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as covariates. In instances where IDD-L scores were not included (e.g., partial
correlations among study variables), the demographic covariates were retained. That is to
say that for any analyses where IDD-L scores, Time 1 BDI-II scores, or Time 2 BDI-II
scores were the outcome or criterion variable in and of itself (e.g., partials correlations),
diagnosis, therapy, and medication history were retained as covariates. Similarly, for any
analyses where SST negativity ratios for the no-load or cognitive load conditions were
the outcome or criterion variable (e.g., bivariate correlations), diagnosis history was
retained as a covariate.
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Appendix J
Negative Binomial Models for the Prediction of Life Stress from Relevant
Demographic Covariates and Baseline Depression
Before reviewing the results, it is prudent to explain how model fit and gain in
prediction were examined (Atkins & Gallop, 2007; Coxe et al., 2009). In Poisson-class
regressions, a maximum likelihood procedure is used to estimate the parameters to
maximize the log-likelihood, where the log-likelihood is the logarithm of the probability
that the observed data came from a population having the estimated parameters. The
omnibus test (i.e., LR χ2) compares the log-likelihood of the fitted model (i.e., the model
containing the predictors identified by the researcher) to the log-likelihood of the
intercept-only model (i.e., the model that contains no predictors). If the LR χ2 is
significant, then there is justification to inspect the coefficients for each predictor on an
individual basis to determine whether any are significantly different from zero.
The significance of each regression coefficient is tested in the same way as in
OLS: (a) the z statistic for each predictor variable is calculated by dividing the
unstandardized regression coefficient by the standard error of the regression coefficient;
and (b) if the absolute value of the z statistic is greater than 1.96 (assuming a Type I error
rate of .05), then that predictor is identified as a unique predictor of the outcome variable.
Predicted scores in Poisson-class regressions are “linear in the logarithm” (Coxe
et al., 2009, p. 124). In other words, when all other variables are held constant, a 1-unit
increase in a predictor results in an increase of the natural logarithm of the predicted
count that is equal to the value of the unstandardized regression coefficient (b). To
interpret coefficients in terms of the predictors’ effect on the actual count (instead of the
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logarithm of the count), the unstandardized coefficient, b, must be exponentiated. The
exponentiated coefficient, eb, is then interpretable as an incidence rate ratio (IRR) (i.e.,
the multiplicative change in the outcome expected with a 1-unit increase in the predictor,
holding all other predictors constant; Coxe et al., 2009).
Gain in prediction is tested using the Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) and the
Bayesian information criterion (BIC). Similar to the F test of the ΔR2 in an OLS
regression, AIC and BIC have been proposed as options for comparing alternative nonnested models (Coxe et al., 2009).16 The AIC and BIC each reflect the fit of the model
with a penalty for increasing complexity (i.e., given two models with the same fit, the
model with the fewest estimated parameters/the more parsimonious model is preferred).
Assuming that two models provide a fit to the same data, the model with the smallest
AIC or BIC is preferred. Typically, the AIC and BIC both lead to the selection of the
same model (Coxe et al., 2009). In the present study, the comparison of the AIC and BIC
across the baseline model (e.g., model with all covariates and baseline control variables)
versus the model with the addition of the interpretive bias variables (Table 8) is the
crucial one. If a predictor is added to the negative binomial model and the AIC and BIC
associated with this new model (e.g., model with an interpretive bias variable) are lower
than the AIC or BIC associated with the model that does not include this additional
predictor (e.g., model with only covariates and control variables), than the additional
predictor is understood to improve prediction of the outcome variable.

16

The equation for the AIC = -2lnL + 2k and the equation for the BIC = -2lnL + kln(n), where lnL is the
log-likelihood of the current model, k is the number of parameters estimated in the model (a parameter is
estimated for each predictor, the constant, and alpha), and n is the sample size.
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Table A
Negative Binomial Models for the Prediction of Life Stress from Relevant Demographic
Covariates and Baseline Depression – SST No Load Condition (N = 205)17, 18
Model

IRR
(95% C.I.)

Z

Predicted Outcome: Rate ILS
Age
Marital Status
Ethnicity
BDI-II – Time 1
IDD-L – Time 1

1.04
(0.98-1.10)
0.70
(0.29-1.71)
1.03
(0.94-1.11)
1.02
(1.00-1.04)
1.00
(1.00-1.01)

Marital Status
Ethnicity
BDI-II – Time 1
IDD-L – Time 1

AIC

BIC

15.31**

647.44

670.70

1.19
-0.77
0.62
2.65**
1.21

Predicted Outcome: Rate DLS
Age

LR χ2

24.76*** 1149.81 1173.07
0.95
(0.89-1.01)
1.98
(0.97-4.05)
1.06
(0.99-1.13)
1.02
(1.01-1.04)
1.00
(1.00-1.01)

-1.72
1.88
1.82
3.58***
0.52

Note. The five covariates listed under the predicted outcome were included in the same
model (i.e., only two models were estimated). df = 7 for LR χ2. z = b/SE. IRR = incidence
rate ratio (i.e., the exponentiated unstandardized regression coefficient, eb). LR =
likelihood ratio. AIC = Akaike’s information criterion. BIC = Bayesian information
criterion. ILS = independent life stress. DLS = dependent life stress. BDI-II = Beck
Depression Inventory – II. IDD-L = Inventory to Diagnose Depression, Lifetime Version.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
17

Two participants were excluded from this analysis due to extreme responding on the SLEQ. One
participant reported 27 independent events and 88 dependent events and the other reported 33 dependent
events, which were both extreme response patterns relative to the values associated with the majority of
cases according to Cook’s D.
18
The pattern of results was identical in analyses conducted without any demographic covariates included.
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Table B
Negative Binomial Models for the Prediction of Life Stress from Relevant Demographic
Covariates and Baseline Depression – SST Cognitive Load Condition (N = 178)19, 20
Model

IRR
(95% C.I.)

Z

Predicted Outcome: Rate ILS
BDI-II – Time 1
IDD-L – Time 1

1.02
(1.00-1.04)
1.00
(1.00-1.01)

IDD-L – Time 1

1.02
(1.01-1.04)
1.00
(1.00-1.01)

AIC

BIC

7.77*

553.25

565.98

12.38**

986.82

999.55

2.05*
1.01

Predicted Outcome: Rate DLS
BDI-II – Time 1

LR χ2

2.88**
0.73

Note. The two covariates listed under the predicted outcome were included in the same
model (i.e., only two models were estimated). df = 4 for LR χ2. z = b/SE. IRR = incidence
rate ratio (i.e., the exponentiated unstandardized regression coefficient, eb). LR =
likelihood ratio. AIC = Akaike’s information criterion. BIC = Bayesian information
criterion. ILS = independent life stress. DLS = dependent life stress. BDI-II = Beck
Depression Inventory – II. IDD-L = Inventory to Diagnose Depression, Lifetime Version.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

19

Two participants were excluded from this analysis due to extreme responding on the SLEQ. One
participant reported 27 independent events and 88 dependent events and the other reported 33 dependent
events, which were both extreme response patterns relative to the values associated with the majority of
cases according to Cook’s D.
20
No demographic covariates were necessary in these analyses, since Time 1 IDD-L scores served as the
sole covariate for previous psychological distress. See Appendix L for further details.
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Table C
Negative Binomial Models for the Prediction of Life Stress from Relevant Demographic
Covariates and Baseline Depression – AST Average Reaction Time for Positive and
Negative Target Trials (N = 182) 21,22
Model

IRR
(95% C.I.)

Z

Predicted Outcome: Rate ILS
BDI-II – Time 1
IDD-L – Time 1

1.02
(1.00-1.04)
1.01
(1.00-1.01)

IDD-L – Time 1

1.02
(1.01-1.04)
1.00
(1.00-1.01)

AIC

BIC

10.58**

578.78

591.60

15.75*** 1023.91

1036.72

2.39*
1.18

Predicted Outcome: Rate DLS
BDI-II – Time 1

LR χ2

3.45**
0.57

Note. The two covariates listed under the predicted outcome were included in the same
model (i.e., only two models were estimated). df = 4 for LR χ2. z = b/SE. IRR = incidence
rate ratio (i.e., the exponentiated unstandardized regression coefficient, eb). LR =
likelihood ratio. AIC = Akaike’s information criterion. BIC = Bayesian information
criterion. ILS = independent life stress. DLS = dependent life stress. BDI-II = Beck
Depression Inventory – II. IDD-L = Inventory to Diagnose Depression, Lifetime Version.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

21

Two participants were excluded from this analysis due to extreme responding on the SLEQ. One
participant reported 27 independent events and 88 dependent events and the other reported 33 dependent
events, which were both extreme response patterns relative to the values associated with the majority of
cases according to Cook’s D.
22
No demographic covariates were necessary in these analyses, since Time 1 IDD-L scores served as the
sole covariate for previous psychological distress. See Appendix L for further details.
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